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Abstract 
 
In response to uncertainty imposed on ITO business environments, it is reported that 
relational and structural embeddedness play an important role in safeguarding against 
opportunistic behaviour and improving long-term performance. A firm can outsource its 
IT services to a partner who is believed to be reliable and competent among existing 
parties for whom it has the outsourcing histories in the perspective of relational 
embeddedness. In contrast, from the viewpoint of structural embeddedness, a firm can 
collect information on multiple alternative candidates through the observation of their 
network linkages and the information transmission via third parties although it has no 
outsourcing histories for them. Also, based on this information, it can outsource its IT 
services to a new partner who could make better performance as well as who is 
considered reliable. However, the building and maintenance of new outsourcing 
relationships require resources which could be better used for the refinement of existing 
outsourcing relationships. Therefore, a firm faces the tension between the two types of 
embeddedness. 
 
Prior studies addressing relational and structural embeddedness in the context of ITO 
are mainly based on relational exchange theory and social capital theory respectively. 
They also provide a body of empirical evidence rooted in these theories. However, each 
ITO research stream on relational or structural embeddedness has mainly focused on its 
own advantages in response to uncertainty. That is, the conditional superiority of each 
type of embeddedness has not been investigated in ITO studies. Furthermore, although 
they have been compared in other research contexts, the main research focus has been 
on which is preferred at the high level of uncertainty rather than which leads to better 
performance according to the type and level of uncertainty. Therefore, this research 
aims at answering the following research question in the context of ITO: which of the 
two types of embeddedness is more appropriate in improving long-term performance in 
the presence of uncertainty of which the type and level are not uniform across a wide 
range of outsourced IT services? 
 
In particular, the following uncertainties from two different sources are introduced for 
the comparison between the two types of embeddedness: the uncertainty stemming from 
the unpredictability of technological requirements and the uncertainty originating in the 
difficulty in measuring performance. In this research, they are called “technological 
unpredictability” and “measurement difficulty” respectively. It is widely accepted that 
the two uncertainties discovered from transaction cost theory and agency theory 
increase the possibility of opportunism and threaten performance. Therefore, the 
different levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty can create 
an ideal platform to investigate the conditional superiority of relational or structural 
embeddedness. 
 
In order to address the research question, an ITO network is simulated. Firms in this 
network perform the role of a coordinator or a partner in establishing ITO consortia to 
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respond to outsourcing opportunities with the different levels of the two uncertainties. 
As coordinators, firms take the partner selection and control strategy based on relational 
or structural embeddedness, which is called “the relational strategy” or “the structural 
strategy” in this research. They also compete with each other to maximise their long-
term profits. As partners, firms behave cooperatively or opportunistically. Their 
decision-makings and payoffs are modelled through a game-theoretic method. In 
addition, a full factorial design of experiments is applied for efficient simulation 
experiments and systematic analyses. 
 
Consequently, the simulation results show that the superiority of each type of 
embeddedness is different according the type and level of uncertainty. The research on 
relational embeddedness emphasises the advantage of trust and commitment generated 
by the repetition or long-term maintenance of outsourcing relationships with reliable 
partners as shown in the literature on long-term cooperative ITO relationships. The 
findings in this research support this argument when measurement difficulty is at the 
high level and technological unpredictability is at the low level. On the other hand, the 
study on structural embeddedness focuses on the use of (potential) partners’ network 
positions and information transmitters as revealed in the literature on network-based 
ITO relationships. The simulation results support this claim when technological 
unpredictability is at the high level regardless of the level of measurement difficulty. 
Especially, at the high levels of both uncertainties, structural embeddedness enables 
better performance. 
 
This research contributes to the literature in three research areas: (1) IT outsourcing, (2) 
network dynamics and (3) environmental adaptation. Firstly, this research examines the 
conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness at the different levels of 
technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty. Therefore, the findings 
resolve the tension between the two types of embeddedness in ITO studies. Especially, 
this resolution can provide possible theoretical answers to why an ITO partnership 
based on relational embeddedness fails in spite of its popularity in the industry and 
academia, and in which condition structural embeddedness is preferred in ITO business 
environments. Secondly, the simulation results reveal that some coordinators preferring 
relational embeddedness consolidate their existing network ties while others favouring 
structural embeddedness increase the number of network ties. Therefore, this research 
improves an understanding of how the strength and structure of network ties at the 
egocentric level can be changed by the type and level of uncertainty. Thirdly, the 
relational and structural strategy in this research focus on the utilisation of present 
partners and the search for alternative partners respectively. Therefore, the concepts 
underlying the two types of embeddedness are in line with those underlying exploitation 
and exploration. The examination on the relative advantage of each type of 
embeddedness can extend the general argument that more resources should be invested 
in exploration than in exploitation to adapt to uncertain business settings. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research. Firstly, the research background is 
described. In sequence, the research gap and question are identified. Then, based on 
these, the research aim and objectives are suggested along with the research scope. Next, 
the research approach and methods are explained which are appropriate to address the 
research question. Finally, this chapter concludes with the contributions and thesis 
structure. 
 
1.2 Research Background  
 
Opportunistic behaviour causes undesirable outcomes including cost escalation and 
service debasement in information technology outsourcing (ITO) (Aubert et al., 1998). 
The prevention of this behaviour is, therefore, one of the critical research topics for the 
improvement of ITO performance. This issue is also gaining its importance as the 
research focus of ITO has shifted from “why and what” to “how and outcomes” 
(Dibbern et al., 2004). Furthermore, “relationship characteristics” has been deeply 
investigated during recent decades (Lacity et al., 2010).  
 
It is commonly recognised that formal mechanisms such as a competitive tender and 
formal contract are fundamental to select a suitable partner and control its behaviour in 
ITO business environments (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). A 
client can choose an appropriate vendor by designing elaborate tender procedures which 
can reveal hidden information on bidders. A competitive tender generally includes the 
following procedures in the context of ITO: request-for-information, site visits, request-
for-proposal and negotiation (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2004). Through these procedures, a 
firm attempts to identify a partner who is suitable for meeting needs as well as who is 
reliable. In the meantime, a client can manage a provider’s behaviour by developing 
more complex and customised contract clauses which clearly stipulate obligations and 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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responsibilities. The empirical study of Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) shows how an ITO 
formal contract is structuralised. The authors propose that it usually includes four major 
provisions: monitoring, dispute resolution, property rights protection and contingency 
planning. It is especially suggested that strict monitoring and thorough contingency 
planning can prevent cost escalation and service debasement caused by opportunistic 
behaviour.  
 
However, several critical risks imposed on ITO business environments tend to attenuate 
the functions of formal mechanisms (Balaji and Brown, 2010; Lee and Kim, 1999). In 
response, it is reported that relational and structural embeddedness play an important 
role in preventing opportunism and enhancing long-term performance in the context of 
ITO (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ravindran et al., 2009). Relational embeddedness is 
defined as “the kind of personal relationships people have developed with each other 
through a history of interactions” while structural embeddedness “the impersonal 
configuration of linkages between people or units” respectively (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998, p.244). 
 
A firm can outsource its IT services to a partner who is believed to be reliable and 
competent among existing parties for whom it has the outsourcing histories in the 
perspective of relational embeddedness. Alternatively, from the viewpoint of structural 
embeddedness, a firm can collect information on multiple alternative candidates through 
the observation of their network linkages and the information transmission via third 
parties although it has no outsourcing histories for them. Also, based on this information, 
it can outsource its IT services to a new partner who could make better performance as 
well as who is considered trustworthy. However, the building and maintenance of new 
outsourcing relationships require resources which could be better used for improving 
outcomes through the refinement of existing outsourcing relationships. As a result, a 
firm face the tension between relational and structural embeddedness.  
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1.3 Research Gap and Question 
 
Prior studies addressing relational and structural embeddedness in ITO business 
environments are mainly based on relational exchange theory and social capital theory 
respectively. They also provide a body of empirical evidence rooted in these theoretical 
backgrounds.  
 
Relational exchange theory supports the research on long-term cooperative outsourcing 
relationships based on relational embeddedness. Trust and commitment are manifested 
and developed in the process of the repetition or long-term maintenance of an 
outsourcing relationship between specific parties in the perspective of relational 
exchange (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). These relational factors can serve as effective 
ways to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour (Brown et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1996). 
Furthermore, a client can reduce the considerable transaction costs involved in finding 
and managing a new vendor by repeating or sustaining its current outsourcing 
relationship (Goo et al., 2007; Gopal et al., 2003). Therefore, a firm can improve its 
outcomes with a relationally embedded outsourcing partner. Rooted in these theoretical 
backgrounds, many empirical studies have been conducted on the advantages of long-
term cooperative outsourcing relationships (Balaji and Brown, 2010; Flemming and 
Low, 2007; Henderson, 1990; Kim et al., 2003; Kim and Chung, 2003; Lee and Kim, 
1999; 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
 
Social capital theory provides the theoretical foundations of studies on network-based 
outsourcing relationships rooted in structural embeddedness. A network is a source of 
information on past exchanges and acts as a “prism” through which this information is 
provided for third parties (Podolny, 2001). Therefore, a firm can gain information on the 
reliability and competence of multiple alternative candidates through the observation of 
their network linkages to connote this information and the transmission of this 
information via third parties (Gulati, 1995; Ravindran et al., 2009). Then, it can enhance 
performance by selecting an outsourcing partner who is considered more suitable for a 
given business opportunity because diverse experts could provide more potential profits 
than fixed partners (Kandori, 1992). Furthermore, the selected partner would refrain 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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from behaving opportunistically to prevent the loss of its reputation (Ravindran et al., 
2009). These theoretical backgrounds are reflected in a few empirical studies on the 
benefits of network-based outsourcing relationships (Drath and Wayman, 2010; Heng et 
al., 2009; Ravindran et al., 2009).  
 
However, each ITO research stream on relational or structural embeddedness has 
mainly focused on its own advantages in response to several critical risks as revealed in 
the literature on long-term cooperative ITO relationships (Balaji and Brown, 2010; 
Flemming and Low, 2007; Goo et al., 2007; Lee and Kim, 2005) or on network-based 
ITO relationships (Drath and Wayman, 2010; Ravindran et al., 2009). That is, the 
conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness has not been investigated in ITO 
business environments. In the theoretical perspective, this one-sided emphasis may lead 
to the puzzling conclusion that both types of embeddedness could be universally 
optimal for any given risk. From the practical viewpoint, an improper prescription 
derived from this confusing conclusion may be given to a firm facing the tension 
between relational and structural embeddedness. Furthermore, although the two types of 
embeddedness have been compared in other research contexts (Beckman et al., 2004; 
DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Gulati, 1995), the main research focus has been on which 
is preferred at the high level of risk rather than which leads better performance 
according to the type and level of risk.  
 
Based on this reasoning, this research attempts to answer the following specific question 
in the context of ITO.  
 
 Which of the two types of embeddedness is more appropriate in improving long-
term performance in the presence of risk imposed on ITO business 
environments? 
 
In particular, the following uncertainties from two different sources are introduced as 
criteria to compare relational and structural embeddedness: the uncertainty originating 
in the unpredictability of technological requirements and the uncertainty stemming from 
the difficulty in measuring performance. They are respectively called “technological 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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unpredictability” and “measurement difficulty” in this study. It is widely accepted that 
the two uncertainties discovered from transaction cost theory and agency theory tend to 
increase the possibility of opportunism and threaten long-term performance in ITO 
business environments (Aubert et al., 1999; Bahli and Rivard, 2003). Therefore, the 
different levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty can create 
an ideal environment for investigating the conditional superiority of relational or 
structural embeddedness.  
  
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
This research aims to reveal the relative advantage of each type of embeddedness in 
enhancing long-term performance in the presence of technological unpredictability and 
measurement difficulty imposed on ITO business environments. In order to achieve this 
aim, an ITO network is simulated. Firms in this network perform the role of a 
coordinator or a partner in establishing ITO consortia in response to outsourcing 
opportunities with the different levels of the two uncertainties. As coordinators, firms 
take the partner selection and control strategy based on relational or structural 
embeddedness, which is called “the relational strategy” or “the structural strategy” in 
this research. They also compete with each other to maximise their long-term profits. As 
partners, firms behave cooperatively or opportunistically. Their decision-makings and 
profits are modelled through a game-theoretic method. Furthermore, a full factorial 
design of experiments is used for efficient simulation tests and systematic analyses.  
 
Accordingly, the research objectives are as follows. 
 
 To review uncertainty which can increase the possibility of opportunism and 
threaten long-term performance 
 
 To investigate the roles of relational or structural embeddedness 
 
 To develop a simulation model for the examination of which of the two types of 
embeddedness operates more successfully  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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 To conduct simulation tests applying a full factorial design of experiments 
 
 To suggest theoretical and practical implications based on simulation results 
 
1.5 Research Scope 
 
In this research, the ITO market is viewed as a network where firms build consortia in 
response to outsourcing opportunities with the different levels of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty. Then, this ITO network is simulated for 
the comparison between relational and structural embeddedness based on several 
theories which are widely applied to organisational studies. Firstly, the two uncertainties 
are discovered from transaction cost theory and agency theory. Secondly, the relational 
or structural strategy taken by coordinators is on the theoretical basis of relational 
exchange theory or social capital theory. Also, partners’ opportunistic behaviour (i.e. 
adverse selection and moral hazard) is supported by agency theory. Finally, game theory 
provides the theoretical foundations for firms’ decision-makings and long-term profits. 
As a result, the theoretical research scope includes the exploration of these theories. In 
addition, based on the theoretical grounds, this research investigates optimal strategies 
in the presence of the two uncertainties imposed on ITO business environments. The 
practical research range contains the provision of a guideline for firms who agonise over 
the tension between relational and structural embeddedness in an ITO network due to 
the scarcity of resources.   
 
1.6 Research Approach and Methods 
 
The comprehensive literature review of Dibbern et al. (2004) illustrates several research 
approaches which are frequently used in ITO studies. In this review, approaches are 
distinguished from methods as follows: “approaches are a generic or overarching way of 
going about research, while methods are more narrowly focused techniques and 
procedures for conducting research” (p.20). The authors also classify research 
approaches according to the application of empirical methods, the epistemological 
foundations and the application of mathematical methods as shown in Figure 1-1.  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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1Figure 1-1 Classification of Approaches in ITO Studies 
 
 
(Source: Dibbern et al., 2004) 
 
In particular, the authors suggest that a mathematical approach based on a set of strict 
assumptions is appropriate to investigate the minimisation of costs or the maximisation 
of profits through the so-called “ceteris paribus restrictions” indicating that key 
parameters are varied while others are fixed. Moreover, it is proposed that this approach 
is naturally related to positivism in terms of epistemology. 
 
The simulation approach used in this study is close to a mathematical approach. The 
decision-makings and long-term profits of firms in an ITO network are mathematically 
modelled through a game-theoretic method. Furthermore, the levels of the two 
uncertainties are varied while the values of the other parameters are fixed in full 
factorial simulation experiments. However, the two types of embeddedness are 
compared through numerical data generated from simulation tests rather than through 
mathematical derivations. In this sense, the simulation approach composed of a game-
theoretic method and a full factorial design of experiments is not purely mathematical. 
                                                          
1 The original classification proposed in the literature review of Dibbern et al. (2004) does not include the 
dimension of a simulation approach because there is no study applying this approach among the papers 
reviewed by the authors. 
Application of 
Empirical Method 
Empirical approach 
Analytical approach 
Epistemological 
Foundations 
Positivistic approach 
Descriptive approach 
Interpretive approach 
Positivistic approach 
Application of 
Mathematical Method 
Conceptual approach 
Mathematical approach 
Simulation approach 
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The dimension of a simulation approach, therefore, needs to be added to the original 
classification proposed in the literature review of Dibbern et al. (2004). In the meantime, 
the research approach (i.e. “a generic or overarching way of going about research”) 
applied to this research follows “the roadmap for developing theory with simulations” 
proposed by Davis et al. (2007). Its details are described in Section 4.2 Research 
Approach. 
 
A simulation approach is useful for dealing with the research question in this study 
because it can appropriately demonstrate the behaviour of actors who compose a 
network and affect one another through their interactions, and the performance which is 
the consequence of their behaviour (Harrison et al., 2007). In addition, this approach is 
especially proper in case of challenging to obtain sufficient empirical data at the 
different levels of the two uncertainties in the long term (Davis et al., 2007). Therefore, 
a simulation approach can be an effective substitute for an empirical approach in this 
research. In the meantime, the discussions of a simulation approach in management 
studies propose that this approach has both deductive and inductive characteristics 
(Harrison et al., 2007). The process of deriving a simulation model from existing 
theories and assumptions is deductive. On the other hand, the process of eliciting new 
findings from simulation experiments and establishing new theories is inductive.   
 
A game-theoretic method is widely adopted in organisational studies. The game models 
developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Kandori (1992) are especially suitable for 
this research. The former illustrates decision-makings and payoffs in repeated 
transactions between a specific employer and employee. However, particular 
outsourcing parties may not iteratively transact with each other for each business 
opportunity in the context of ITO (Ravindran et al., 2009). The latter relieves the 
condition of the repeatedness by showing the substitutable effects of the observation of 
labels, the collection of information via third parties and the sharing of social norms. 
Therefore, a modified game model based on a mixture of the two studies can 
analytically reveal the decision-makings and outcomes of firms in an ITO network 
where repeated or non-repeated interactions occur. 
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A full factorial design of experiments is applied for efficient experiments and systematic 
analyses. An experimental design has two or more factors and each of them has discrete 
possible values, which are called levels. The combinations of levels are also called 
experimental points. Then, the tests at all of the possible experimental points are 
conducted in a full factorial design of experiments. In this research, there are two key 
factors involved in uncertainty imposed on ITO business environments: technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty. Each factor has two levels: high and low.  
 
1.7 Contributions 
 
This research contributes to the literature in three research areas: (1) IT outsourcing, (2) 
network dynamics and (3) environmental adaptation.  
 
Firstly, as shown in the literature on long-term cooperative outsourcing relationships 
(Balaji and Brown, 2010; Flemming and Low, 2007; Goo et al., 2007; Lee and Kim, 
2005) or on network-based outsourcing relationships (Drath and Wayman, 2010; 
Ravindran et al., 2009), each ITO research stream on relational or structural 
embeddedness has mainly focused on its own advantages in response to uncertainty. 
Furthermore, although there are several prior studies comparing the two types of 
embeddedness in other research contexts (Beckman et al., 2004; DiMaggio and Louch, 
1998; Gulati, 1995), they mainly emphasise which is preferred at the high level of 
uncertainty rather than which leads to better performance according to the type and 
level of uncertainty. This research intends to examine which of the two types of 
embeddedness leads to better performance at the different levels of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty. The findings, therefore, resolve the tension 
between the two types of embeddedness in the presence of the two uncertainties which 
are considered critical in ITO studies. Especially, this resolution can provide possible 
theoretical answers to why an ITO partnership based on relational embeddedness fails in 
spite of its popularity in the industry and academia, and in which condition structural 
embeddedness is preferred in ITO business environments.  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
12 
 
Secondly, a network is viewed as antecedents or consequences in various research 
settings (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). A body of research especially at the egocentric 
level has investigated the effects of an actor’s network position on its performance in 
the perspective of antecedents. For example, much attention has been paid to the 
correlations between network positions and a variety of significant outcomes such as 
“power, leadership, mobility, employment, individual performance, individual creativity, 
entrepreneurship and team performance” (Borgatti and Foster, 2003, p.993). On the 
other hand, it has been studied why and how network ties are consolidated or generated 
from the viewpoint of consequences. For instance, the strength of network ties is 
reinforced in the presence of the uncertainty regarding service and product quality or 
partners’ performance because organisations or individuals tend to select their existing 
partners to suppress the uncertainty (DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Kraatz, 1998; Podolny, 
1994). In addition to the literature in the research area of network dynamics, this study 
attempts to illustrate how the strength and structure of network ties at the egocentric 
level can be changed by the different levels of technological unpredictability and 
measurement difficulty. 
  
Thirdly, the relational and structural strategy in this research emphasise the utilisation of 
present partners and the search for alternative partners respectively. Therefore, the ideas 
underlying the two strategies are in line with those underlying exploitation and 
exploration. It is generally argued that more resources should be invested in exploration 
than in exploitation in uncertain business settings (Lant et al., 1992). This research tries 
to extend this common claim by examining the conditional superiority of each type of 
embeddedness according to the type and level of uncertainty. 
 
Finally, this research intends to provide a guideline for ITO managers who agonise over 
the choice between existing partners who are strongly connected and reputational 
partners who occupy prominent network positions. 
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1.8 Thesis Structure 
 
This research includes the following seven chapters along with references and 
appendices. 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of this research. 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Chapter 2 reviews a body of existing literature related to this research and discusses 
their limitations. First, several literature review papers on ITO studies are introduced. 
The next section focuses on opportunistic behaviour and risks in the research area of 
ITO based on transaction cost theory and agency theory. In the following section, the 
research on relational and structural embeddedness is explored on the theoretical basis 
of relational exchange theory and social capital theory. The fifth section mainly reviews 
the empirical literature on long-term cooperative outsourcing relationships based on 
relational embeddedness and on network-based outsourcing relationships rooted in 
structural embeddedness. Finally, the limitations of prior studies are discussed, and the 
research gap and question are more clearly understood.  
 
Chapter 3 Research Approach and Methods 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the approach and methods applied to the research. The simulation 
approach including a game-theoretic method and a full factorial design of experiments 
is explained. 
 
Chapter 4 Simulation Model 
 
In Chapter 4, a simulation model is developed which includes the following elements. 
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 ITO opportunities with the different levels of technological unpredictability and 
measurement difficulty 
 
 Relational strategy vs. structural strategy 
 
 Opportunistic behaviour vs. cooperative behaviour  
 
 Decision-makings and payoffs 
 
 Information updating and transferring through network ties 
 
Chapter 5 Simulation Experiments and Results 
 
Chapter 5 describes simulation experiments and analyses simulation results. The 
following two-step tests are conducted: the basic test on the selected experimental point 
and the complete tests on all the experimental points. First, the basic test verifies the 
developed simulation model by examining the consistency between its results and the 
related existing studies. Next, the complete tests are implemented to examine the 
conditional superiority of relational or structural embeddedness at the different levels of 
technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty.  
 
Chapter 6: Discussions 
 
In Chapter 6, the conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness is discussed in 
accordance with the results of the complete tests. This chapter also discusses the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the results. The limitations of the research are also discussed. 
Finally, several future research directions are proposed. 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
15 
 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The research question is which of the two types of embeddedness is more appropriate in 
improving long-term performance according to the type and level of uncertainty 
imposed on ITO business environments? In order to answer this question, Chapter 2 
reviews a body of literature related with this question.  
 
Chapter 2 involves the following sections: Literature Review Papers on ITO Studies, 
Opportunistic Behaviour and Risks in ITO, Relational and Structural Embeddedness, 
and Roles of Two Types of Embeddedness in ITO. This chapter begins by introducing 
several literature review papers on ITO studies, which help to comprehensively 
understand ITO research streams. The next section reviews opportunistic behaviour and 
risks in the context of ITO on the theoretical basis of transaction cost theory and agency 
theory. This review provides knowledge to interpret why risks can increase the 
possibility of opportunism and how they can threaten outcomes in ITO business 
environments. In the following section, the literature on relational and structural 
embeddedness is explored based on relational exchange theory and social capital theory. 
This review illustrates the roles of the two types of embeddedness in suppressing 
uncertainty which can enhance the likelihood of opportunism and hamper the 
improvement of long-term performance. The fifth section mainly reviews the empirical 
research on long-term cooperative ITO relationships based on relational embeddedness 
and network-based ITO relationships rooted in structural embeddedness. Finally, based 
on the above reviews, this chapter discusses the limitations of prior studies. Also, the 
research gap and question are more clearly understood.  
 
2.2 Literature Review Papers on ITO Studies 
 
Since Kodak’s historic decision to outsource its information systems to IBM, DEC and 
Business Land, an enormous and diverse body of research has been theoretically and 
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empirically conducted in the research area of ITO (Dibbern et al., 2004). Accordingly, 
several classification frameworks with multi-dimensions are provided to systematically 
organise existing studies and to clearly show future research directions. This section 
introduces the following literature review papers with a focus on the dimension related 
to ITO research topics.  
 
Table 2-1 Classification Dimensions 
Authors Classification Dimensions 
Dibbern et al. (2004)   ITO stages 
- Why, What, Which, How and Outcomes 
 Research approaches 
- Empirical and Analytical approaches 
 Reference theories 
- Strategic, Economic and Social/organisational theories 
 Analysis levels 
- Macro and Micro levels 
Fjermestad and Saitta  
(2005)   
 Components for ITO success 
- Alignment to business strategy, Contracts, Infrastructure and technology, 
Culture, Strategic partnership, Management support,  
Governance committees, Economics 
Gonzalez et al. (2006) 
 
 Research methodologies 
- Theoretical and Empirical methodologies 
 Topics 
- Client, Provider, Relationship, Economic theory perspective 
 Scopes 
- General IS, S/W development, Applications and E-commerce 
Lacity et al. (2010)  Effects on ITO decisions 
- Motivations to outsource, Transaction attributes,  
Client firm characteristics, Influence source 
 Effects on ITO outcomes 
- Transaction attributes, Client firm characteristics,  
Client firm capabilities, Contractual governance,  
Relationship characteristics, ITO decision, Decision characteristics 
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2.2.1 ITO Stage Model  
 
The comprehensive literature review of Dibbern et al. (2004) includes definitions, 
concepts, modes, stages, theoretical foundations, approaches and literature analyses. 
The main dimension applied for the categorisation of existing studies is based on the 
ITO stage model in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 Stage Model of Information Systems Outsourcing  
 
 
 (Source: Dibbern et al., 2004) 
 
An ITO process is classified into five stages: why, what, which, how and outcomes. The 
applications of each stage represent research topics. Especially, the authors propose that 
“how” is closely related to “outcomes” and deconstruct its applications as follows.  
 
 Vendor selection: vendor types, selection criteria, selection procedures 
How 
Outcome 
Phase 2 
Implementation 
Process 
 Vendor selection 
 Relationship building 
 Relationship management 
 Experience / Learning 
 Type of success 
 Determinants of success 
Why 
What 
Which 
Phase 1 
Decision 
Process 
 Determinants 
 Advantages/Disadvantages 
Outsourcing Alternatives 
 Degree of ownership 
 Degree of outsourcing 
Guidelines, Procedures and 
stakeholders of decision initiation, 
evaluation and making 
Outsourcing 
Stages 
Application of 
Outsourcing Stages 
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 Relationship building: attributes and determinants of relationships 
 
 Relationship management: management techniques and procedures   
 
Furthermore, it is emphasised that the research focus of ITO has shifted from “why and 
what” to “how and outcomes”.  
 
2.2.2 Strategic Management Framework of ITO 
 
The research of Fjermestad and Saitta (2005) proposes the strategic management 
framework which integrates several critical components for ITO success as shown in 
Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2 Strategic Management Framework of ITO 
 
 
 
(Source: Fjermestad and Saitta, 2005) 
 
ITO studies are categorised based on these significant components which represent 
research topics. This framework provides ITO managers with an integrated insight into 
the successful management of ITO. However, the authors suggest that each component 
could be implemented in varying degrees in accordance with complex and dynamic 
business settings, which can be addressed in future empirical studies.   
Culture 
Align to 
business 
strategy 
Infra- 
structure 
Strategic  
partners Govern 
Management 
support Contracts 
Economics: 
Cost &  
Quality 
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2.2.3 Classification Dimension for Research Topics 
 
The literature review of Gonzalez et al. (2006) involves the following multi-dimensions 
for the classification of ITO studies: research methodologies, topics, scopes, authors and 
countries. Especially, Figure 2-3 shows the classification dimensions in terms of 
research topics. 
 
Figure 2-3 Classification Dimension for Research Topics 
 
 
 
(Source: Gonzalez et al., 2006) 
Research topics 
in ITO 
Client 
perspective 
Provider 
perspective 
Relationship 
perspective 
Others 
Economic theory  
perspective 
Success factors 
Reasons 
Decision-makings 
General view: occurrence, 
evolution and growth of ITO 
on demand side 
Application service providing
Global outsourcing 
General view: occurrence, 
evolution and growth of ITO 
on supply side 
Contract 
Assessment 
Client-provider relationship
Agency theory 
Transaction cost theory
Other theories: Game theory,  
Resource-based theory,  
Resource-dependence theory 
Nationality 
Industry 
IS staff 
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Existing ITO studies are classified according to the above research topics and the 
following publication periods: until 1995, 1996 ~ 2000 and since 2001. This 
categorisation shows that since 2001, increasing attention has been paid to “global 
outsourcing” and “client-provider relationships”. In particular, the growing amount of 
literature on “client-provider relationships” is also found in the literature analysis of 
Dibbern et al. (2004) indicating that the ITO research focus has shifted to “how”.    
 
2.2.4 Descriptive Models of Findings on ITO Decisions and Outcomes 
 
The recent literature review of Lacity et al. (2010) on empirical ITO studies identifies 
various kinds of independent and dependent variables which are frequently examined 
and are statistically significant. The identified independent and dependent variables are 
classified into thirteen and two categories respectively through several rigorous 
classification procedures. Table 2-2 is derived from the descriptive model of findings 
proposed in this review paper. It shows a wide range of ITO research topics. Especially, 
the authors indicate that the broad category of “relationship characteristics” has been 
frequently investigated during the past two decades. 
 
Table 2-2 Independent and Dependent Variables in Empirical ITO Studies  
Broad Categories of 
Independent Variables 
Frequently Examined & Statistically Significant 
Independent Variables  
Dependent 
Variables 
Motivation to outsource Cost reduction, Focus on core capabilities, 
Access to skills/expertise,  
Business/process improvements, Technical reasons, 
Political reasons, Concern for security,  
Fear of losing control 
ITO Decisions 
Transaction attributes Uncertainty, Critical role of IS transaction, 
Transaction costs, Business risk 
Client firm characteristics Prior IS department performance 
Influence sources Mimetic 
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Table 2-2 Continued 
Broad Categories of 
Independent Variables 
Frequently Examined & Statistically Significant 
Independent Variables  
Dependent 
Variables 
Transaction attributes Uncertainty, Measurement difficulty ITO Outcomes 
Client firm characteristics Client experience with outsourcing 
Client firm capabilities Supplier management capability,  
Contract negotiation capability,  
IS technical and methodological capability, 
Cultural distance management capability, 
Risk management capability 
Supplier firm capabilities IS human resource management capability,  
IS technical and methodological capability, 
Domain understanding 
Contractual governance Contract detail, Contract size, Contract type, 
Control mechanisms 
Relationship characteristics Effective knowledge sharing, Trust, 
Communication, Partnership view, 
Prior client/supplier working relationship, 
Relationship quality, Cultural distance 
ITO decision Outsourcing decision 
Decision characteristics Top management commitment/support, 
Evaluation process 
(Source: Lacity et al., 2010)  
 
2.2.5 Current ITO Research Trends 
 
The investigation into these literature review papers with a focus on research topics 
provides a better understanding of the current research trends and issues in the context 
of ITO. The initial discussions on whether to outsource and what to outsource have 
evolved into the recent debates on how to outsource and how to measure and increase 
outcomes. Also, multidisciplinary theories from economic, strategic and relational 
views are applied to explain complex and dynamic interactions between ITO parties. 
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Especially, the volume of literature based on relational views has increased over recent 
decades in accordance with the current research trend with a focus on how to initiate 
and maintain ITO relationships.  
 
2.3 Opportunistic Behaviour and Risks in ITO 
 
This section reviews opportunistic behaviour and risks on the theoretical basis of 
transaction cost theory and agency theory. They have been deeply investigated in the 
context of ITO because they tend to hamper the formation of cooperative outsourcing 
relationships and decrease their efficiency (Aubert et al., 1998).  
 
2.3.1 Opportunistic Behaviour 
 
In transaction cost theory, opportunistic behaviour is generally defined as “self-interest 
seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975, p.6), which is supplemented with the following 
examples: “lying, stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, p.47). Based on these fundamental 
definition and examples, a body of literature has attempted to conceptualise and 
measure this behaviour. For instance, opportunistic behaviour is classified into four 
forms in selling environments: “misrepresenting information, activities or efforts, 
distorting results, misrepresenting intentions and misrepresenting selling costs” 
(Anderson, 1988, p.248). Several examples of self-interest seeking with guile are also 
provided in retail business settings: “taking shortcuts, breaking promises, masking 
inadequate or poor quality work and generally being dishonest in order to gain an 
advantage” (Provan and Skinner, 1989, p.203). Also, the recent study of Liu et al. (2010) 
measures a buyer’s opportunistic behaviour with five items in a buyer-supplier 
relationship: a buyer “takes advantage of holes in contracts, breaches informal 
agreements, breaks promises, uses unexpected events to extract concessions, and lies to 
maximize its own benefits” (p.848). In the research area of ITO, three types of 
opportunistic behaviour are proposed: “withholding or distorting of information, failing 
to fulfil promises and delivery of substandard products and services” (Goo et al., 2007, 
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p.2113). The research of Wathne and Heide (2000), however, points out that there is a 
paucity of literature on a systematic conceptualisation of opportunistic behaviour. 
Presenting a wide range of examples in the real world, the authors classify this 
behaviour into four forms such as evasion, refusal to adapt, violation and forced 
renegotiation in accordance with “how active or passive opportunism manifest 
themselves under existing or new circumstances” (p.41) as shown in Figure 2-5.  
 
Figure 2-4 Forms of Opportunism 
  
   
Circumstances 
Existing New 
Behaviour 
Passive Evasion Refusal to adapt 
Active Violation Forced renegotiation 
   Oh 
(Source: Wathne and Heide, 2000)  
 
This theory also predicts that opportunistic behaviour is likely to occur when the 
routinisation of transactions to overcome bounded rationality and market uncertainty 
causes the problems of asset specificity and small-number conditions (Provan, 1993). 
 
Agency theory suggests two types of opportunistic behaviour: adverse selection and 
moral hazard, which are respectively defined as “the mispresentation of ability by the 
agent” and “the lack of effort on the part of the agent” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.61). This 
theory also predicts that each type of opportunistic behaviour is caused due to 
information asymmetry derived from the fact that the principal cannot observe the 
characteristic or behaviour of the agent (Aubert et al., 1998). The following description 
simply and explicitly explains why the two types of this behaviour occur (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p.61).  
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“... the agent may simply not put forth the agreed-upon effort. ... For 
example, moral hazard occurs when a research scientist works on a 
personal research project on company time, but the research is so 
complex that corporate management cannot detect what the scientist is 
actually doing. ... the agent may claim to have certain skills or abilities 
when he or she is hired. Adverse selection arises because the principal 
cannot completely verify these skills or abilities either at the time of 
hiring or while the agent is working. For example, adverse selection 
occurs when a research scientist claims to have experience in a scientific 
specialty and the employer cannot judge whether this is the case.” 
 
The empirical research on opportunistic behaviour has been deeply conducted in various 
research settings. Table 2-3 shows the statistical test results on this behaviour which is 
viewed as an independent variable (i.e. what are the outcomes caused by opportunistic 
behaviour?) and a dependent variable (i.e. what are the determinants of the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour?). In this table, A(+)B or A(−)B indicates that A has a positive 
or negative effect on B. Also, A*B(+)C or A*B(−)C means that A’s effect on C is 
positively or negatively moderated by B. 
 
Table 2-3 Empirical Studies on Opportunistic Behaviour 
Author 
Industry 
/ Relationship 
Constructs / Empirical Test Results 
John (1984) Oil /  
Retail dealer (RD) & 
Supplier (S) 
 
 
 Constructs 
- Bureaucratic structure (A) 
- Coercive influence attributions (B) 
- Reward influence attributions (C) 
- Attitudinal orientation (D) 
- RD’s Opportunism (E) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: C(+)E, D(−)E,  
- Rejected: A(+)E, B(+)E  
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Table 2-3 Continued 
Author 
Industry 
/ Relationship 
Constructs / Empirical Test Results 
Anderson 
(1988) 
 
Electronic components / 
Sales people (SP) & 
Sales manager (SM) 
 
 Constructs 
- SP’s transaction-specific assets (A) 
- Integration (B) 
- Difficulty of evaluation (C) 
- Goal congruence (D) 
- SP’s Opportunism (E) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(+)E, B(−)E, C(+)E, D(−)E 
Provan & 
Skinner (1989) 
Farm equipment /  
Retail dealer (RD) & 
Supplier (S) 
 Constructs 
- RD’s dependence on S (A) 
- S’s control over RD’s decisions (B) 
- RD’s Opportunism (C) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(−)C, B(+)C 
Mohr & Sohi 
(1995) 
Computer / 
Retail dealer (RD) & 
Manufacturer (M) 
 Constructs 
- Communication formality (A) 
- RD’s Opportunism (B) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(−)B 
Joshi & Arnold 
(1997) 
Microchip /  
Buyer (BU) &  
Supplier (S) 
 
 Constructs 
- BU’s Dependence on S (A) 
- Relational norm (B) 
- BU’s Opportunism (C) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A*B(−)C 
Lee (1998) International alliance /  
Exporter (EX) & 
Importer (IM) 
 
 Constructs 
- EX’s decision-making uncertainty (A) 
- EX’s opportunism (B) 
- Relational strength (C) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(+)B, B(−)C 
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Table 2-3 Continued 
Author 
Industry 
/ Relationship 
Constructs / Empirical Test Results 
Dahlstrom &  
Nygaard (1999) 
Oil / 
Franchisor (FO) & 
Franchisee (FE)  
 
 Constructs 
- Interfirm cooperation (A) 
- Formalisation (B) 
- FO’s Opportunism (C) 
- FE’s Bargaining costs (D) 
- FE’s Monitoring costs (E) 
- FE’s Maladaption costs (F) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(−)C, B(−)C, C(+)D, C(+)E, C(+)F 
Brown et al.  
(2000) 
Hotel / 
Hotel (H) & 
Brand headquarter (BH)  
 Constructs 
- BH’s ownership (A) 
- H’s investment in transaction-specific assets (B) 
- H’s Perception level of relational exchange (C) 
- H’s Opportunism (D) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: B(−)D, C(−)D, B*C(−)D 
- Rejected: A(−)D, A*C(−)D 
Rokkan &  
Buvik (2003) 
Voluntary retail / 
Retailer (R) &  
Retail headquarter (RH) 
 Constructs 
- Group size (A) 
- Goal conflict (B) 
- RH’s Monitoring (C) 
- R’s opportunism (D) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(+)D, B(+)D, C(−)D 
Rokkan et al.  
(2003) 
Building material /  
Manufacturer (M) & 
Distributer (DI) 
 
 Constructs 
- DI’s specific investment (A) 
- Extendedness (B) 
- Solidarity (C) 
- M’s Opportunism (D) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A*B(−)D, A*C(−)D 
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Table 2-3 Continued 
Author 
Industry 
/ Relationship 
Constructs / Empirical Test Results 
Goo et al.  
(2007) 
IT outsourcing /  
Vendor (VE) & 
Client (CL) 
 
 Constructs 
- VE’s opportunism (A) 
- Relationship duration (B) 
 Empirical test results 
- Rejected: A(−)B 
Liu et al. (2010) Household appliances / 
Buyer (BU) &  
Supplier (S) 
 Constructs 
- S’s calculative commitment (A)  
- S’s loyalty commitment (B) 
- Competitiveness (C) 
- Environmental uncertainty (D) 
- BU’s Opportunism (E) 
 Empirical test results 
- Supported: A(+)E, B(−)E, C(+)E, D(+)E 
Legend 
 A(+)B: A has a positive effect on B 
 A(−)B: A has a negative effect on B 
 A*B(+)C: A’s effect on C is positively moderated by B 
 A*B(−)C: A’s effect on C is negatively moderated by B 
 
The review of empirical literature on opportunistic behaviour provides several findings 
on its nature. Initially, the research viewing self-interest seeking with guile as an 
independent variable proposes that opportunistic behaviour causes the inefficiency of 
transaction relationships and hampers their maturity. Secondly, as a dependent variable, 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviour is increased by transaction risks and formal 
governance. On the other hand, its possibility is decreased by formal and informal 
governance. The third finding is derived from that of the second. That is, there is 
inconsistency in the effects of formal governance on opportunistic behaviour. This 
governance can safeguard against self-interest seeking with guile. However, its 
strictness may act as a signal of distrust, which can increase the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003). A clear example is found in the 
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process of designing and enforcing a rigorous formal contract (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
When a formal contract includes more complex and customised clauses and the 
implementation of them is strictly monitored, exchange parties tend to behave 
opportunistically in response to what cannot be specified and monitored (Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1998). Fourthly, the effects of transaction risks on opportunistic behaviour 
are moderated by informal governance. These empirical findings on the characteristics 
of opportunistic behaviour in various research settings are graphically summarised in 
Figure 2-5.  
 
Figure 2-5 Empirical Findings on Features of Opportunistic Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
In addition to these findings, it needs to be noted that the essence of opportunistic 
behaviour is guile and hence self-interest seeking with guile is differentiated from 
normal self-interest seeking such as “hard bargaining, intense and frequent 
disagreements, and similar conflictual behaviors” (John, 1984, p.278). 
 
2.3.2 Risks in ITO 
 
This subsection reviews ITO literature addressing risks which can facilitate outsourcing 
parties’ opportunistic behaviour and threaten their outcomes. In ITO business 
environments, a wide range of risks are identified in accordance with their sources such 
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as a client, vendor and transaction as shown in Table 2-4 (Aubert et al., 1999; Aubert et 
al., 1998; Bahli and Rivard, 2003).  
 
Table 2-4 Risks in ITO 
Risk Sources Risks 
Client  Lack of expertise with IT operation  
 Lack of expertise with IT outsourcing 
Vendor  Lack of expertise with IT operation  
 Lack of expertise with IT outsourcing 
Transaction  Uncertainty  
 Dependence 
 Asset specificity 
 Small-number conditions 
(Source: Aubert et al., 1999; Aubert et al., 1998; Bahli and Rivard, 2003) 
 
Based on the arguments in transaction cost theory and agency theory, the identified risks 
stemming from a client and transaction can be reorganised as shown in Figure 2-6.  
 
Figure 2-6  Risks faced by Client in ITO 
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At first, following the arguments of transaction cost theory (Provan, 1993), a client 
attempts to repeat or maintain its current ITO relationship to overcome the risks of its 
lack of expertise and uncertainty. However, the attempt increases the dependence on its 
existing vendor. In sequence, the heightened dependence paradoxically results in the 
other risks of asset specificity and small-number conditions. In the end, the possibility 
of the current vendor’s opportunistic behaviour is enhanced. Secondly, following the 
claims of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), a client cannot collect sufficient 
information on a (potential) vendor’s characteristic and behaviour due to its lack of 
expertise and uncertainty. Therefore, the vendor may exploit information asymmetry 
and is likely to behave opportunistically.   
 
Among various kinds of risks faced by a client in ITO business environments, the 
uncertainties from two different sources are regarded as the fundamental and critical 
determinants of ITO success: the uncertainty stemming from the unpredictability of 
technological requirements and the uncertainty originating in the difficulty in measuring 
performance (Lacity et al., 2010). Basically, transaction relationships are initiated and 
maintained in the presence of a certain level of uncertainty (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). Their efficiency is considerably affected by measurement difficulty (Barzel, 
1982). Also, the research of Kim and Chung (2003) proposes three types of uncertainty 
which have been intensively investigated in the context of ITO: technological, 
measurement and demand uncertainty as shown in Figure 2-7. Moreover, the study of 
Robertson and Gatignon (1998) provides a well-organised classification of uncertainty 
according to its source in R&D alliances. That is, uncertainty is categorised into two 
dimensions: external and internal uncertainty. The former stems from demand 
uncertainty and technology uncertainty while the latter originates in a firm’s ability to 
measure performance and a firm’s level of experience with alliances as shown in Figure 
2-8. Therefore, this research focuses on the two uncertainties emanating from the 
unpredictability of technological requirements and the difficulty in measuring 
performance. For the convenience of the description, they are respectively called 
“technological unpredictability or TU” and “measurement difficulty or MD” in this 
study. 
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Figure 2-7 Three Dimensions of Uncertainty in ITO 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-8 Classification of Uncertainty in R&D Alliances  
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contracting, asset specificity, interdependence, market dynamics and information 
asymmetry (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Anderson, 1988; Brown et al., 2000; Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000; John, 1984; Rokkan and Buvik, 2003; Söllner, 1999).  
 
From the traditional economic viewpoint, the best strategy to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour is having multiple alternative candidates in the market and transacting with 
the most competitive partner in terms of price or quality for each given business 
opportunity. However, the effects of the market-based strategy on this behaviour are 
attenuated when risks are at the high level and competitions are limited (John, 1984). 
What is worse, this strategy exposes (potential) partners to the following undesirable 
situations: the difficulty in predicting future demands, the limitation on innovative 
attempts due to strict contract clauses, the investment for short-term profits and the 
search for other business opportunities (Cousins, 2002).  
 
Transaction cost theory suggests that vertical integration is efficient when risks 
considerably increase the transaction costs of choosing and controlling exchange 
partners (Hill, 1990). This governance can remove uncertainty in the market and control 
opportunistic behaviour by internalising transactions. Also, agency theory proposes that 
opportunistic behaviour can be managed by elaborate bidding procedures, explicit 
contract clauses specifying tasks, strict monitoring of them and objective incentives 
according to performance (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2004; Kwon, 2007). However, it is 
sometimes reported that these formal mechanisms incur considerable hidden costs, 
increase opportunistic behaviour and lead to unsatisfactory outcomes (Barzel, 1982; 
Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Nam et al., 1996). For example, the research of John (1984) 
reports the negative effects of a bureaucratic structure which includes the formalisation 
of operational procedures, the centralisation of authority, and the enforcement and 
surveillance of rules. It is shown that the strictness of this structure may dispossess a 
counterparty of its self-control and autonomy, and hence lead to its disaffection and less 
commitment.  
 
In ITO business environments, scholars have also observed that uncertainty tends to 
attenuate the effects of formal mechanisms on the prevention of opportunistic behaviour 
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and the improvement of long-term performance (Balaji and Brown, 2010; Lee and Kim, 
1999). In response, it is reported that relational and structural embeddedness can serve 
as complements to formal mechanisms (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ravindran et al., 
2009). This section explores the literature surrounding the two types of embeddedness 
based on relational exchange theory and social capital theory. 
 
2.4.1 Concepts and Theoretical Backgrounds 
 
Embeddedness is defined as “the contextualization of economic activity in on-going 
patterns of social relations” (Dacin et al., 1999, p.319). Therefore, it can help to 
understand how economic behaviour is implanted in business settings including 
relational structures as well as economic structures (Granovetter, 1985; Zukin and 
DiMaggio, 1990).  
 
The origin of embeddedness is found in the pioneering research of Granovetter (1985), 
which argues that embeddedness is useful to explain economic phenomena occurring 
between organisations as well as individuals because “most behaviour is closely 
embedded in networks of interpersonal relations” (p.504). This seminal study classifies 
embeddedness into two dimensions: “concrete personal relations and structures (or 
networks) of such relations” (p.490). In the following research, it is again emphasised 
that “economic actions and outcomes are affected by actors’ dyadic (pair wise) relations 
and by the structure of the overall network of relations” (Granovetter, 1992, p.33). The 
author uses the terms “relational and structural embeddedness” to distinguish the unique 
effects of the two viewpoints. Based on these original conceptualisations, the more 
specific definitions of relational and structural embeddedness are respectively provided: 
“the kind of personal relationships people have developed with each other through a 
history of interactions” and “the impersonal configuration of linkages between people or 
units” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p.244).  
 
The roles of relational and structural embeddedness in transaction relationships are 
scrutinised mainly based on relational exchange theory and social capital theory. First, 
relational exchange theory is frequently used to address issues related to relational 
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exchange which is regarded as a dynamic process evolving through consecutive 
transactions between particular partners (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Therefore, this 
theory is suitable for explaining a situation where a firm taking the relational strategy 
attempts to repeat or maintain its outsourcing relationships with existing partners for 
whom it has the outsourcing histories. Second, social capital theory mainly deals with 
the value of connections (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). The most common 
conceptualisation of social capital is considered structural embeddedness although it 
involves the relational and structural dimension of embeddedness (Moran, 2005). 
Furthermore, a body of literature on networks’ structural properties is rooted in this 
theory (Brass et al., 2004). Therefore, this theory is helpful to explain a situation where 
a firm taking the structural strategy tries to exchange with reputational partners who 
occupy prominent network positions although it has no outsourcing histories for them.  
 
Based on these theoretical backgrounds, the investigation on relational embeddedness 
addresses the quality and contents of network ties such as “interpersonal trust and 
trustworthiness, overlapping identities and feelings of closeness or interpersonal 
solidarity” while the examination on structural embeddedness deals with the structures 
of network ties such as “the presence or absence of network ties between actors, along 
with other structural features like connectivity, centrality and hierarchy” (Moran, 2005, 
p.1132). The following subsections more specifically review the roles of relational and 
structural embeddedness. 
 
2.4.2 Relational Embeddedness 
 
It has been observed that firms in the automobile and electronics industries are neither 
involved in market-based transaction relationships nor are vertically integrated (Cousins, 
2002; Frazier et al., 1988; Helper, 1991). Rather, they attempt to sustain long-term 
cooperative exchange relationships (Uzzi, 1999; Walker and Poppo, 1991). Relational 
exchange theory is frequently applied to explain these relationships which are 
differentiated from arm’s-length relationships in classical or neoclassical economics 
(DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Fowler et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1999).  
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It is argued that relational exchange is distinguished from discrete exchange (Macneil, 
1980). Discrete exchange is regarded as a one-time interaction between anonymous 
parties, who mainly focus on the maximisation of their own short-term economic 
efficiency (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Therefore, the identities and relational aspects 
between them are likely to be ignored in this exchange (Kim and Chung, 2003). On the 
other hand, relational exchange is not viewed as a separate event but rather as a dynamic 
process evolving through successive interactions between specific partners (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). Therefore, they decide whether to maintain an exchange relationship and 
anticipate outcomes based on the history of their past transactions (Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Levinthal and Fichman, 1988). A premium is also placed on non-economic values such 
as trust and commitment generated by the iteration or long-term maintenance of a 
transaction relationship (Brown et al., 2004).  
 
Various advantages can be enjoyed by exchange parties who are coupled through 
relationally embedded ties. Firstly, the research of Uzzi (1997) argues that they can 
benefit from trust, fine-grained information and joint problem-solving as shown in 
Figure 2-9. Opportunistic behaviour is effectively controlled in a transaction 
relationship based on trust. The sharing of fine-grained information dramatically 
reduces exchange risks which threaten outcomes. Complex problems and conflicts are 
smoothly resolved by the joint efforts to solve problems.  
 
Figure 2-9 Advantages of Relational Embeddedness 
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In line with this research, it is also claimed that transaction risks are noticeably 
decreased by flexibility, solidarity and information sharing between relationally 
embedded firms (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Flexibility enables them to effectively 
respond to unpredictable events. Solidarity encourages their joint problem-solving 
activities. Information sharing facilitates the flexible response to unpredictability and 
the joint problem solving through solidarity. Secondly, as transaction relationships 
evolve over time, relationally embedded partners deeply understand each other’s 
business, harmoniously resolve conflicts and share benefits and risks. Therefore, the 
differences in their strategic goals are minimised, which facilitates the successful 
establishment of partnerships (Lee and Kim, 1999; 2005). Thirdly, in the perspective of 
cost-effectiveness, firms can cut the considerable transaction costs of finding and 
managing new partners by repeating or maintaining their current transaction 
relationships (Goo et al., 2007).  
 
Contrary to these arguments, the research of Cousins (2002) claims that partnerships do 
not exist and organisations only make an effort to manage transaction risks. In particular, 
this study emphasises that interfirm relationships should not be developed with a focus 
on “a utopian ideal of working better together” but on “a sound business case” such as 
the minimisation of costs to survive and compete in the market (p.72). Furthermore, it is 
pointed out that the term “trust” is misleading in commercial contexts which are 
fundamentally calculative (Williamson, 1996).  
 
Nevertheless, transaction relationships are not well developed when they are too much 
calculative (Kumar et al., 1995). The research of Liu et al. (2010) identifies two forms 
of attitudinal commitment: calculative commitment (i.e. “instrumental realization of the 
benefits of staying and the costs of leaving”) and loyalty commitment (i.e. “sentiment of 
allegiance and faithfulness”) (p.844), which exist together in exchange relationships 
(Gilliland and Bello, 2002). According to this study, calculative commitment is 
negatively related to loyalty commitment and is positively associated with opportunistic 
behaviour.   
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2.4.3 Structural Embeddedness 
 
The research of Provan (1993) shows that a body of literature on various forms of long-
term cooperative transaction relationships is mainly based on dyadic exchange 
relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987; Frazier et al., 1988; Heide and John, 1988; Hill, 
1990). However, scholars in favour of social capital theory have paid attention to the 
fact that particular partners may not repeatedly transact with each other or maintain their 
long-term exchange relationships. In particular, it is argued that the existence of firms 
related with multiple exchange partners in a network can be proof that relational 
exchange theory is likely to be incomplete to explain the building and maintenance of 
transaction relationships (Ravindran et al., 2009). Over recent decades, the analysis 
level of a relationship has shifted from dyads to egocentric and complete networks, and 
studies at the level of a network have successfully investigated complex and interrelated 
exchange relationships (Cousins, 2002; Provan et al., 2007). According to this research 
stream, the volume of literature on structural embeddedness has dramatically increased 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003). 
 
Social capital is defined as “resources embedded in a social structure which are 
accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions” and hence its concept includes “three 
elements intersecting structure and action: the structural embeddedness, opportunity 
accessibility and action-oriented use aspects” (Lin, 1999, p.35). Especially, the most 
common conceptualisation of social capital is regarded as structural embeddedness 
(Moran, 2005).  
 
Following this conceptualisation, social capital research has been conducted under the 
general agreement that its value emanates from the access to resources through social 
relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Granovetter, 1992). Therefore, a body of 
literature based on this theory addresses the values of linkages and their structures. In 
particular, they have investigated the relationships between network positions and a 
variety of significant outcomes such as “power, leadership, mobility, employment, 
individual performance, individual creativity, entrepreneurship and team performance” 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003, p.993). Also, a (potential) partner’s network position 
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represents its reputation which is an indicator of past performance and a predictor of 
future behaviour (Gopal et al., 2003; Heng et al., 2009; Malik and Bouguettaya, 2009). 
This valuable information can be gained through the observation of a network position 
or the information transmission via indirect ties with little cost (Hansen, 1999; 
Ravindran et al., 2009). Therefore, a firm can collect information on multiple alternative 
candidates, have an opportunity to compare them and flexibly respond to a given 
business opportunity by transacting with a more suitable partner. In fact, it is reported 
that project managers place a premium on reputation rather than cost and consider the 
roles of a third party important to find a competent partner in uncertain situations (Drath 
and Wayman, 2010; Gopal et al., 2003). Moreover, a firm’s reputation is regarded as a 
collective measure of reliability rooted in the evaluation of counterparties and as an 
intangible asset (Jøsang et al., 2007; Lee and Roh, 2012). It is also described that a 
network is “a nonhierarchical contracting relation in which reputation effects are 
quickly and accurately communicated” (Williamson, 1991, p.290). Therefore, a 
reputational partner would refrain from behaving opportunistically because the damage 
of its reputation caused by this behaviour is the loss of its capital (Kandori, 1992).  
 
The research of Provan (1993) provides a conceptual framework on how opportunistic 
behaviour can be affected by a network’s structural properties as shown in Figure 2-10.  
 
Figure 2-10 Moderating Effects of Structural Properties 
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In this study, the following two features of a network are proposed: interconnectedness 
which indicates that members are interconnected and hence a certain member’s success 
or failure influences others’ outcomes in a network, and low information impactedness 
which means that uncodified information diffuses across a network. The interactions 
between the two features can increase the incentive for information sharing (Axelrod, 
1984) and impede the restoration of damaged reputation (Granovetter, 1985). Therefore, 
the author argues that the following network structural properties stemming from 
interconnectedness and low information impactedness play an important role in 
safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour: overall network interdependence and 
supplier-supplier dependence. That is, it is shown that the effects of buyer-supplier 
dependence on opportunistic behaviour are moderated by the two structural properties 
in a buyer-dominant network. 
 
2.4.4 Comparison between Relational and Structural embeddedness 
 
Relational and structural embeddedness have been compared under alternative labels 
such as direct ties vs. indirect ties (Gulati, 1995), within-network embeddedness vs. 
search embeddedness (DiMaggio and Louch, 1998), strong ties vs. weak ties (Hansen, 
1999; Kraatz, 1998; Schneider et al., 1997) and reinforcing vs. broadening (Beckman et 
al., 2004). This subsection more specifically reviews these studies on the comparison 
between the two types of embeddedness in other research contexts.    
 
Information on (potential) partners enables firms to discover multiple alternative 
candidates and to improve trust in their counterparties. A network can serve as a conduit 
of this information because direct and indirect ties composing it emerge and evolve 
through the accumulation of transaction experience (Podolny, 2001). The research of 
Gulati (1995) investigates the roles of direct and indirect ties in selecting alliance 
partners. In this study, it is shown that information asymmetry between alliance parties 
can be resolved through direct and indirect ties as follows. Firstly, alliance parties can 
resolve information asymmetry by repeating or maintaining their current alliance 
relationships. Secondly, firms can access information on multiple alternative alliance 
candidates through indirect ties which increase the amount and diversity of information. 
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As a result, it is suggested that the number of past alliances between two specific 
alliance parties is positively related to the possibility of their establishing new alliances. 
Furthermore, this study proposes that the number of common indirect ties between two 
particular firms increases the possibility of their building new alliances when they are 
not directly connected.   
 
The study of DiMaggio and Louch (1998) shows the preference for within-network 
embeddedness or search embeddedness at the high level of uncertainty. In this research, 
the two forms of embeddedness respectively represent directly and indirectly connected 
relationships which are used to evaluate potential partners’ reliability. Firstly, it is 
suggested that search embeddedness can suppress uncertainty by increasing the amount 
of information with little cost. In fact, this form of embeddedness is frequently used to 
purchase products or services with higher quality at lower cost when uncertainty is at 
the high level (Brown and Reingen, 1987; Powell, 1990). Secondly, it is proposed that 
within-network embeddedness can overcome uncertainty by resolving information 
asymmetry through repeated transactions and by imposing reciprocal obligations which 
may not exist in search embeddedness. Moreover, this research argues that competitive 
quality or price derived from search embeddedness can be balanced by reliability 
underlying within-network embeddedness. Consequently, it is revealed that buyers tend 
to prefer within-network embeddedness when uncertainty is at the high level.  
 
In the meantime, weak ties are considered more beneficial in searching information 
because exchange parties maintaining weak ties can rapidly and flexibly explore 
information beyond their existing relationships (Brass et al., 2004). Conversely, the 
amount and diversity of information accessed by transaction parties coupled through 
strong ties are limited because they tend to stay within their existing relationships 
(Boorman, 1975; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Henderson and Clark, 1990). The 
research of Schneider et al. (1997) investigates the roles of weak ties in collecting 
information on public goods of which the quality is multidimensional and is difficult to 
exactly evaluate. Weak ties can considerably contribute to the dissemination and 
diversity of information (Kogut, 2000; Oliver, 2001). Therefore, the author reveals that 
they play an important role in gaining information on public goods.  
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However, the study of Hansen (1999) asks whether tacit information is correctly 
transferred through weak ties although they are more useful in finding the location of 
knowledge in a network. Therefore, it is examined how the effectiveness of strong and 
weak ties is affected by the tacitness of knowledge in this research. Social network 
research typically assumes that information is well shared among actors in a network 
and hence it takes little additional effort to transfer it (Burt, 1992). In contrast to this 
assumption, it is difficult to transfer tacit knowledge which is neither documented nor 
independent (Zander and Kogut, 1995). Accordingly, the author shows that reciprocity 
and commitment between a sender and receiver are needed to correctly transmit tacit 
information and that strong ties are more advantageous in transferring this knowledge. 
In addition, the research of Kraatz (1998) points out that strong ties play an important 
role in adapting to environmental change. This study argues that strong ties 
characterised by frequent interactions, extended histories and intimacy can facilitate 
cooperative interactions and provide reliable information for the imitation of successful 
practices. Therefore, it is shown that organisations attempt to respond to environmental 
change through the interactions with others who are strongly connected and the 
imitation of their practices.  
 
The study of Beckman et al. (2004) examines the preference for broadening or 
reinforcing network ties in the presence of two types of uncertainty: firm-specific 
uncertainty which is peculiar and is internal to a firm, and market uncertainty which is 
external and is experienced across the market. The examples for each type of 
uncertainty are provided as follows: firm-specific uncertainty stems from the entrance 
of a new market, the acquisition of another firm and the turnover of top management 
while market uncertainty originates in competitive uncertainty, demand uncertainty and 
input cost uncertainty. Then, this research suggests that firms can control firm-specific 
uncertainty by help of diverse information gained through heterogeneous and temporary 
relationships. On the other hand, it is proposed that market uncertainty beyond firms’ 
control can be managed by the repetition or long-term maintenance of existing 
relationships. As a result, it is shown that firms tend to choose broadening both at the 
high level of firm-specific uncertainty and at the low level of market uncertainty while 
they are apt to select reinforcing at the high level of market uncertainty. 
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Table 2-5 summarises the literature on the comparison between relational and structural 
embeddedness in other research contexts. 
 
Table 2-5 Comparison between Relational and Structural Embeddedness 
Author Findings 
Gulati (1995)  Direct ties vs. Indirect ties 
 The number of past alliances between two specific firms is positively 
related to the possibility of their establishing new alliances. 
 The number of common indirect ties between two particular firms has a 
positive relationship with the possibility of their new alliances when they 
are not directly connected 
DiMaggio and Louch  
(1998) 
 
 Within-network embeddedness vs. Search embeddedness 
 Buyers tend to apply within-network embeddedness when uncertainty is at 
the high level. 
Schneider et al. (1997)  Strong ties vs. Weak ties 
 Weak ties are more beneficial in collecting information on public goods.  
Kraatz (1998)  Strong ties vs. Weak ties 
 Organisations attempt to respond to environmental change through the 
interactions with others who are strongly connected and the imitation of 
their practices. 
Hansen (1999) 
 
 Strong ties vs. Weak ties 
 Strong and weak ties are more advantageous in transferring tacit and 
explicit knowledge respectively. 
Beckman et al. (2004)  Reinforcing vs. Broadening 
 Firms tend to choose broadening both at the high level of firm-specific 
uncertainty and at the low level of market uncertainty  
 Firms are apt to select reinforcing at the high level of market uncertainty. 
 
2.5 Roles of Two Types of Embeddedness in ITO  
 
A body of research has been conducted on the roles of relational and structural 
embeddedness in the context of ITO. The former has examined long-term cooperative 
outsourcing relationships mainly based on relational exchange theory while the latter 
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has investigated network-based outsourcing relationships primarily rooted in social 
capital theory. This section reviews the empirical literature on the roles of the two types 
of embeddedness in ITO business environments. 
  
2.5.1 Roles of Relational Embeddedness in ITO 
 
As shown in Section 2.2 Literature Review Papers on ITO Studies, increasing attention 
has been focused on how to initiate and maintain ITO relationships over recent decades. 
In particular, a body of literature has deeply investigated long-term cooperative ITO 
relationships (i.e. partnerships) based on relational embeddedness. 
  
The research of Henderson (1990) investigates the concept of an ITO partnership. First, 
an ITO partnership is classified into two dimensions: partnership in action (i.e. “what 
are the factors or elements of this relationship that contribute to its effective execution 
on a day-to-day, week to week basis?”) and partnership in context (i.e. “what are the 
factors or elements of this relationship that lead you to believe that it will be sustained 
over time?”) (p.9). Next, several critical components of each dimension are identified. 
That is, the former includes shared knowledge, distinctive competency and resources, 
and organisational linkage while the latter involves mutual benefits, commitment and 
predisposition. As a result, an ITO partnership model composed of the six elements is 
established and is validated through interviews with executives. 
 
The study of Lee and Kim (1999) points out that the components and determinants of 
ITO partnership quality are not clearly distinguished in existing studies. Therefore, the 
authors propose an ITO partnership quality model mainly based on power-political 
theory and relational exchange theory as shown in Figure 2-11. Their following research 
argues that the causalities between the determinants and components are not 
theoretically justified although they are statistically supported (Lee and Kim, 2005). 
Three alternative models are established as shown in Figure 2-12 and are compared 
through structural equation modelling. Finally, it is found that the first model based on 
behavioural-attitudinal theory can more closely represent the reality of ITO partnerships. 
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Figure 2-11 ITO Partnership Quality Model 
 
 
(Source: Lee and Kim, 1999) 
 
Figure 2-12 Three Alternative Models of ITO Partnership 
 
 
 
Model 1: ITO Partnership Model Based on Behavioural-Attitudinal Theory 
ITO 
success 
Shared 
knowledge 
Mutual 
dependency 
Organisational 
linkage 
Behavioural Variables 
Perception of 
mutual benefits
Perception of 
commitment
Perception of 
predisposition
Psychological Variables 
Model 2: Simple Direct Effects Model 
ITO 
success
Shared 
knowledge 
Mutual 
dependency 
Organisational 
linkage 
Behavioural Variables 
Perception of 
mutual benefits
Perception of 
commitment 
Perception of 
predisposition
Psychological Variables
ITO success 
Dynamic factors 
Participation 
Joint action 
Communication quality 
Coordination 
Information sharing 
Static factors 
Age of relationship 
Mutual dependency 
Contextual factors 
Cultural similarity 
Top management support 
Determinants of  
Partnership Quality 
Trust 
Business understanding 
Benefit and risk sharing 
Conflict 
Commitment
Partnership quality
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
45 
 
Figure 2-12 Continued 
 
 
 
(Source: Lee and Kim, 2005) 
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The above reviewed literature explicitly or implicitly indicates that the establishment of 
long-term cooperative outsourcing relationships is critical for ITO success in the 
presence of uncertainty. Based on these studies, the research of Flemming and Low 
(2007) points out that the existing models of ITO partnerships need to be more 
systematically integrated in the perspective of both clients and vendors. Therefore, an 
integrated model of ITO relationships is proposed as shown in Figure 2-13 and is 
validated through interviews with professionals. 
 
Figure 2-13 Integrated ITO Relationship Model 
 
 
 
(Source: Flemming and Low, 2007) 
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Goo et al. (2007) argues that it is necessary to examine the duration of ITO relationships 
unlike the literature which mainly focuses on satisfaction levels and perceived benefits. 
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The authors identify the determinants of the duration in the strategic, economic and 
social perspectives. At first, two determinants are identified in the strategic perspective: 
knowledge acquisition and strategic importance of IT activities. Next, the economic 
viewpoint proposes three determinants: relationship-specific investment, demand 
uncertainty and extent of substitution. Finally, the determinants like opportunism and 
satisfaction with output quality are derived from the social perspective. In this research, 
it is interesting that opportunism is not significantly associated with the duration of ITO 
relationships, which is unlike the prediction. The authors provide a possible explanation 
that the effects of opportunism may be mitigated by the impacts of relationship-specific 
investment. That is, it is explained that opportunism may no longer play an important 
role in an ITO relationship where outsourcing parties behave cooperatively because they 
believe that opportunism is harmful to their trust-based relationship for overcoming 
uncertainty at the high level of asset specificity.   
 
Several studies illustrate that various forms of governance structures can complement 
each other in the context of ITO. The research of Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
demonstrates that formal contracting and relational governance act as complements 
rather than substitutes in ITO business environments. It is sometimes argued that 
relational governance can be a substitute of formal contracting since the former incurs 
less transaction costs while the latter serves as a signal of distrust and increases the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour (Liu et al., 2010; Rokkan and Buvik, 2003). 
However, this study suggests that well-specified formal contract terms can reduce risks 
and this reduction can again improve trust and cooperation between outsourcing parties. 
In addition, it is proposed that continuity and reciprocity underlying relational 
governance can decrease risks which are not likely to be controlled by formal 
contracting. As a result, the authors show that managers tend to prefer less customised 
contracting in response to uncertainty and are apt to supplement its incompleteness with 
relational governance. 
 
The study of Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) investigates several control modes for 
the management of vendors in the context of information systems development (ISD) 
outsourcing. In this research, ISD is viewed as complex, intensive and dynamic 
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activities which are organised based on cooperation among various stakeholders. The 
authors argue, therefore, that the selection of an appropriate control mode can promote 
the effective integration of these activities. Two types of control modes are identified: 
formal mode including outcome control and behaviour control, and informal mode 
involving clan control and self control. It is also shown that the former affects vendors’ 
behaviour through assessment and reward while the latter reduces the difference of 
goals between clients and vendors. As a result, this research observes that clients 
employ a mixture of the four control modes according to task characteristics, 
participants’ project-related knowledge and role expectations, and the portfolio of the 
modes evolves over time. 
 
The research of Balaji and Brown (2010) claims that outsourcing parties need to invest 
in various forms of governance structures because uncertainty cannot be completely 
managed only by contractual specifications although they are generally perceived to be 
fundamental to ITO success. Therefore, the following four governance structures are 
examined: contractual, structural, extra-contractual and relational governance. 
Furthermore, this study introduces the multidimensional ITO outcomes composed of 
business, functional and economic benefits, and execution-level effectiveness. 
Consequently, it is revealed that relational trust serves as a positive mediator between 
the various governance structures and the multidimensional ITO outcomes. 
 
In the meantime, increasing attention has been paid to relational embeddedness in the 
context of international outsourcing. Earlier studies have mainly focused on clients’ 
economic advantages in terms of cost-benefits or their abilities to evaluate vendors for 
the removal of opportunism and the facilitation of cooperation (Berggren et al., 2001; 
Lacity et al., 1994). However, the research of Harried and Ramamurthy (2009) argues 
that clients’ economic profits cannot capture all the dimensions of offshoring success 
and they may behave opportunistically. Therefore, the essential components of key 
relationship dimensions and relational success dimensions are identified in the context 
of international outsourcing. The former includes information exchange, legal bonds, 
mutual obligations, relationship-specific adaptations and intellectual competence while 
the latter involves trust, commitment and conflict. Finally, it is revealed how key 
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relationship dimensions affect relational success dimensions in offshoring business 
environments. 
 
2.5.2 Roles of Structural Embeddedness in ITO 
 
Interestingly, although the roles of structural embeddedness have been intensively 
investigated in other research areas (Borgatti and Foster, 2003), there are just a few 
studies addressing them in the context of ITO. As described in the research of 
Ravindran et al. (2009), their study is likely to be the first empirical attempt to examine 
the effects of structural embeddedness in ITO business environments. The authors point 
out that the existing ITO literature on the control of uncertainty has mainly focused on 
formal contracting and relational governance. They argue, however, that another type of 
governance needs to be investigated to supplement the incompleteness of formal 
contracting and to explain the existence of multiple alternative partners in an ITO 
network. A network position is introduced as a new form of governance in this research. 
It is shown that a client occupying a prominent network position can access diverse 
information on vendors and their services or products, and a vendor’s reputational 
network position represents its good performance or its ability to fulfil duties. As a 
result, this research shows that the higher network positions of a client and vendor are 
associated with the shorter and longer duration of an ITO contract respectively.  
 
The research model established by Heng et al. (2009) includes the construct of 
referencing power related with structural embeddedness. ITO contracts are terminated 
due to various reasons such as unsatisfactory performance, multiple alternative vendors 
and competence loss (Whitten and Leidner, 2006). The authors point out, however, that 
these reasons are significant only from a client’s perspective and hence it is necessary to 
understand what factors can affect the suspension of ITO contracts from a vendor’s 
viewpoint. Referencing power represents “the ability of clients to positively promote or 
negatively tarnish vendors’ reputation” (p.6). Consequently, it is shown that a client’s 
positive referencing power is negatively associated with a vendor’s terminating 
intention since vendors are not likely to terminate ITO relationships with clients who 
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tend to transfer positive information on their services or products to potential clients in 
an ITO network. 
 
The survey report of Drath and Wayman (2010) shows how coordinators select their 
partners for the establishment of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
consortia. As shown in Figure 2-14, about fifty percent of the coordinators select 
members based on previous collaborations. However, around thirty-five percent of them 
choose partners recommended by other consortium members or third parties. This 
proportion indicates that coordinators sometimes build ICT consortia with partners for 
whom they have no transaction histories. From this practical report, it is inferred that 
ITO relationships can be established through structural embeddedness as well as 
relational embeddedness. 
 
Figure 2-14 Source of Partners 
    
 
 
(Source: Drath and Wayman, 2010) 
 
Finally, the reviewed studies on the roles of relational and structural embeddedness in 
this section are organised in Table 2-6. 
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Table 2-6 Relational and Structural Embeddedness in ITO 
Author Findings 
Henderson (1990) 
 
 Conceptualising ITO Partnership 
 Two dimensions of an ITO partnership are identified: (PIA) and 
partnership in context (PIC). 
 PIA is related to the components that contribute to the effective 
implementation of an ITO partnership and includes shared knowledge, 
distinctive competency and resources, and organisational linkage. 
 PIC is associated with the components that strengthen outsourcing parties’ 
belief in the maintenance of an ITO partnership and involves mutual 
benefits, commitment and predisposition. 
Lee and Kim (1999)  Establishing ITO Partnership Quality Model 
 The components and determinants of ITO partnership quality are clearly 
distinguished. 
 The determinants include the dynamic factors (participation, joint action, 
communication quality, coordination and information sharing), the static 
factors (age of relationship and mutual dependency) and the contextual 
factors (culture similarity and top management support). 
 The components involve trust, business understanding, benefit and risk 
sharing, conflict and commitment. 
Lee and Kim (2005)  Comparing Three Alternative ITO Partnership Models 
- Model based on behavioural-attitudinal theory 
- Simple direct effects model 
- Model based on theory of reasoned action 
 The model based on behavioural-attitudinal theory can more closely 
represent the reality of ITO partnerships. 
Kim et al. (2003)  Identifying Determinants of ITO Satisfaction of Different Groups 
 Transaction relationships and partnerships are more significant for the ITO 
satisfaction of project directors while outcomes are more important for 
that of users and operators. 
Kim and Chung (2003) 
 
 Investigating Effects of Relational and Task Features on ITO Success 
 Vendor capability, solidarity, continuity expectation, flexibility and 
monitoring are positively associated with ITO success while role integrity 
and asset specificity are negatively related to ITO success. 
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Table 2-6 Continued 
Author Findings 
Flemming and Low 
 (2007) 
 Integrating Existing ITO Partnership Models 
 An integrated ITO partnership model is proposed which includes the 
behavioural and psychological dimensions from the viewpoint of both 
clients and vendors. 
Harried and 
Ramamurthy (2009) 
 Investigating Relational Success in Offshoring 
 The relationship between the key relationship dimensions and the 
relational success is examined in the context of international outsourcing. 
Goo et al. (2007)  Scrutinizing Determinants of ITO Contract Duration 
 Knowledge acquisition, relationship-specific investment and extent of 
substation are positively related to contract duration. 
 Requirement uncertainty is negatively associated with contract duration. 
 Strategic importance of IT activities, opportunistic behaviour and 
satisfaction with output quality have no significant impact on contract 
duration. 
Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) 
 Examining Roles of Formal Contracting and Relational Governance  
 Less customised formal contracts tend to be used in the context of ITO 
where it is difficult to measure performance and the pace of technological 
change is unpredictable and hence relational governance can supplement 
the incompleteness of them. 
Choudhury and 
Sabherwal (2003) 
 Investigating Different Control Modes for ITO relationships 
 Clients employ the mixture of outcome, behaviour, clan and self control 
mode according to task characteristics, participants’ project-related 
knowledge and role expectations, and the portfolio of the modes evolves 
as time passes. 
Balaji and Brown  
(2010) 
 Scrutinizing Mediating Effects of Trust between Different Forms of 
Governance Structures and Multidimensional ITO Outcomes 
 Relational trust mediates the impacts of contractual, extra-contractual and 
relational governance on business, functional and economic benefits, and 
execution-level effectiveness.   
Ravindran et al. (2009)  Examining Effects of Network Positions on ITO Contract Duration 
 The higher network positions of clients and vendors are associated with 
the shorter and longer duration of ITO contracts respectively. 
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Table 2-6 Continued 
Author Findings 
Heng et al. (2009)  Investigating Effects of Referencing Power on Terminating Intention 
 A client’s positive referencing power is negatively related to a vendor’s 
ITO contract terminating intention. 
Drath and Wayman 
(2010) 
 Survey Source of Partners for ICT Consortia 
 Coordinators find partners through the recommendation of other 
consortium members and third parties as well as from previous 
collaborations. 
 
2.6 Limitations of Prior Literature 
 
A body of literature has deeply investigated the roles of relational and structural 
embeddedness in the context of ITO. However, the literature does not clearly answer the 
following research question in this study: which of the two types of embeddedness is 
more appropriate in enhancing long-term performance at the different levels of 
technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty imposed on ITO business 
environments?  
 
First of all, existing ITO studies have not compared the two types of embeddedness. The 
comparisons between them have been conducted in other research contexts such as 
organisational learning (Hansen, 1999), environmental adaptation (Kraatz, 1998), 
alliances (Beckman et al., 2004; Gulati, 1995) and buyer-seller relationships (DiMaggio 
and Louch, 1998). In ITO business environments, however, each research stream on 
relational or structural embeddedness has mainly focused on its own advantages as 
shown in the literature on long-term cooperative outsourcing relationships or on 
network-based outsourcing relationships. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding the 
conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness in the context of ITO.  
 
Secondly, the two types of embeddedness have not been compared at the different levels 
of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty even in other research 
contexts. The study of Robertson and Gatignon (1998) argues that the efficiency of an 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
54 
 
exchange relationship can be considerably affected by the selection of a proper 
governance structure in response to the type of uncertainty. The authors suggest two 
types of uncertainty: internal uncertainty stemming from measurement difficulty and 
lack of experience, and external uncertainty originating in technological and demand 
uncertainty. In ITO studies, technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty 
have been frequently and significantly addressed (Kim and Chung, 2003; Lacity et al., 
2010). Therefore, relational and structural embeddedness need to be compared in the 
presence of these two uncertainties imposed on ITO business environments.    
 
Thirdly, the comparisons between the two types of embeddedness in other research 
contexts mainly emphasise which is preferred at the high level of uncertainty rather than 
which leads to better performance according to the type and level of uncertainty. It is 
proposed that organisations prefer partners for whom they have the transaction histories 
when the uncertainty of service or product quality is at the high level (Podolny, 1994). It 
is also suggested that the uncertainty regarding the performance of partners tends to 
encourage individuals to utilise within-network embeddedness (DiMaggio and Louch, 
1998). Furthermore, the research of Beckman et al. (2004) reveals a firm’s preference 
for reinforcing or broadening according to the type of uncertainty. These existing 
studies could provide a partial answer to the research question in this study. However, 
the preference for relational or structural embeddedness is distinguished from the 
performance led by each type of embeddedness. Therefore, it needs to be examined how 
each type of embeddedness affects long-term performance in the context of ITO. 
 
To sum up, ITO studies have hardly investigated the conditional superiority of relational 
or structural embeddedness at the different levels of technological unpredictability and 
measurement difficulty. In other research contexts, only the preference for each type of 
embeddedness has been examined at the high level of uncertainty. It needs to be 
understood, therefore, which of the two types of embeddedness is more appropriate in 
improving long-term performance at the different levels of the two uncertainties 
imposed on ITO business environments.  
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In fact, the choice between the utilisation of something present and the search for 
something alternative has been considered one of the fundamental and critical problems 
for adapting to uncertain business environments (Lee et al., 2003b). A possible 
theoretical answer to this choice problem can be found by examining the conditional 
superiority of each type of embeddedness in the presence of the two uncertainties which 
promote opportunism and threaten long-term performance in the context of ITO. Also, 
from the practical viewpoint, the comparison between the two types of embeddedness 
can provide ITO managers with a guideline for the choice between existing partners 
who are connected through strong network ties and reputational partners who are 
located in prominent network positions. 
 
2.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed several literature review papers, opportunistic behaviour and 
risks, relational and structural embeddedness which are related to the research question 
in this study. The limitations of prior studies were more clearly identified through this 
review. 
 
Several literature review papers provided a better understanding of the current research 
trends and issues in the research area of ITO. The early discussions on “why and what” 
have shifted into the recent debates on “how and outcomes”. In particular, there has 
been a dramatic increase in the volume of literature on how to initiate and maintain ITO 
relationships over the recent two decades. Moreover, according to these trends, much 
attention has been paid to relational exchange theory and social capital theory.    
 
Among various kinds of risks drawn from transaction cost theory and agency theory, the 
two uncertainties (i.e. technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty) have 
been frequently and significantly addressed in ITO studies because they can increase the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and threaten long-term performance. Therefore, a 
body of literature has investigated the roles of relational and structural embeddedness in 
controlling these uncertainties on the theoretical basis of relational exchange theory and 
social capital theory.  
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However, each ITO research stream on relational or structural embeddedness has 
focused on its own advantages. This one-sided emphasis may lead to the puzzling 
conclusion that both types of embeddedness could be universally optimal regardless of 
the type and level of uncertainty. What is worse, an improper prescription derived from 
this confusing conclusion may be given to a firm facing the tension between the two 
types of embeddedness. Furthermore, existing studies in other research contexts have 
mainly investigated the preference for relational or structural embeddedness at the high 
level of uncertainty rather than the performance led by each type of embeddedness at 
the different type and level of uncertainty. 
  
As a result, there is a paucity of literature on the conditional superiority of each type of 
embeddedness in the context of ITO. This research attempts to fill this research gap by 
answering the following specific question.  
 
 Which of the two types of embeddedness is more appropriate in improving long-
term performance at the different levels of technological unpredictability and 
measurement difficulty imposed on ITO business environments? 
 
The next chapter discusses how this research proceeds to address this question. That is, 
the simulation approach including a game-theoretic method and a full factorial design of 
experiments is explained. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 describes the research approach and methods used in this study. As described 
in Section 1.6 Research Approach and Methods, approaches are differentiated from 
methods as follows: “approaches are a generic or overarching way of going about 
research, while methods are more narrowly focused techniques and procedures for 
conducting research” (Dibbern et al., 2004, p.20). This research takes a simulation 
approach, which includes a game-theoretic method and a full factorial design of 
experiments to examine the conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness 
according to the type and level of uncertainty in the long-term perspective.  
 
This chapter includes the following two sections: Simulation in Management Studies 
and Research Approach. Firstly, it is described why a simulation approach is applied. 
This section provides, therefore, a better understanding of the novelty of a simulation 
approach in management studies. The next section explains “the roadmap for 
developing theories with simulations” developed by Davis et al. (2007). This roadmap 
is used as a guideline for the research approach in this study. It is also demonstrated 
how this research proceeds to address the research question.  
 
3.2 Simulation in Management Studies 
 
A simulation approach has become more important in organisational and strategic 
studies (Axelrod, 1997b; Harrison et al., 2007; Repenning, 2003; Zott, 2003). This 
computer-based approach creates computational representations for constructs derived 
from existing literature, theoretical logics establishing relationships among them and 
assumptions defining research boundary conditions (Davis et al., 2007). Therefore, a 
theory developed or extended through a simulation approach includes constructs, 
theoretical logics and assumptions which are necessary to be qualified for a well-made 
theory (Sutton and Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989).   
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Research has been traditionally conducted through two main approaches: “theoretical 
analysis or deduction, and empirical analysis or induction” (Harrison et al., 2007, 
p.1230). A deductive study draws conclusions from a set of strict assumptions while an 
inductive research infers consequences from observed data (Hammersley, 1960). 
Furthermore, a modified version of an inductive approach has been widely employed to 
confirm hypotheses developed in a study applying a deductive approach (Harrison et al., 
2007). However, each research approach has its own shortcomings: the former 
sometimes makes assumptions which are far distant from the real world for their 
usefulness itself, and the latter sometimes faces the problem of data availability 
(Harrison et al., 2007). A simulation approach can cope with these problems by making 
more realistic assumptions and generating virtual data. In this sense, this approach has 
both deductive and inductive characteristics (Axelrod, 1997a). It is deductive in the 
perspective that a simulation model is derived from existing theories and assumptions. 
On the other hand, it is inductive from the viewpoint that new findings are from 
simulation experiments. These two features, therefore, lead to the usefulness of a 
simulation approach. That is, based on computational representations with high internal 
validity from the exact specification of constructs, theoretical logics and assumptions, a 
wide range of experiments can be conducted to gain sufficient data by modifying 
computer codes (Berends and Romme, 1999; Davis et al., 2007).  
 
A simulation approach is beneficial when multiple processes are interconnected, 
nonlinear and circular causal phenomena are addressed, and it is challenging to obtain 
empirical data (Repenning, 2003; Zott, 2003). Multiple processes can be individually 
well understood. However, as the processes continuously interact with each other, their 
behaviours and/or outcomes could become more interrelated. The interrelatedness also 
tends to increase the nonlinearity and circular causality of the behaviours and/or 
outcomes over time. When investigating this situation, some researchers using a 
deductive approach may make unrealistic assumptions and others employing an 
inductive approach may experience difficulty in collecting sufficient empirical data. In 
such a case, a simulation approach can act as an effective substitute for the two 
traditional approaches. In the meantime, the majority of simulation studies do not 
usually provide hypotheses because the interrelatedness, nonlinearity and circular 
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causality hamper the establishment of clear and logical relationships among the 
behaviours and/or outcomes (Harrison et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the roles of a simulation study in management studies.   
 
Figure 3-1 Roles of Simulation Research in Management Studies 
 
 
 
 
As described above, a simulation approach is considered more appropriate for dealing 
with a research problem with interconnectedness, nonlinearity or circular causality. It is 
worthwhile, therefore, to apply a simulation approach if a given problem includes the 
whole or part of these complex features. Next, a simulation study is conducted based on 
existing theories and empirical studies which provide theoretical foundations and 
empirical evidences for internal and external validity. Then, a new theory is established 
or an existing theory is extended by analysing simulation experiment results. Moreover, 
this newly developed or extended theory serves as a basis for further empirical research. 
 
Finally, the research of Davis et al. (2007) proposes that a simulation study is evaluated 
based on the contribution to literature and the strictness of an approach. 
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Contribution to Theory 
 
 Is the research question derived from its related existing studies and theories to 
maintain its theoretical consistency with them?  
 
 Is the focus of simulation experiments on the development of a new theory or on 
the extension of an existing theory? 
 
Strictness of Approach 
 
 Does the simulation approach clearly define computational representations for 
constructs, theoretical logics and assumptions? 
 
 Does the simulation approach explicitly verify computational representations to 
confirm internal validity and correct coding? 
 
 Does the simulation approach apply the proper design of simulation tests? 
 
This study examines the conditional superiority of relational or structural embeddedness 
in the following research setting. There are multiple vendors in an ITO network. They 
establish ITO consortia in response to given outsourcing opportunities with the different 
levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty. The consortium 
formation is viewed as an interaction between the vendors to gain their profits. Then, as 
they continuously interact with one another, ITO ties are generated and reinforced, and 
their behaviours and/or outcomes become more interrelated. Therefore, this research 
includes the behaviour of vendors who compose a network and affect one another 
through their interactions, and the performance which is the consequence of their 
behaviour. Furthermore, the two types of embeddedness are compared at the different 
levels of the two uncertainties in the long-term perspective. As a result, a simulation 
approach is appropriate for this study. 
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3.3 Research Approach  
 
The research approach (i.e. “a generic or overarching way of going about research”) in 
this study is on the basis of “the roadmap for developing theories with simulations” 
(Davis et al., 2007). Figure 3-1 shows how this research proceeds based on the roadmap. 
 
Figure 3-2 Roadmap and Research Approach 
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3.3.1 Step 1: Begin with research question and simple theory 
 
A simulation study theoretically disconnected from extant literature is apt to emphasise 
only the side of computational representations. Therefore, similar to studies with other 
approaches, the roadmap recommends that a study using a simulation approach should 
start from the clear and concrete definition of a research question which is derived from 
the intensive review of existing literature and which is involved in theoretical issues.  
 
It is also emphasised that the development of a new theory or the extension of an 
existing theory through a simulation approach is based on a “simple theory” which 
serves as a platform for discovering new findings. A simple theory is regarded as an 
immature theory which is restricted due to “weak conceptualisation, few propositions, 
and/or rough underlying theoretical logic” (Davis et al., 2007, p.484). However, it does 
not always refer to a less developed theory. That is, the roadmap suggests that a well-
established theory can perform the role of a simple theory when a research question is 
associated with competitions, conflicts, tensions and trade-offs among concepts or 
processes drawn from this mature theory. 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature concerning the concepts and roles of 
relational and structural embeddedness to respond to uncertainty in the context of ITO. 
In addition to this review, the chapter explored the comparison between the two types of 
embeddedness in other research contexts. Through this comprehensive literature review, 
the following research question was clearly defined: which of the two types of 
embeddedness is more suitable for improving long-term performance at the different 
levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty imposed on ITO 
business environments? The two uncertainties are discovered from transaction cost 
theory and agency theory. Also, the notions of relational and structural embeddedness 
are supported by relational exchange theory and social capital theory respectively. As a 
result, this research attempts to resolve the tension between the two types of 
embeddedness in the presence of the two uncertainties based on the above simple 
theories through a simulation approach. Furthermore, this approach is appropriate for 
addressing the research question in this study as described in the previous section. 
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3.3.2 Step 2: Choose simulation method 
 
The roadmap proposes the following five simulation methods: systems dynamics, NK 
fitness landscape, genetic algorithms, cellular automata and stochastic processes. Table 
3-1 shows the comparison of the methods, which is extracted from the table in the 
research of Davis et al. (2007, p.486).  
 
Table 3-1 Simulation Method 
Method Focus 
Systems  
dynamics 
Behaviour of a system with complex causality and timing 
NK fitness 
landscape 
Speed and effectiveness of adaptation of modular systems with tight vs. loose 
coupling to an optimal point 
Genetic  
algorithms 
Adaptation of a population of agents via simple learning to an optimal agent form 
Cellular  
automata 
Emergence of macro patterns from micro interactions via spatial processes in a 
population of agents 
Stochastic  
processes 
Flexible method to a wide variety of research questions, assumptions and 
theoretical logics 
Method Common Research Questions 
Systems 
dynamics 
What conditions create system instability? 
NK fitness 
landscape 
How long does it take to find an optimal point? 
What is the performance of an optimal point? 
Genetic 
algorithms 
What affects the rate of adaptation? 
When does an optimal form emerge? 
Cellular 
automata 
How does a pattern emerge and change? 
How fast does a pattern emerge? 
Stochastic 
processes 
No specific research questions beyond asking what the effects of varying stochastic 
sources are? 
Method Key Assumptions 
Systems 
dynamics 
System with intersecting and circular causal loops 
Flows that specify rates within system 
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Table 3-1 Continued 
Method Key Assumptions 
NK fitness 
landscape 
System of N nodes and K coupling  
Fitness landscape that maps the performance of all combinations 
Adaptation via incremental moves and long jumps 
Genetic 
algorithms 
Population of agents with genes / Evolutionary adaptation / 
Variation via mutation and crossover / Retention via copying selected agents 
Cellular 
automata 
Population of spatially arrayed and semi-intelligent agents 
Neighbourhood of agents where local rules apply 
Stochastic 
processes 
One or more processes by which system operates 
One or more stochastic sources  
Probabilistic distributions for each stochastic source 
Method Common Experiments 
Systems 
dynamics 
Add causal loops / Change mean of flow rates / Change variance of flow rates 
NK fitness 
landscape 
Vary N and K / Change adaptation moves / Add a map of the landscape / 
Create an environmental jolt 
Genetic 
algorithms 
Vary mutation probability / Vary crossover probability /  
Vary length of evolution time / Create an environmental jolt 
Cellular 
automata 
Change rules / Change neighbourhood size 
Stochastic 
processes 
Change stochastic sources / Vary levels of stochasticity / Unpack constructs / 
Change pieces of theoretical logic 
(Source: Davis et al., 2007) 
 
The first four methods are standardised methods which have their own applicable 
research questions, assumptions and common experiments. On the other hand, 
stochastic processes are just an alternative name for a set of simulation methods which 
are customised to specific domains and include probabilistic sources. Therefore, this 
method is recommended when research questions, assumptions and common 
experiments in a certain simulation study do not match those in the four standardised 
methods. The roadmap also suggests that a study applying stochastic processes is 
suitable to examine how the different levels of stochastic sources can affect outcomes. 
For this examination, several interesting sources of probability are varied while others 
are fixed. 
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The research question in this study does not lie in the categories of the first four 
methods. Furthermore, the levels of the two uncertainties are varied while the values of 
other parameters are fixed in full factorial simulation experiments. Therefore, this study 
employs stochastic processes, which are customised to investigate the conditional 
superiority of each type of embeddedness at the different levels of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty.   
 
3.3.3 Step 3: Create Computational Representation 
 
The roadmap demonstrates that creating computational representations includes three 
activities: operationalising theoretical constructs, building algorithms and specifying 
assumptions. It is also illustrated that the activities are simultaneously performed since 
constructs, algorithms and assumptions are highly correlated. 
 
Operationalising Theoretical Constructs 
 
During the activity of operationalising theoretical constructs, the measures for them are 
computationally defined. The roadmap describes that this operationalisation in a 
simulation study is roughly similar to the development of measures to gauge constructs 
in an empirical research. It is argued, therefore, that constructs in a simulation study 
should be based on existing literature for the theoretical consistency with extant studies 
and their computational measures should be rigorously formulated for the correctness of 
analyses.  
 
Building Algorithms 
 
Theoretical logics, constructs and assumptions are embodied in a computer programme 
during the activity of building algorithms. The roadmap argues that the adjustment of 
the tension between parsimony and accuracy is one of the most important issues in 
building algorithms and depends on the complexity of theoretical logics, constructs and 
assumptions. It is pointed out, however, that a simulation study frequently emphasises 
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the side of parsimony because a simple algorithm is intuitively understood and hence is 
used as a basis for extracting more complex implications (Repenning, 2003). 
    
Specifying Assumptions 
 
The research range is limited by the specification of assumptions. Furthermore, the 
roadmap claims that this specification itself is a way of adjusting the tension between 
parsimony and accuracy because assumptions can exclude several logics and constructs 
which are not essential to address a research question. 
 
In Chapter 4, a simulation model is developed which includes theoretical logics, 
constructs and assumptions. An ITO network is modelled where vendors build consortia 
to maximise their long-term profits in response to given outsourcing opportunities. At 
first, vendors in this network are provided with ITO opportunities with the different 
levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty. Then, they act as a 
coordinator or a partner in establishing ITO consortia. As coordinators, they take the 
relational or structural strategy. As partners, they behave cooperatively or 
opportunistically. Also, the winning consortium members gain their profits in 
accordance with the assessment result of a delivered IT service. Their decision-makings 
and profits are formulated through a game-theoretic method. 
 
The following key constructs are operationalised to embody this simulation model. 
 
 Partner selection and control strategy based on relational embeddedness, which 
is called “relational strategy”  
 
 Partner selection and control strategy based on structural embeddedness, which 
is called “structural strategy”  
 
 Cooperative behaviour 
 
 Opportunistic behaviour including adverse selection and moral hazard 
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 Uncertainty stemming from the unpredictability of technological requirements, 
which is called “technological unpredictability” 
 
 Uncertainty originating in the difficulty in measuring performance, which is 
called “measurement difficulty”  
 
Next, the following measures are developed for the comparison between relational and 
structural embeddedness. 
 
 Cumulative profit for coordination abilities 
 
 Cumulative number of ties 
 
 Average strength of ties 
 
 Average proportion of opportunistic partners 
 
 Average proportion of existing or reputational partners 
 
Finally, the following key assumptions are made in this research. 
 
 Technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty exist together in ITO 
business environments. 
 
 Existing partners for the coordinators taking the relational strategy can be 
controlled with lower hidden costs than reputational partners for the coordinators 
taking the structural strategy.  
 
 Vendors can update and transfer information on others’ tendencies to behave 
cooperatively or opportunistically through network ties. 
 
 Vendors share a norm such that a vendor is deprived of its further outsourcing 
opportunities when its opportunistic behaviour is detected. 
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3.3.4 Step 4: Verify Computational Representation 
 
The roadmap argues that the step of verifying computational representations is very 
critical in a simulation approach. Verification is a procedure for confirming internal 
validity (Davis et al., 2007, p.482). That is, this activity confirms whether 
computational representations correctly reflect theoretical logics, constructs and 
assumptions, and provides high internal validity. In the roadmap, several ways are 
proposed to verify computational representations. Above all, it is most significant to 
compare the simulation results derived from the implementation of a simulation model 
with the existing propositions of simple theories. Theoretical logics, constructs and 
assumptions are likely to be correctly embodied when the results maintain the 
consistency with the propositions. In addition, the completeness and correctness of 
coding need to be verified through monitoring the values of key variables at each step of 
a simulation model. 
 
In Chapter 5, full factorial experiments are designed. Then, the basic test for verifying 
the developed simulation model is conducted at the low level of technological 
unpredictability and the high level of measurement difficulty. The results at this 
experimental point are compared with the existing studies addressing the advantages of 
relational embeddedness when it is difficult to measure performance. This comparison 
confirms whether the model is consistent with extant theories. At the same time, the 
source codes are checked through tracking the values of key variables at each procedure 
of the model.  
 
3.3.5 Step 5: Experiment to Build Novel Theory 
 
The roadmap describes that a new theory is established or an existing theory is extended 
through effective and appropriate simulation experiments. The following four types of 
simulation experiments are proposed: varying values of constructs, unpacking 
constructs, varying assumptions and adding new features. The first type is common in 
the case where new findings can be discovered by varying the values of constructs 
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which are fixed in simple theories. Next, if a multidimensional construct can be divided 
into several subconstructs which have their own unique effects, unpacking constructs is 
helpful. The third type is applicable when there are alternative processes and the 
assumptions for them are different. Finally, adding new features to original 
computational representations can provide a better understanding of complex 
interactions among processes which individually exist. 
 
In Chapter 5, the complete tests for comparing the two types of embeddedness are 
conducted at all the experimental points. The levels of the two uncertainties are varied 
while the values of the other parameters are fixed. Also, the following measures are 
gauged at each test point: (1) the average proportion of existing or reputational partners, 
(2) the average proportion of opportunistic partners, (3) the average strength of ties, (4) 
the cumulative number of ties and (5) the cumulative profit for coordination abilities. 
Then, the analysis results reveal the conditional superiority of each type of 
embeddedness at the different levels of technological unpredictability and measurement 
difficulty.  
 
3.3.6 Step 6: Validate with Empirical Data 
 
The final step is to validate a simulation model. Validation is a procedure for 
strengthening external validity (Davis et al., 2007, p.482). New findings in a simulation 
study can be validated through the collection and analysis of additional empirical data 
related to them. However, the developers of the roadmap state that the significance of 
validating a simulation model is controversial. They take a contingent view and argue 
that the importance is subject to the extent to which simple theories are supported by 
empirical evidences. That is, the validation is a less significant issue in a simulation 
study applying simple theories which have evolved based on a lot of empirical literature. 
Conversely, its importance is emphasised when a simulation research employs simple 
theories which are mainly based on analytical arguments.     
 
Considerable empirical evidence supports the simple theories applied to this research 
(i.e. relational exchange theory, social capital theory, transaction cost theory and agency 
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theory). Therefore, the new findings derived from the simulation results can attain a 
certain level of their external validity. As a result, the validation issue is less important 
and this final step is not addressed in this research.    
 
3.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
There is no study applying a simulation approach among the papers explored in several 
literature reviews on ITO (Dibbern et al., 2004; Fjermestad and Saitta, 2005; Gonzalez 
et al., 2006; Lacity et al., 2010). A simulation study is rarely found in the research area 
of ITO in spite of its usefulness. Therefore, this chapter specifically explained why and 
how a simulation approach was applied to this research. 
 
Firstly, the roles of a simulation approach in management studies were explained. It was 
shown that a theory developed or extended through a simulation approach can be 
qualified for a well-made theory. Next, this approach was compared with a deductive 
and inductive approach. This comparison provided a better understanding of the 
usefulness of a simulation approach. In addition to the comparison, several research 
settings were identified where this approach is applicable. Finally, this section 
illustrated the roles of a simulation approach in developing a new theory or extending an 
existing theory, and the two evaluation criteria for a simulation study.    
 
Secondly, it was described how this research proceeds based on “the roadmap for 
developing theories with simulations”. The simulation steps to address the research 
question in this study include (1) beginning with a research question and simple theory, 
(2) choosing a simulation method, (3) creating computational representations, (4) 
verifying computation representations and (5) experimenting to build a novel theory. 
The final step of validating with empirical data was excluded.   
 
In the next chapter, a simulation model is developed based on existing theories and 
empirical studies to compare relational and structural embeddedness at the different 
levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty. 
 
Chapter 4 Simulation Model 
71 
 
CHAPTER 4 SIMULATION MODEL 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 aims at describing a simulation model which can examine the conditional 
superiority of each type of embeddedness according to the type and level of uncertainty 
based on several theories. At first, transaction cost theory and agency theory propose the 
two uncertainties (i.e. technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty) which 
are significantly addressed in ITO studies (Bahli and Rivard, 2003; Kim and Chung, 
2003; Robertson and Gatignon, 1998). In the simulation model, the market offers ITO 
business opportunities with the different levels of the two uncertainties. Next, the 
establishment of ITO consortia is simulated in response to these opportunities. Vendors 
in an ITO network perform the role of either a coordinator or a partner. As coordinators, 
they take the partner selection and control strategy based on relational or structural 
embeddedness (i.e. the relational or structural strategy). The advantages of each strategy 
are derived from relational exchange theory and social capital theory respectively 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ravindran et al., 2009). As partners, they behave 
cooperatively or opportunistically. Two types of opportunistic behaviour drawn from 
agency theory are manifested in the simulation model: adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, the decision-makings and payoffs of ITO consortium 
members are modelled based on the game models developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) and Kandori (1992). 
 
This chapter includes the following sections. Firstly, it is overviewed how the 
simulation proceeds. The next section describes several characteristics of vendors in an 
ITO network. Thirdly, it is explained how ITO opportunities with the different levels of 
the two uncertainties are generated. In sequence, the decision-makings of coordinators 
and (potential) partners are illustrated. Thereafter, consortium members’ profits are 
formulated. It is also demonstrated how vendors update and transfer information on 
others through ITO network ties. Finally, several measures are illustrated to compare 
relational and structural embeddedness. 
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4.2 Simulation Procedure 
 
This research simulates an ITO network where vendors establish consortia in response 
to outsourcing opportunities given by the market. Figure 4-1 schematically shows how 
the simulation proceeds. 
 
Figure 4-1 Simulation Procedures 
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Initially, the market generates an ITO business opportunity with certain levels of 
technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty. The details of this 
opportunity are defined in a request-for-proposals (RFP). Then, the RFP is notified to 
vendors in an ITO network.  
 
Thereafter, several vendors qualified to be coordinators establish their ITO consortia. A 
coordinator has an option to take the relational or structural strategy. A coordinator 
employing the relational strategy prefers an existing partner who is strongly connected 
while one using the structural strategy favours a reputational partner who is located in a 
prominent network position. In the meantime, a cooperative potential partner attempts 
to participate in an ITO consortium only if it has enough resources to cover a 
technological requirement in the RFP while an opportunistic one tries to become a 
consortium member exaggerating its current resource availability.  
 
After several ITO consortia are established, the coordinators submit their proposals to 
the market. When receiving the proposals, the market selects the one with the highest 
level of coordination abilities and awards a contract in accordance with the RFP to the 
winning consortium. The other consortia except for the winner are disbanded and their 
members wait for the next opportunity.  
 
The winning consortium coordinator manages its partners by using coordination 
abilities. When the coordinator takes the relational strategy, an existing partner can be 
controlled with lower hidden costs because they are coupled through a strong tie. On the 
other hand, when the coordinator employs the structural strategy, a reputational partner 
is likely to be more suitable for a given technological requirement. However, it should 
bear higher hidden costs because the outsourcing parties are not completely committed 
to each other. In the meantime, the partners perform their tasks by inputting their 
resources to cover the technological requirements in the contract. A cooperative partner 
invests as many resources as required while an opportunistic one inputs no resources for 
its own interests. 
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When the tasks are completed, the coordinator delivers the IT service. Then, the market 
assesses the quality of the delivered IT service and gives the payoff according to the 
assessment result. Thereafter, the coordinator allocates the payoff to its consortium 
partners. More specifically, if the quality is evaluated as satisfactory, the coordinator 
believes that all the members behaved cooperatively (i.e. they invested as many 
resources as required). Therefore, it allocates the payoff to them in proportion to the 
amounts of resources required in the RFP. On the other hand, if the quality is assessed 
as unsatisfactory and opportunistic partners are detected, the coordinator allocates the 
payoff to its partners according to the amounts of resources which were actually 
invested by them. That is, a cooperative partner receives the payoff which is the same 
with the amount of resources which it inputted while an opportunistic partner receives 
nothing. Finally, the members update and transfer information on one another through 
ITO network ties. 
 
The simulation model mainly includes three parts: market’s activities, coordinator’s 
activities and partner’s activities. More specifically, the market's activities are involved 
in publishing a RFP, selecting the winning consortium, assessing the quality of a 
delivered IT service and awarding payoff. The coordinator’s activities consist of 
identifying the types and quantities of resources for technological requirements in a RFP, 
selecting partners according to the identified resource set, coordinating members, 
allocating payoff and updating information. The partner’s activities include applying for 
a consortium member, performing a given task through the investment of its resources 
and updating information. The computational representations of each party are provided 
in the following sections. 
 
4.3 Vendors in ITO Network 
 
In an ITO network, there exist vendors who play the role of either a coordinator or a 
partner in establishing ITO consortia to respond to given outsourcing opportunities with 
the different levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty.  
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As coordinators, vendors take the relational or structural strategy, which affects their 
decision-makings on how to select and control consortium members. A coordinator 
taking the relational strategy attempts to select existing partners who are strongly 
connected through the experience of participating in ITO consortia together. The 
coordinator has the outsourcing histories for these partners in the perspective of 
relational embeddedness (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). In this case, the level of 
uncertainty can be noticeably decreased by flexibility, solidarity and information 
sharing which emerge and evolve through the repetition or long-term maintenance of 
outsourcing relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Furthermore, the coordinator can 
reduce the cost of measuring the partners’ outcomes because the outsourcing parties 
believe that their temporary inequities will be eventually compensated for by their long-
term joint success and hence the need for the precise measurement of performance is 
decreased (Kronman, 1985). Therefore, it can control their behaviour with lower hidden 
costs (Barthelemy, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, a coordinator taking the structural strategy tries to choose 
reputational partners who occupy prominent network positions although it has no 
outsourcing histories for them from the viewpoint of structural embeddedness (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). The partners are likely to be more competent for given outsourcing 
opportunities because a network position is an indicator of past performance and a 
predictor of future behaviour (Gopal et al., 2003; Malik and Bouguettaya, 2009). 
Furthermore, the coordinator actively uses information on potential partners which is 
transferred by third parties (Drath and Wayman, 2010). Therefore, it can flexibly 
respond to the fast and unstable pace of technological change by collecting information 
on multiple alternative candidates through the observation of their network positions 
and the information transmission via third parties, and by selecting the most suitable 
partners. However, in this case, the coordinator bears the higher hidden costs of 
managing the partners’ behaviour since they are not completely committed to each other. 
 
As partners, vendors behave cooperatively or opportunistically. Two types of 
opportunistic behaviour are manifested in the simulation model: adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989). That is, an opportunistic vendor attempts to attend an 
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ITO consortium by exaggerating its current resource availability although the amount of 
its resources is smaller than that is required (i.e. adverse selection). Also, when selected 
as a partner, it invests no resources for its own interests (i.e. moral hazard). These types 
of behaviour induce a coordinator to select an unqualified partner and decrease the 
quality of a delivered IT service (Aubert et al., 1998).  
 
Besides the key assumptions in Section 3.3.3 Create Computational Representation, the 
following assumptions related to vendors are additionally made for the parsimony of the 
developed simulation model. 
 
 As a coordinator, a vendor takes either of the two divergent strategies (i.e. the 
relational or structural strategy), and selects one partner for each type of 
technology in the establishment of its ITO consortium. 
 
 As a partner, a vendor has either of the two contradictory behavioural tendencies 
(i.e. the tendency to behave cooperatively or opportunistically), and has 
resources for one type of technology. 
 
Figure 4-2 graphically shows vendors and their characteristics in an ITO network. 
 
Figure 4-2 Vendors and Characteristics in ITO network 
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vij represents the j th vendor who has resources for the i th type of technology. Then, it 
has rij(t) and bij to act as a partner and, at the same time, aij(t) and sij to serve as a 
coordinator in the establishment of an ITO consortium. More specifically, let us suppose 
that following vendors exist in an ITO network. 
 
vi1, vi2, ···, vij, ···, vin for i = 1, 2, ···, m, (4-1) 
 
where m denotes the number of technology types. Also, n and vij represent the number 
of vendors who has resources for the i th type of technology and the j th among those 
vendors. Also, it is assumed that n is an even number. 
 
Then, vij has the following features to serve as a partner. 
 
rij(t) for t = 0, 1, ···, T and bij, 
 
where rij(t) and bij represent the amount of resources which vij has for the i th type of 
technology at the period of t and the behavioural propensity which vij has. At the initial 
period of t = 0, rij(0) is generated to follow the uniform distribution over the range 
[rmin(0), rmax(0)]. In the meantime, let nc or no be the number of cooperative or 
opportunistic vendors for each type of technology. Then, n = nc + no. Also, +1 or −1 is 
randomly given to bij so that nc = no, where each value means that vij behaves 
cooperatively or opportunistically. 
 
At the same time, vij has the following characteristics to play a coordinator role. 
 
aij(t) for t = 0, 1, ···, T and sij, 
 
where aij(t) and sij indicate the level of coordination abilities which vij has at the period 
of t and the strategy which vij takes. At the initial period of t = 0, aij(0) is generated to 
follow the uniform distribution over the range [amin(0), amax(0)]. In the meantime, let nr 
or ns be the number of vendors taking the relational or structural strategy for each type 
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of technology. Then, n = nr + ns. Also, +1 or −1 is randomly given to sij, so that nr = ns,   
where each value means that vij takes the relational or structural strategy. 
 
4.4 Two Uncertainties Imposed on ITO Business Environments 
 
This research simulates the uncertainties stemming from the unpredictability of 
technological requirements and the difficulty in measuring outcomes. Basically, 
transaction relationships are initiated and maintained at a certain level of uncertainty 
and their performance is seriously affected by measurement difficulty (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982). Also, the selection of a suitable governance structure in 
response to the type and level of uncertainty is one of the important determinants of 
successful transactions (Beckman et al., 2004; Robertson and Gatignon, 1998). In ITO 
studies, the two uncertainties have been frequently and significantly addressed (Kim and 
Chung, 2003; Lacity et al., 2010) since they increase the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour and threaten long-term performance (Auber et al. 1998, 1999). Therefore, the 
different levels of technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty create an 
ideal platform for the comparison between relational and structural embeddedness in 
ITO business environments.  
 
4.4.1 Technological Unpredictability 
 
In the simulation model, a request-for-proposals (RFP) is denoted by a combination of 
types and quantities of coordination abilities and resources which are necessary to cover 
technological requirements for the delivery of an outsourced IT service. Therefore, the 
RFP published at the period of t is indicated by  
 
RFP(t) = [pa(t), pr1(t), pr2(t), ···, prx(t), ···, prm(t)], 
 
where pa(t) and prx(t) denote the level of coordination abilities and the amount of 
resources for the x th type of technology required in RFP(t).  
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In the meantime, uncertainty is defined as “the degree of unpredictability or volatility of 
future states as it relates to the definition of IS requirements, emerging technologies, 
and/or environmental factors” (Lacity et al., 2010, p.411). Following this definition, 
technological unpredictability in the simulation model is represented as the extent to 
which technological requirements in a RFP are unpredictable. More specifically, this 
uncertainty can be considered from two viewpoints: how fast technological 
requirements increase and how unstably they fluctuate as time passes. Their rapid 
incline and unsteady variation can hinder vendors from responding to future outsourcing 
opportunities. On the other hand, vendors can keep up with the pace of change in 
technological requirements when they increase slowly and their fluctuation range is 
narrow.    
  
In order to simulate this situation, pa(t) and prx(t) are generated to follow the normal 
distribution with μa(t), σa(t) and μr(t), σr(t), where 
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Also, pa(t) or prx(t) with a negative value is generated again. Then, α can indicate the 
increasing rate and instability of coordination abilities and resources required in RFP(t). 
That is, as the value of α is higher, pa(t) and prx(t) are likely to increase more steeply 
and their fluctuation range seems to become larger over time.  
 
In the simulation model, technological unpredictability is associated with the use of 
elaborate tender procedures and rigorous contract clauses. When the change of 
technological requirements is too rapid and unstable, existing or reputational partners 
for a coordinator taking the relational or structural strategy may not cover them. In this 
case, new consortium members should be found and controlled with elaborate tender 
Chapter 4 Simulation Model 
80 
 
procedures and rigorous contract clauses. However, these formal mechanisms incur the 
considerable hidden costs involved in selecting and managing new partners (Barthelemy, 
2001). 
 
4.4.2 Measurement Difficulty 
 
The quality of a delivered IT service is one of the critical indicators to measure ITO 
performance (Dibbern et al., 2004) and is evaluated in the perspective of “fitness of 
use”, that is, whether a customer’s requirements are satisfied (Garvin, 1988). Let I(t) 
and R(t) be the sum of coordination abilities and resources which are actually invested 
by the winning consortium members at the period of t, and the sum of coordination 
abilities and resources which are necessary to cover the technological requirements in 
RFP(t). Then, the quality of an IT service can be assessed with respect to the following 
proportion. 
 
Prop(t) = I(t) / R(t) (4-3)  
 
since the proportion can represents the extent to which the technological requirements in 
the RFP have been achieved. For example, the extreme case that Prop(t) = 1 indicates 
the winning consortium members inputted all the coordination abilities and resources 
required in RFP(t) and hence all the requirements have been achieved. In the meantime, 
this proportion is decided by the number of opportunistic partners in the winning 
consortium because they invest no resources for their own interests. The higher the 
number, the lower the proportion and vice versa. 
 
However, it is almost impossible to exactly measure this proportion due to measurement 
difficulty, which is defined as “the degree of difficulty in measuring performance of 
exchange partners under circumstances of joint effort, soft outcomes, and/or ambiguous 
links between effort and performance” (Lacity et al., 2010, p.411). This uncertainty 
stems from various sources according to the types of IT activities, for example, high in 
the comprehensive type of ITO such as “application development, systems conversion 
and integration, consulting services and disaster recovery” and low in the commodity 
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type of ITO such as “network maintenance, data center operations, systems maintenance 
and PC maintenance” (Goo et al., 2007, p.2116). Therefore, the type of an outsourced 
IT service makes a difference in the extent to which Prop(t) can be exactly measured.  
 
In order to simulate this situation, a cut-off value (β) between 0 and 1 is given to an 
outsourced IT service, which refers to the degree to which the technological 
requirements in RFP(t) can be verified. Then, the quality of a delivered IT service is 
evaluated as 
 
satisfactory if β ≤ Prop(t) or unsatisfactory if β > Prop(t). (4-4) 
 
For example, let us suppose that β = 0.7 and Prop(t) = 0.8. In this case, seventy percent 
of the technological requirements in RFP(t) can be verified. Also, eighty percent of 
them have been achieved although this proportion cannot be exactly measured. Then, 
the quality is evaluated as satisfactory. An IT service with the high value of β is 
involved in the commodity type of ITO. In contrast, the comprehensive type of ITO 
includes an IT service with the low value of β. 
 
The randomness for measurement difficulty originates in a combination of Prop(t) and β. 
Above all, a coordinator cannot always select cooperative partners. Therefore, Prop(t) 
has a wide range of values between 0 and 1 according to the number of opportunistic 
partners in the winning ITO consortium. Furthermore, it is difficult to exactly measure 
this proportion. Therefore, the quality evaluation result is subject to Prop(t) and β. For 
example, although Prop(t) is low, the quality is assessed as satisfactory if β is lower 
than Prop(t). On the contrary, it is evaluated as unsatisfactory if β is higher than Prop(t).  
 
In the simulation model, measurement difficulty is related to the correctness of 
information on (potential) partners. At the high level of measurement difficulty, the 
quality of a delivered IT service may be evaluated as satisfactory although its actual 
quality is low. In this case, consortium members’ opportunistic behaviour is not 
detected and hence incorrect information on them is distributed across an ITO network. 
Moreover, coordinators need to use more coordination abilities to control their partners’ 
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behaviour and to exactly measure their performance when it is difficult to measure 
outcomes (Barthelemy, 2001).  
 
4.5 Coordinator’s Decision-Making 
 
Figure 4-3 Coordinator’s Decision-Makings 
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taking the relational or structural strategy attempts to form an ITO consortium with 
existing partners who are coupled through strong ties or reputational partners who 
occupy prominent network positions. Furthermore, the type of its strategy makes a 
difference in the hidden costs of managing members (Barthelemy, 2001; Gopal et al., 
2003; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). With a focus on the relational and structural strategy, 
this section explains a coordinator’s decision-makings, which are schematically shown 
in Figure 4-3. 
 
4.5.1 Whether to Become Coordinator 
 
When receiving RFP(t), a vendor (vij) can be qualified for a coordinator if 
 
aij(t) ≥ pa(t), 
 
which means that the level of its coordination abilities is higher than that is required in 
the RFP. However, in order to prevent too many coordinators from forming their ITO 
consortia in the simulation, p1 percent of the vendors satisfying this condition are 
randomly selected as coordinators.  
 
4.5.2 Publication of Call-for-Bids (CFB) 
 
A coordinator publishes CFBs to secure resources which are necessary to cover the 
technological requirements in the RFP. Again, let vij be a coordinator. Then, this 
coordinator does not need to find a partner to provide resources for the i th type of 
technology if 
 
rij(t) ≥ pri(t) 
 
because it has enough resources for this type of technology. On the other hand, vij needs 
to additionally secure resources which are necessary to cover the requirement for the i th 
type of technology if  
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rij(t) < pri(t) 
 
since the amount of its resources is smaller than that is required in the RFP.  
 
For the convenience of the description, let rij(t) ≥ pri(t) and rij(t) < pri(t) be the condition 
1 (C1) and condition 2 (C2) respectively. Also, let CFBijx(t) be the CFB which vij 
publishes to secure resources for the x th type of technology required in RFP(t). Then, 
vij publishes the following CFBs to secure resources under C1. 
 
CFBij1(t), CFBij2(t), ···, CFBi,j,i-1(t), CFBi,j,i+1(t), ···, CFBijm(t), 
 
where CFBijx(t) = [brijx(t)] and brijx(t) = prx(t) (x ≠ i). Under this condition, vij has 
enough resources for the i th type of technology. Therefore, it can cover this 
technological requirement for itself. On the other hand, the coordinator additionally 
publishes the following CFB to compensate for the lack of resources for the i th type of 
technology under C2. 
 
CFBiji(t), 
 
where CFBiji(t) = [briji(t)] and briji(t) = pri(t) – rij(t). 
 
4.5.3 Relational vs. Structural Strategy 
 
A coordinator taking the relational strategy prefers an existing partner who is strongly 
connected through prior working experience. Let 
 
pij↔xy(t) (4-5) 
 
be vij’s cumulative profit gained through the join in ITO consortia together with vxy until 
the period of t − 1. Then, this indicator can denote the strength of the tie between vij and 
vxy (Uzzi, 1996).  
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Let vij↔x,pmax(t) be the vendor with the maximum value of pij↔xy(t). Then, vij such as sij = 
+1 (i.e. taking the relational strategy) requests 
 
vij↔x,pmax(t) 
 
to attend its ITO consortium for the x th type of technology.  
 
Alternatively, a coordinator employing the structural strategy favours a reputational 
partner who occupies a prominent network position. Let cxy(t) be vxy’s degree centrality 
at the period of t. Then, this measurement can indicate the extent to which vxy is 
prominent in an ITO network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and is calculated as follows.  
 
1 1
1
( )
( )
um n
uv xyv u
xy m
vv
r t
c t
n
 

   , (4-6) 
 
where ruv↔xy(t) = +1 if vuv has the experience of participating in ITO consortia together 
with vxy between the period of 1 and t − 1, or 0 if it has no experience. In addition to 
information gained through the observation of network positions, the coordinator 
actively uses information transferred through indirect ties. That is, although vij has no 
experience of joining ITO consortia together with vxy, the coordinator can know about 
this potential partner’s behavioural tendency through the information transmission via 
third parties. Therefore, in the case where vij receives information on vxy’s tendency to 
behave opportunistically, the coordinator does not request this candidate to participate in 
its ITO consortium although cxy(t) is high.  
 
Let vij↔x,cmax(t) be the vendor with the maximum value of cxy(t) among candidates who 
are perceived to be cooperative by vij. Then, vij such as sij = −1 (i.e. taking the structural 
strategy) asks 
 
vij↔x,cmax(t) 
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to participate in its ITO consortium for the x th type of technology.  
 
In the meantime, when there is no such existing or reputational partner or when 
vij↔x,pmax(t) or vij↔x,cmax(t) rejects the request to join, vij notifies CFBijx(t) to vendors who 
have resources for the x type of technology and unavoidably uses a competitive tender 
to find its member. However, it incurs the substantial hidden costs involved in running a 
bid, which is denoted by bc in the simulation model. 
 
Next, let us suppose that an ITO consortium is selected as the winner. When the 
winning consortium coordinator takes the relational strategy, an existing partner who is 
connected through a strong tie can be managed with lower hidden costs, which is 
represented by rc in the model. Alternatively, when the coordinator employs the 
structural strategy, a reputational partner who occupies a prominent network position is 
likely to be more suitable for a given technological requirement. However, the 
coordinator should bear the higher hidden costs of controlling this partner because they 
are not completely committed to each other. In the simulation model, the hidden costs of 
managing a reputational member are represented by sc. Finally, when a partner is 
selected via a competitive tender, the coordinator needs to design more customised 
contract clauses and to more strictly enforce them. In this case, these formal 
mechanisms incur considerable hidden costs, which are indicated by cc in the model. 
Also, based on this reasoning, the simulation model makes the following assumption on 
the hidden costs involved in selecting and controlling a partner. 
 
rc < sc < bc + cc. (4-7) 
 
4.6 Partner’s Decision-Making 
 
A cooperative (potential) partner attempts to participate in an ITO consortium only 
when it has enough resources to cover a technological requirement, and invests as many 
resources as required. However, an opportunistic one tries to become a consortium 
member by exaggerating its current resource availability (i.e. adverse selection) and 
inputs no resources for its own interests (i.e. moral hazard) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kandori, 
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1992; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Figure 4-4 schematically illustrates the decision-
makings of a (potential) partner. 
 
Figure 4-4 Partner’s Decision-Making 
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vij↔x,pmax(t) or vij↔x,cmax(t) be vxy again. Then, vxy such as bxy = +1 (i.e. behaving 
cooperatively) agrees to the request and become a partner only if it satisfies  
 
rxy(t) ≥ brijx(t),  
 
which means that the amount of its resources is higher than that is required. 
 
In contrast, vxy such as bxy = −1 (i.e. behaving opportunistically) accepts the request  
 
regardless of its current resource availability. 
 
That is, although the vendor cannot cover the requirement for the x th type of 
technology, it agrees to this asking and becomes a partner. This deceit may induce the 
coordinator to select an unqualified partner (Aubert et al., 1998). 
 
When a CFB is notified for a competitive tender, the behaviour of a bidder is similar to 
that of a vendor requested to attend an ITO consortium. A cooperative bidder decides to 
apply to become a consortium member only if it can cover the technological 
requirement. On the contrary, an opportunistic candidate unconditionally bids for the 
CFB. This deception may also induce the coordinator to choose an incompetent partner 
(Aubert et al., 1998). In the meantime, in order to prevent too many vendors from 
bidding, p2 percent of the cooperative vendors satisfying the above condition and the 
opportunistic vendors are randomly selected as bidders. Let vxy be a bidder in case of the 
notification of CFBijx(t). Then, vxy such as bxy = +1 (i.e. behaving cooperatively) submits 
a bid which represents that the amount of its resources is 
 
rxy(t). 
 
On the other hand, vxy such as bxy = −1 (i.e. behaving opportunistically) submits a bid 
which indicates that the quantity of its resources is  
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rxy(t) if rxy(t) ≥ brijx(t) or brijx(t) if rxy(t) < brijx(t). 
 
Then, the coordinator selects the candidate submitting the bid with the largest amount of 
resources as a partner. 
 
Next, let us suppose that vxy becomes a partner for the x th type of technology and the 
ITO consortium which it belongs to is selected as the winner by the market. Then, vxy 
such as bxy = +1 (i.e. behaving cooperatively) invests as many resources as the 
coordinator requires while vxy such as bxy = −1 (i.e. behaving opportunistically) spends 
no resources for its own interests. This breach may decrease the quality of an IT service 
(Aubert et al., 1998). 
 
4.7 Profits 
 
The decision-makings and profits of ITO consortium members follow a modified game 
model based on a mixture of the following two game models. The game model 
developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) describes the repetition of transactions 
between a specific employer and employee. The authors show that this iteration can 
serve as a mechanism to safeguard against opportunism and improve long-term 
outcomes. However, particular members may not repeatedly build their consortium for 
each outsourcing opportunity in the context of ITO (Ravindran et al., 2009). The game 
model developed by Kandori (1992) reveals that the roles of the repeatedness can be 
substituted with the direct observation of various labels (e.g. reputation, membership 
and license) or the indirect collection of this information through third parties. In 
addition, the author suggests that a norm such that an opportunistic member is 
permanently expelled from a community can serve as an alternative to the repeatedness. 
Following the results, the simulation model assumes that vendors in an ITO network 
can update and transfer information on others’ tendencies to behave cooperatively or 
opportunistically through the observation of network positions and the information 
transmission via indirect ties. It is also assumed that they share a norm such that a 
vendor is deprived of its further outsourcing opportunities when its opportunistic 
behaviour is detected. Then, the sharing of this information and norm can promote a 
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partner’s cooperation even in a one-time outsourcing relationship. Therefore, a 
combination of the two game models enables the analyses of the decision-makings and 
profits for both cases of the relational and structural strategy in the simulation model. 
 
The profits of the winning consortium members are calculated for four cases according 
to the assessment result of a delivered IT service and the sufficiency of the winning 
consortium coordinator’s resources as shown in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 Profits for Four Cases 
Case C1 such as rij(t) ≥ pri(t) C2 such as  rij(t) < pri(t) 
Unsatisfactory quality 
and Opportunism detected 
 Profit of coordinator  
such as sij = +1 or −1 
 Profit of partner 
such as bij = +1 or −1 
 Profit of coordinator  
such as sij = +1 or −1 
 Profit of partner 
such as bij = +1 or −1 
Satisfactory quality  Profit of coordinator  
such as sij = +1 or −1 
 Profit of partner 
such as bij = +1 or −1 
 Profit of coordinator  
such as sij = +1 or −1 
 Profit of partner 
such as bij = +1 or −1 
 
4.7.1 Actual Investment 
 
Let vij and caa(t) be the winning consortium coordinator and the level of coordination 
abilities which are actually used by this coordinator. Also, let u, v and w be the number 
of existing partners for the relational strategy, the number of reputational partners for 
the structural strategy and the number of partners selected via bidding. Then, Table 4-2 
shows the level of coordination abilities which vij actually uses. 
 
Table 4-2 Level of Coordination Abilities Actually Used by Coordinator 
Coordinator Actual Investment in Coordination Abilities 
vij if sij = +1 (Relational)  caa(t) = pa(t) + u × rc + w × (bc + cc) 
vij if sij = −1 (Structural) caa(t) = pa(t) + v × sc + w × (bc + cc)  
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In Equation (4-7), rc and sc indicates the hidden costs of managing an existing partner 
for the relational strategy and a reputational partner for the structural strategy 
respectively. Also, bc + cc represent the hidden costs of selecting and managing a 
partner through elaborate tender procedures, and more customised and complex contract 
clauses when there is no existing or reputational partner.  
 
In the meantime, let car(t) be the amount of resources which vij actually invests in the i 
th type of technology. Also, let vxy and parx(t) be the partner for the x th type of 
technology and the quantity of resources which this partner actually invests in this type 
of technology. Then, Table 3-2 and 3-3 illustrate the amounts of resources which vij and 
vxy invest under C1 and C2 respectively.  
 
Table 4-3 Amount of Resources Actually Invested by Coordinator & Partner under C1 
Member Actual Investment in Resources 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1 (Relational)  
car(t) = pri(t) 
vij if sij = −1 (Structural) 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1 (Cooperative) parx(t) = prx(t) for x ≠ i 
vxy if bxy = −1 (Opportunistic) parx(t) = 0 for x ≠ i 
 
Under C1, the coordinator has enough resources for the i th type of technology. 
Therefore, it covers this technological requirement for itself. Also, a cooperative partner 
invests as many resources as required while an opportunistic one inputs no resources for 
its own interests. 
 
Table 4-4 Amount of Resources Actually Invested by Coordinator & Partner under C2 
Member Actual Investment in Resources 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1 (Relational)  
car(t) = rij(t) 
vij if sij = −1 (Structural) 
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Table 4-4 Continued 
Member Actual Investment in Resources 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1 (Cooperative) 
parx(t) = prx(t) for x ≠ i or  
parx(t) = pri(t) – rij(t) for x = i  
vxy if bxy = −1 (Opportunistic) parx(t) = 0 
 
Under C2, the coordinator itself cannot cover the requirement for the i th type of 
technology. Therefore, a cooperative partner for this technological requirement provides 
resources of which the amount is pri(t) – rij(t).   
 
4.7.2 Payoff 
 
The payoff awarded by the market is different according to the quality assessment of a 
delivered IT service. When the quality is unsatisfactory and hence the opportunistic 
partners for the technology type f, ···, g are detected, the market gives the following 
payoff to the contracted consortium. 
 
POu(t) = R(t) – [prf(t) + ··· + prg(t)], 
 
where R(t) denotes the sum of coordination abilities and resources which are necessary 
to cover the technological requirements in RFP(t) in Equation (4-3). Also, R(t) = pa + 
pr1(t) + ··· + prm(t). Then, the coordinator allocates this payoff to its partners. A 
cooperative partner receives as much payoff as it invests. Conversely, an opportunistic 
one receives nothing. Furthermore, the consortium members punish this partner by 
transferring its negative information to other vendors. The vendors receiving the 
information will not select it as a member in their future ITO consortium establishment.  
 
When the quality is evaluated as satisfactory, the market rewards the cooperation of the 
consortium with the following payoff. 
 
POs(t) = (1 + r) × R(t), 
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where r indicates the profit rate. Then, the coordinator allocates this payoff to its 
partners in proportion to their investments.  
 
More specifically, let cpoa(t), cpor(t) and pporx(t) be the payoffs which are allocated to 
the coordinator and partner. Then, POu(t) if unsatisfactory or POs(t) if satisfactory is 
allocated to the winning consortium members as shown in Table 4-5 under C1 and 
Table 4-6 under C2 respectively. 
 
Table 4-5 Payoff under C1  
Case Member Payoff 
Unsatisfactory 
Quality 
and 
Opportunism 
Detected 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1 
cpoa(t) = pa(t) and 
cpor(t) = pri(t) 
vij if sij = −1 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1 pporx(t) = prx(t) for x ≠ i 
vxy if bxy = −1 pporx(t) = 0 for x ≠ i 
Satisfactory 
Quality 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1  
cpoa(t) = (1 + r) × pa(t) and 
cpor(t) = (1 + r) × pri(t) 
vij if sij = −1  
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1  
pporx(t) = (1 + r) × prx(t) for x ≠ i 
vxy if bxy = −1  
 
Table 4-6 Payoff under C2 
Case Member Payoff 
Unsatisfactory 
Quality 
and 
Opportunism 
Detected 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1  
cpoa(t) = pa(t) and 
cpor(t) = rij(t) 
vij if sij = −1  
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1  
pporx(t) = prx(t) for x ≠ i or  
pporx(t) = pri(t) – rij(t) for x = i 
vxy if bxy = −1  pporx(t) = 0 
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Table 4-6 Continued 
Case Member Payoff 
Satisfactory 
Quality 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1  
cpoa(t) = (1 + r) × pa(t) and 
cpor(t) = (1 + r) × rij(t) 
vij if sij = −1  
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1  
pporx(t) = (1 + r) × prx(t) for x ≠ i or 
pporx(t) = (1 + r) × [prx(t) – rij(t)] for x = i 
vxy if bxy = −1  
 
4.7.3 Profit 
 
The profit can be obtained by subtracting the actual investment from the payoff. Let 
cpa(t), cpr(t) and pprx(t) be the profits which the coordinator and partner gain. Then, 
their profits are shown in Table 4-7 under C1 and Table 4-8 under C2. 
 
Table 4-7 Profit under C1 
Case Member Profit 
Unsatisfactory 
Quality 
and 
Opportunism 
Detected 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1  
cpa(t) = − u × rc − w × (bc + cc) and 
cpr(t) = 0 
vij if sij = −1  cpa(t) = − v × sc − w × (bc + cc) and cpr(t) = 0 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1  
pprx(t) = 0 for x ≠ i 
vxy if bxy = −1  
Satisfactory 
Quality 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1  
cpa(t) = r × pa(t) − u × rc − w × (bc + cc) and 
cpr(t) = r × pri(t) 
vij if sij = −1  cpa(t) = r × pa(t) − v × sc − w × (bc + cc) and cpr(t) = r × pri(t) 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1  pprx(t) = r × prx(t) for x ≠ i 
vxy if bxy = −1  pprx(t) = (1 + r) × prx(t) for x ≠ i 
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Table 4-8 Profit under C2 
Case Member Profit 
Unsatisfactory 
Quality 
and 
Opportunism 
Detected 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1 
cpa(t) = − u × rc − w × (bc + cc) and 
cpr(t) = 0 
vij if sij = −1 cpa(t) = − v × sc − w × (bc + cc) and cpr(t) = 0 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1 
pprx(t) = 0  
vxy if bxy = −1 
Satisfactory 
Quality 
Coordinator 
vij if sij = +1  
cpa(t) = r × pa(t) − u × rc − w × (bc + cc) and 
cpr(t) = r × rij(t) 
vij if sij = −1  cpa(t) = r × pa(t) − v × sc − w × (bc + cc) and cpr(t) = r × rij(t) 
Partner 
vxy if bxy = +1  
pprx(t) = r × prx(t) for x ≠ i or 
pprx(t) = r × [pri(t) – rij(t)] for x = i 
vxy if bxy = −1  pprx(t) = (1 + r) × prx(t) for x ≠ i or  pprx(t) = (1 + r) × [pri(t) – rij(t)] for x = i 
 
4.8 Information Update and Transfer 
 
The winning consortium members update and transfer information on one another for 
further outsourcing opportunities after the allocation of the payoff has been completed. 
Let us suppose that (1) vab and vcd are two members who belong to the winning ITO 
consortium at the period of t (2) vcd’s behavioural tendency is opportunistic (3) vab has 
the experience of joining ITO consortia together with vpq between the period of 1 and t 
− 1 and (4) vpq’s behavioural tendency was perceived to be cooperative by vab. Then, vab 
updates information on vcd’ behavioural tendency according to the quality assessment 
result and transfers this information to vpq for further outsourcing opportunities. 
Moreover, in accordance with the update and transfer of the information, the matrices of 
the cumulative profit, relationship and perceived behavioural tendency are revised in the 
simulation model.  
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4.8.1 Cumulative Profit Matrix 
 
In Equation (4-5), pab↔cd(t) represents vab’s cumulative profit gained through joining 
ITO consortia together with vcd until the period of t − 1. Therefore, if vab and vcd are the 
coordinator and partner for the c th type of technology, pab↔cd(t) and pcd↔ab(t) are 
revised to pab↔cd(t + 1) and pcd↔ab(t + 1) as follows. 
 
pab↔cd(t + 1) = pab↔cd (t) + [cpa(t) + cpr(t)] and 
pcd↔ab(t + 1) = pcd↔ab (t) + pprc(t). 
 
Cumulative Profit at Period of t − 1 
Vendor   vab   vcd   
            
vab   itself   pab↔cd(t)    
            
vcd   pcd↔ab (t)    itself   
            
↓ 
Cumulative Profit at Period of t 
Vendor   vab   vcd   
            
vab   itself   pab↔cd( t + 1)    
            
vcd   pcd↔ab ( t + 1)    itself   
            
 
Chapter 4 Simulation Model 
97 
 
4.8.2 Relationship Matrix 
 
In Equation (4-6), rab↔cd(t) indicates whether vab has the experience of participating in 
ITO consortia together with vcd between the period of 1 and t − 1. Therefore, rab↔cd(t) is 
revised to rab↔cd(t + 1) as follows. 
 
rab↔cd(t + 1) = +1. 
 
Relationship between Period of 1 and t − 1 
→ 
Relationship between Period of 1 and t 
Vendor   vcd   Vendor   vcd   
                
vab   rab↔cd (t)   vab   rab↔pq( t + 1)   
                
  
4.8.3 Perceived Behavioural Tendency Matrix 
 
Let pbab↔cd(t) be vcd’s behavioural tendency perceived by vab at the period of t − 1.  
When the quality is evaluated as unsatisfactory and vcd’s opportunistic behaviour is 
detected at the period of t, vcd’s behavioural tendency is perceived to be opportunistic by 
vab. Therefore, 
 
pbab↔cd(t + 1) = −1. 
 
Alternatively, when the quality is assessed as satisfactory at this period, vab perceives 
that vcd is cooperative although its actual behavioural tendency is opportunistic. Then, 
 
pbab↔cd(t + 1) = +1. 
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Also, according to the assumption that vab has the experience of participating in ITO 
consortia with vpq between the period of 1 to t − 1 and vpq’s behavioural tendency is 
perceived to be cooperative by vab, 
 
rab↔pq(t) = +1 and pbab↔pq(t) = +1. 
 
Then, vab transfers information on vcd’s behavioural tendency to vpq with the probability 
of pt. Therefore,  
 
pbpq↔cd(t + 1) = pbab↔cd(t + 1) with the probability of pt  
if rab↔pq(t) = +1 and pbab↔pq(t) = +1. 
 
Perceived Behavioural Tendency at Period of t − 1 
Vendor   vcd   vpq   
            
vab   pbab↔cd (t)   pbab↔pq(t)    
            
vpq   pbpq↔cd (t)    itself   
            
↓ 
Perceived Behavioural Tendency at Period of t 
Vendor   vcd   vpq   
            
vab   pbab↔cd ( t + 1)   pbab↔pq( t + 1)    
            
vpq   pbpq↔cd ( t + 1)    itself   
            
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4.9 Measurements 
 
In this research, the notion of relational or structural embeddedness is reflected in the 
relational or structural strategy which is taken by a coordinator. Moreover, the 
conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness is examined in managing 
members as well as in selecting partners. Therefore, five measures associated with the 
winning consortium coordinator are observed at the end of each period: (1) the profit for 
coordination abilities, (2) the number of ties, (3) the strength of ties, (4) the proportion 
of opportunistic partners and (5) the proportion of existing or reputational partners. In 
the meantime, the winning consortium coordinators are categorised into two groups to 
compare the two types of embeddedness: Group 1 using the relational strategy and 
Group 2 employing the structural strategy. Then, the following quantities for each group 
are calculated based on the above five measures,  
 
4.9.1 Cumulative Profit for Coordination Abilities 
 
Let vij be the winning consortium coordinator at the period of t. Then, its profit for 
coordination abilities is represented by cpa(t) as shown in Table 4-7 and 4-8. Also, let 
cpar(t) and cpas(t) be the profit for Group 1 and 2 at this period. Then, 
 
( ) if 1
( )
0 if 1
ij
r
ij
cpa t s
cpa t
s
    
 and 
0 if 1
( )
( ) if 1
ij
s
ij
s
cpa t
cpa t s
    
. 
 
Finally, let CPAr(T) and CPAs(T) be the cumulative profit for Group 1 and 2 at the 
period of T. Then, 
 
1
( ) ( )
T
r r
t
CPA T cpa t

   and 
1
( ) ( )
T
s s
t
CPA T cpa t

  . 
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4.9.2 Cumulative Number of Ties 
 
Let vxy be the partner for the x th type of technology in the winning consortium at the 
period of t (x ≠ i under C1). Also, let ntij↔xy(t) be equal to +1 if the tie between vij and 
vxy is newly created at this period or 0 if the tie between them was established before 
this period. That is,  
 
1 if ( ) 0
( )
0 if ( ) 1
ij xy
ij xy
ij xy
r t
nt t
r t



    
.  
 
In the meantime, let nt(t) be the number of ties newly built by the winning consortium 
coordinator at the period of t. Then, 
 
1
( ) ( )
m
ij xy
x
nt t nt t

  . 
 
Also, let ntr(t) and nts(t) be the number of new ties for Group 1 and 2 at this period. 
Then, 
 
( ) if 1
( )
0 if 1
ij
r
ij
nt t s
nt t
s
    
 and 
0 if 1
( )
( ) if 1
ij
s
ij
s
nt t
nt t s
    
. 
 
Finally, let CNTr(t) and CNTs(t) be the cumulative number of ties for Group 1 and 2 at 
the period of T. Then, 
 
1
( ) ( )
T
r r
t
CNT T nt t

   and 
1
( ) ( )
T
s s
t
CNT T nt t

  . 
 
In the meantime, from Equation (4.1), the total number of vendors is  
 
m n . 
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Therefore, the maximum number of ties for each vendor is bounded by  
 
1m n  . 
  
Also, the maximum number of possible ties for all the vendors is bounded by 
 
( ) ( 1)
2
m n m n    . 
 
4.9.3 Average Strength of Ties 
 
The average strength of ties can be obtained by dividing the cumulative profit by the 
cumulative number of ties. Let ASTr(T) and ASTs(T) be the average strength of ties for 
Group 1 and 2 at the period of T.  
 
( ) / ( ) if ( ) 0
( )
0 if ( ) 0
r r r
r
r
CPA T CNT T CNT T
AST T
CNT T
    and 
( ) / ( ) if ( ) 0
( )
0 if ( ) 0
s s s
s
s
CPA T CNT T CNT T
AST T
CNT T
   . 
 
4.9.4 Average Proportion of Opportunistic Partners 
 
Let n(t), no(t) and po(t) be the number of partners, the number of opportunistic partners 
and the proportion of opportunistic partners in the winning consortium at the period of t. 
Then, 
 
( ) ( ) / ( )po t no t n t . 
 
Also, let por(t) and pos(t) be the proportion of opportunistic partners for Group 1 and 2 
at this period. Then, 
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( ) if 1
( )
0 if 1
ij
r
ij
po t s
po t
s
    
 and 
0 if 1
( )
( ) if 1
ij
s
ij
s
po t
po t s
    
. 
 
In the meantime, let NWr(T) and NWs(T) be the cumulative number of winning contracts 
for Group 1 and 2 at the period of T. Also, let APOr(T) and APOs(t) be the average 
proportion of opportunistic partners for Group 1 and 2 at this period. Then, 
 
1
( ) / ( ) if ( ) 0
( )
if ( ) 0
T
r r rt
r
r
po t NW T NW T
APO T
impossible to measure NW T

   
  and 
1
( ) / ( ) if ( ) 0
( )
if ( ) 0
T
s s st
s
s
po t NW T NW T
APO T
impossible to measure NW T

   
  . 
 
In the case where NWr(T) = 0, the coordinators belonging to Group 1 have won no 
contracts until the period of T. Therefore, it is impossible to measure the average 
proportion of opportunistic partners in the winning consortium, which is also the case if 
NWs(T) = 0 for Group 2.   
 
4.9.5 Average Proportion of Requested Partners 
 
In contrast to a partner selected via bidding, an existing partner for Group 1 and a 
reputational partner for Group 2 are together called a requested partner in this research. 
Let nrp(t) and prp(t) be the number and proportion of requested partners in the winning 
consortium at the period of t. Then, 
 
( ) ( ) / ( )prp t nrp t n t . 
 
Also, let prpr(t) and prps(t) be the proportion of requested partners for Group 1 and 2 at 
this period (i.e. the proportion of existing partners for Group 1 and the proportion of 
reputational partners for Group 2). Then,  
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( ) if 1
( )
0 if 1
ij
r
ij
prp t s
prp t
s
    
 and 
0 if 1
( )
( ) if 1
ij
s
ij
s
prp t
prp t s
    
. 
 
Finally, let APRr(T) and APRs(t) be the average proportion of requested partners for 
Group 1 and 2 at the period of T. Then, 
 
1
( ) / ( ) if ( ) 0
( )
if ( ) 0
T
r r rt
r
r
prp t NW T NW T
APR T
impossible to measure NW T

   
  and 
1
( ) / ( ) if ( ) 0
( )
if ( ) 0
T
s s st
s
s
prp t NW T NW T
APR T
impossible to measure NW T

   
  . 
 
As with the proportion of opportunistic partners, it is impossible to measure the average 
proportion of requested partners in the winning consortium in the case where NWr(T) = 
0 and NWs(T) = 0.  
 
4.10 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained the simulation model to compare relational and structural 
embeddedness at the different levels of technological unpredictability and measurement 
difficulty imposed on ITO business environments. This model included the two 
uncertainties, the decision-makings of coordinators and partners, the profits according to 
the features of consortium members, and the update and transfer of information. 
 
Firstly, the two uncertainties were modelled as the increasing rate and instability of 
coordination abilities and resources necessary to cover technological requirements in a 
RFP and the extent to which these requirements can be verified. Also, technological 
unpredictability is associated with the use of elaborate tender procedures and rigorous 
contract clauses, and measurement difficulty is related to the correctness of information 
on (potential) partners’ behavioural tendencies. 
 
Chapter 4 Simulation Model 
104 
 
Secondly, the simulation model involved vendors who perform the role of either a 
coordinator or a partner in the establishment of ITO consortia to respond to outsourcing 
opportunities with the different levels of the two uncertainties. The coordinators taking 
the relational strategy prefer existing partners who are connected through strong ties in 
the perspective of relational embeddedness. Those employing the structural strategy 
favour reputational partners who are located in prominent network positions. They also 
actively utilise information transferred through third parties. Furthermore, the difference 
in the hidden costs between the two strategies was reflected in the simulation model. In 
case of partners, two types of opportunistic behaviour were modelled: adverse selection 
and moral hazard. That is, opportunistic (potential) partners attempt to become a 
consortium member by exaggerating their current resource availability (i.e. adverse 
selection) and input no resources for their own interests (i.e. moral hazard). This self-
interest seeking with guile may induce a coordinator to select an unqualified partner and 
decrease the quality of a delivered IT service. 
 
Thirdly, the profits according to the features of the winning consortium members were 
modelled through a modified game model. This model analytically revealed the profits 
of the coordinators taking the relational or structural strategy and those of the partners 
behaving cooperatively or opportunistically. 
 
Fourthly, it was described how consortium members update and transfer information on 
one another. They revise information on other members’ behavioural tendencies 
according to the assessment result of a delivered IT service. They also punished 
opportunistic members by transferring negative information to other vendors through 
ITO network ties.  
 
Finally, the following measures are illustrated to compare relational and structural 
embeddedness: (1) the cumulative profit for coordination abilities, (2) the cumulative 
number of ties, (3) the average strength of ties, (4) the average proportion of 
opportunistic partners and (5) the average proportion of requested partners.  
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The simulation model is embodied in Microsoft Excel 2007 Visual Basic for 
Applications. Also, the implementation of simulation experiments and the analysis of 
results are described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 Simulation Experiments and Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 provides the graphical and numerical analyses of the simulation results and 
includes four sections: Design of Experiments, Basic Test Results, Complete Test 
Results, and Interaction Effect and Comparison at End Period.  
 
At first, simulation tests are planned with a full factorial design of experiments for 
efficient simulation tests and systematic analyses. This study identified the two 
uncertainties which exist together in ITO business environments: the uncertainty 
stemming from the unpredictability of technological requirements and the uncertainty 
originating in the difficulty in measuring performance. They are used as two factors in 
this experimental design.  
 
Then, the two step simulation strategy is employed: the basic test at the selected 
experimental point to verify the developed simulation model and the complete tests at 
all the experimental points to compare relational and structural embeddedness. That is, 
the developed simulation model is verified through examining the consistency between 
the results from the basic test and those in existing studies. Next, the cumulative profits 
for relational and structural embeddedness are compared through analysing the results 
from the complete tests with this confirmed model. For this comparison, the following 
measures are additionally analysed: the average proportion of requested partners, the 
average proportion of opportunistic partners, the average strength of ties and the 
cumulative number of ties.  
 
Finally, this chapter concludes with the examination of the interaction effect of the two 
uncertainties on the cumulative profits for the two types of embeddedness at the end 
period, and the comparison between them at the end period of each test point. Then, it is 
explicitly shown which of relational and structural embeddedness is more appropriate at 
the different levels of the two uncertainties in the long-term perspective.  
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5.2 Design of Experiments 
 
This research adopts a full factorial design of experiments for efficient simulation tests 
and systematic analyses. An experimental design has two or more factors and each of 
them has discrete possible values, which are called levels. The combinations of levels 
are also called experimental points. Then, the tests at all of the possible experimental 
points are conducted in a full factorial design. Therefore, this experimental design is 
beneficial when the interaction effects of two or more factors on outcomes are 
investigated. Furthermore, a full factorial design including factors especially with two 
levels is widely used in research work because the results drawn from this fundamental 
design perform the role of a basis of other designs with a variety of practical levels 
(Montgomery, 2009).  
 
At first, this section explains a full factorial design of experiments with two factors and 
two levels. Let us suppose that the effects of two factors (i.e. A and B) on the outcomes 
of two strategies (i.e. S1 and S2) are compared. Then, as shown in Figure 5-1, the full 
factorial experiments are designed in the case where each of the factors has two levels: 
low and high (i.e. L and H). 
 
Figure 5-1 Full Factorial Design with Two factors and Two Levels 
 
                  
      Factor B 
Factor A 
   H 
   L 
L H 
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Let n be the number of replicates at each test point. Then, the following results are 
obtained after all the experiments have been completed. 
 
Table 5-1 Observed Performance  
Factor  
A 
Factor 
B 
Strategy 
Replicate 
Total 
1 2 ··· n 
Low 
Low 
S1 L,L,11p  L,L,21p  ··· L,L,1 np  L,L L,L,
1
1 1
n
k
k
T p

   
S2 L,L,12p  L,L,22p  ··· L,L,2 np  L,L L,L,
1
2 1
n
k
k
T p

   
High 
S1 L,H,11p  L,H,21p  ··· L,H,1 np  L,H L,H,
1
1 1
n
k
k
T p

   
S2 L,H,12p  L,H,22p  ··· L,H ,2 np  L,H L,H,
1
2 2
n
k
k
T p

   
High 
Low 
S1 H,L,11p  H,L,21p  ··· H,L,1 np  H,L H,L,
1
1 1
n
k
k
T p

   
S2 H,L,12p  H ,L ,22p  ··· H ,L ,2 np  H,L H,L,
1
2 2
n
k
k
T p

   
High 
S1 H,H,11p  H,H,21p  ··· H,H,1 np  H,H H,H,
1
1 1
n
k
k
T p

   
S2 H ,H ,12p  H,H,22p  ··· H,H,2 np  H,H H,H,
1
2 2
n
k
k
T p

   
   
In Table 5-1, p1ijk and p2ijk represent the observed outcomes of S1 and S2 respectively 
when A is at the i th level (for i = L, H) and B is at the j th level (for j = L, H) for the k 
th replicate (for k = 1, 2, ··· , n). 
 
Based on these observations, the main and interaction effects of A and B on the 
outcomes of S1 and S2 are calculated as follows. 
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Table 5-2 Main and Interaction Effects  
Effect Calculation 
Main effect of A on S1 H,L H,H L,L L,HS1
[( 1 1 ) ( 1 1 )]
2
T T T T
MA
n
    
Main effect of B on S1 L,H H,H L,L H,L1
[( 1 1 ) ( 1 1 )]
2S
T T T T
MB
n
    
Main effect of A on S2 H,L H,H L,L L,HS2
[( 2 2 ) ( 2 2 )]
2
T T T T
MA
n
    
Main effect of B on S2 L,H H,H L,L H,LS2
[( 2 2 ) ( 2 2 )]
2
T T T T
MB
n
    
Interaction effect of A and B on S1 L,L H,H L,H H,LS1
[( 1 1 ) ( 1 1 )]
2
T T T T
IAB
n
    
Interaction effect of A and B on S2 L,L H,H L,H H,LS2
[( 2 2 ) ( 2 2 )]
2
T T T T
IAB
n
    
   
Factor A has a positive or negative effect on the performance of S1 if MAS1 > or < 0. 
Also, its statistical significance is tested with an ANOVA. This is the same for MBS1, 
MAS2, MBS2, IABS1 and IABS2.  
 
Furthermore, a T-test examines the statistical difference between the outcomes of S1 
and S2 at each test point. For example,  
 
L,L1T
n
 and L,L
2T
n
 
 
are statistically compared with a T-test at the low level of both A and B. 
 
Turning to this research, there are two key factors involved in uncertainty imposed on 
ITO business environments: technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty. 
Each factor has two levels: low and high. Therefore, the following simulation 
experiments are planned with a full factorial design. 
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Figure 5-2 Full Factorial Design Applied to Research 
 
  
 
 
In Equation (4-2) and (4-4), the two uncertainties are represented as α (i.e. the 
increasing rate and instability of coordination abilities and resources) and β (i.e. the 
degree to which technological requirements can be verified). Therefore, when 
technological unpredictability is at the low and high level, the value of α is set up as 0.3 
and 0.7 respectively. Also, when measurement difficulty is at the low and high level, the 
value of β is set up as 0.7 and 0.3 respectively.      
 
Then, the two step simulation strategy is applied: the basic test at the highlighted 
experimental point and the complete tests at the three remaining experimental points. 
Firstly, the developed simulation model is verified through the implementation of the 
basic test where technological unpredictability is fixed at the low level and 
measurement difficulty is fixed at the high level. A set of the other parameters are 
chosen so that they produce the results which are in line with the existing studies 
favouring relational embeddedness when it is difficult to measure ITO outcomes. 
Secondly, the complete tests based on the selected parameter set are conducted where 
the levels of the two uncertainties are varied simultaneously. The results from these 
experiments enable the investigation of the conditional superiority of relational or 
structural embeddedness in the presence of both uncertainties.  
 
Technological 
unpredictability 
Measurement 
difficulty 
High 
Low 
Low High 
Test point for 
verification of 
simulation model 
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The experiment from the period of 1 to 150 is replicated 50 times at each test point. 
Also, as described earlier, the winning consortium coordinators are classified into two 
groups: Group 1 taking the relational strategy and Group 2 taking the structural strategy. 
Then, the following five measures for each group are gauged: (1) the average proportion 
of requested partners, (2) the average proportion of opportunistic partners, (3) the 
average strength of ties, (4) the cumulative number of ties and (5) the cumulative profit 
for coordination abilities. The first four measures are used to explain the change of the 
cumulative profit for each group over time. Finally, an ANOVA is employed to 
examine the interaction effect of the two uncertainties on the cumulative profit for each 
group at the end period of 150. A T-test is applied to compare the cumulative profits for 
the two groups at the end period at each test point. However, the main effects of the two 
uncertainties are not addressed in this research due to the assumption that they exist 
together in ITO business environments. 
 
Finally, the two uncertainties of technological unpredictability and measurement 
difficulty are denoted by TU and MD respectively in the following sections for the 
convenience of the description. Also, the simulation experiments were conducted on a 
Viglen desktop computer with an Intel® Core™ i5-2320 CPU @ 3.00 GHz processor 
and 4.00 GB RAM. 
 
5.3 Basic Test Results 
 
This section verifies the developed simulation model through the basic test where TU 
and MD are fixed at the low and high level respectively. A set of the other parameters 
are also selected so that they lead to the results which maintain the consistency with the 
existing studies preferring relational embeddedness at the high level of MD. In the 
meantime, the basic test results are partial in the sense that the two key factors, TU and 
MD, are not varied. 
 
At the low level of TU, the amounts of resources necessary to cover technological 
requirements increase slowly and stably. In this case, it seems that a competitive tender 
is hardly used to find appropriate ITO consortium members because both existing 
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partners for the coordinators taking the relational strategy and reputational partners for 
the coordinators employing the structural strategy are likely to have enough resources to 
respond to the slow and stable pace of change in technological requirements.  
 
This prediction is supported by Figure 5-3 which illustrates the average proportion of 
requested partners (i.e. existing or reputational partners) in the winning ITO consortia. 
The proportion for Group 1 increases steeply until the period of about 30 and then 
shows a flat trend with around 0.85. On the other hand, the proportion for Group 2 stays 
at about 0.95 throughout the period. The high proportions for the two groups indicate 
that technological requirements are covered by existing partners for Group 1 and 
reputational partners for Group 2 respectively. Therefore, the coordinators hardly 
employ bidding which incurs the considerable hidden costs involved in finding proper 
members at the low level of TU. In the meantime, existing partners connected via strong 
ties can be managed with lower hidden costs although it is difficult to exactly measure 
ITO performance. Therefore, the relational strategy is superior in cost-effectiveness to 
the structural strategy. 
 
Figure 5-3 Average Proportion of Requested Partners at Low TU & High MD 
   
In the meantime, the coordinators taking the relational strategy need time to accumulate 
information on potential partners because they can gain this information through the 
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direct approach such as the participation in ITO consortia. As demonstrated in Figure 5-
3, the proportion for Group 1 starts to stay at around 0.85 from the period of about 30. 
This means that the coordinators employing the relational strategy gather information 
on candidates during the period of 1 to around 30. Thereafter, based on this collected 
information, they establish ITO consortia mainly with existing partners who are strongly 
connected. On the other hand, the coordinators taking the structural strategy can easily 
and quickly access information on potential partners through the indirect approach such 
as the observation of network positions and the information transmission via third 
parties without joining ITO consortia. Therefore, the proportion for Group 2 shows a 
flat trend with about 0.95 from the initial period.  
 
However, it is remarkable that the accessibility to this information is not in line with its 
accuracy. Figure 5-4 shows the average proportion of opportunistic partners in the 
winning ITO consortia and represents the correctness of information on members which 
is collected through the relational and structural strategy. 
 
Figure 5-4 Average Proportion of Opportunistic Partners at Low TU & High MD 
 
The proportion for each group stays at around 0.25 or 0.4 throughout the period. At the 
high level of MD, it is difficult to exactly measure performance and hence to detect 
opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, incorrect information on partners is likely to diffuse 
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across an ITO network. In this case, the coordinators taking the relational strategy enjoy 
more advantages in acquiring accurate information on partners.  
 
Figure 5-5 Cumulative Number of Ties at Low TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-6 Average Strength of Ties at Low TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-5 and 5-6 illustrate the cumulative number and average strength of ties of the 
coordinators in the winning ITO consortia respectively. As explained previously, the 
coordinators taking the relational strategy collect information on candidates through the 
participation in ITO consortia during the period of 1 to about 30. ITO ties are created 
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during the process of this participation and hence the cumulative number for Group 1 
increases steeply until this period. After that, based on this collected information, these 
coordinators form ITO consortia mainly with existing partners who are strongly coupled 
and hence just a few new ITO ties are generated. As a result, the cumulative number 
goes up gently and the average strength becomes higher as time passes as demonstrated 
in Figure 5-5 and 5-6.  
 
On the other hand, the network positions of potential partners denote their capabilities to 
cover technological requirements. At the low level of TU, the higher network positions 
of several candidates at the initial period act as a signal indicating that they can continue 
to effectively deal with the slow and stable pace of change in technological 
requirements. Therefore, the coordinators taking the structural strategy build ITO 
consortia mainly with these candidates. However, the access to information on multiple 
alternative candidates and the replacement of partners based on this information are 
easier for Group 2. Therefore, if there are any potential partners with higher network 
positions, these coordinators build ITO consortia with them. As a result, Group 2 
maintains a little large number of weak ITO ties as shown in Figure 5-5 and 5-6. 
 
The analysis of the above results enables the prediction of ITO outcomes at the low 
level of TU and the high level of MD. The research of Hansen (1999) addresses the 
roles of weak and strong network ties in searching and transferring tacit knowledge. It is 
argued that weak ties are more advantageous to search the location of this knowledge in 
a network while strong ties are more beneficial to send and receive this knowledge. 
Turning to this research, the tacitness of information on potential partners is likely to be 
high when it is difficult to exactly measure ITO performance. In this case, the relational 
strategy to maintain strong ties is superior in information correctness to the structural 
strategy to sustain weak ties. Also, the coordinators taking the relational strategy do not 
need to search multiple alternative candidates because existing partners connected 
through strong ties can sufficiently respond to the low level of TU. Furthermore, these 
partners can be managed with lower hidden costs although it is difficult to measure ITO 
performance. Therefore, Group 1 can perform better performance than Group 2. 
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Figure 5-7 demonstrates the cumulative profit of the coordinators in the winning ITO 
consortia. At the initial period, there is little difference between the cumulative profits 
for Group 1 and 2. However, Group 1 gains more profits than Group 2 as time passes. 
 
Figure 5-7 Cumulative Profit at Low TU & High MD 
 
These results from the basic test are supported by relational exchange theory and 
empirical ITO research. In the relational exchange perspective, a present transaction 
between specific partners is not regarded as a one-time occasion but rather as a bridge 
which links their past and future transactions. They are willing, therefore, to bear short-
term inequities because they believe that the inequities will be compensated for by their 
long-term joint success, and this shared belief can reduce the costs involved in the 
precise measurement of performance (Kronman, 1985). In addition, the costs of 
switching or managing a partner can be saved through the repetition or long-term 
maintenance of their current outsourcing relationship (Gopal et al., 2003; Hill, 1990). In 
fact, it is empirically shown that ITO outcomes are enhanced by the experience of 
working together, the duration of an outsourcing relationship and the expectation of 
continuity (Kim et al., 2003; Kim and Chung, 2003; Lee and Kim, 1999). Several 
studies also reveal that measurement difficulty and opportunism are not significantly 
related to the outcomes of an ITO relationship between relationally embedded partners 
(Goo et al., 2007; Kim and Chung, 2003). 
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Finally, Table 5-3 shows the numerical results at the basic test point at the low level of 
TU and the high level of MD. 
 
Table 5-3 Numerical Results at Low TU & High MD 
Period 1 30 60 90 120 150 
Proportion of 
requested partners 
Group 1 0.00 0.93 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.85 
Group 2 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 
Proportion of 
opportunistic partners 
Group 1 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Group 2 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41 
Cumulative number 
of ties 
Group 1 2 15 17 18 20 21 
Group 2 2 18 20 21 23 25 
Average strength 
of ties 
Group 1 0.11 0.60 0.96 1.21 1.31 1.33 
Group 2 0.11 0.32 0.61 0.79 0.89 0.92 
Cumulative profit 
Group 1 0.22 8.80 16.05 21.86 25.73 28.22 
Group 2 0.23 5.74 12.11 16.98 20.61 23.06 
 
5.4 Complete Test Results 
 
In the previous section, the developed simulation model was verified through examining 
the consistency between the results and those in existing studies. This section addresses 
the main research question with this confirmed model: which of the two types of 
embeddedness is more appropriate for improving long-term performance at the different 
levels of the two uncertainties? In order to answer this question, the two key factors, 
technological unpredictability (TU) and measurement difficulty (MD), are varied from 
the low level to the high level while the values of the other parameters are fixed as 
determined in the basic test.  
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5.4.1 Low Level of TU and Low Level of MD 
 
The results at the experimental point of the low level of TU and the low level of MD are 
similar with those at the basic test point of the low level of TU and the high level of MD.  
At first, Figure 5-8 shows the average proportion of requested partners. 
 
Figure 5-8 Average Proportion of Requested Partners at Low TU & Low MD 
 
The high proportion for each group indicates that the coordinators taking the relational 
or structural strategy build ITO consortia mainly with existing partners who are strongly 
connected or reputational partners who occupy prominent network positions. Also, even 
at the low level of MD, the hidden costs of managing existing partners for Group 1 is 
lower than those of controlling reputational partners for Group 2. Therefore, the 
relational strategy is superior in cost-effectiveness to the structural strategy. In the 
meantime, the proportions for Group 1 and 2 start to stay at the high level from the 
period of around 30 and from the initial period respectively. Therefore, the structural 
strategy is more advantageous in information accessibility than the relational strategy. 
  
Figure 5-9 illustrates that the coordinators taking the relational strategy enjoy a little 
more advantages in information correctness than those employing the structural strategy.  
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Figure 5-9 Average Proportion of Opportunistic Partners at Low TU & Low MD 
 
It is interesting that the proportions for both groups generally decrease over time at this 
experimental point because MD is at the low level. 
 
Figure 5-10 and 5-11 demonstrate the cumulative number and average strength of ties 
respectively. As with the basic test results, Group 1 maintains a small number of strong 
ties while Group 2 sustains a somewhat large number of weak ties. 
 
Figure 5-10 Cumulative Number of Ties at Low TU & Low MD 
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Figure 5-11 Average Strength of Ties at Low TU & Low MD 
 
The coordinators taking the relational strategy can gather more accurate information on 
partners than those employing the structural strategy. Also, they can sufficiently 
respond to the low level of TU mainly with existing partners who are coupled via strong 
ties. Moreover, these partners can be controlled with the lower hidden costs even at the 
low level of MD. Therefore, the relational strategy is likely to be more appropriate than 
the structural strategy at the low level of TU and the low level of MD.  
 
Figure 5-12 Cumulative Profit at Low TU & Low MD 
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Figure 5-12 shows the cumulative profit. At the initial period, the cumulative profits for 
Group 1 and 2 increase similarly. However, Group 1 gains more profit than Group 2 
over time. 
 
Finally, Table 5-4 illustrates the numerical results at the experimental point of the low 
level of TU and the low level of MD. 
 
Table 5-4 Numerical Results at Low TU& Low MD 
Period 1 30 60 90 120 150 
Proportion of 
requested partners 
Group 1 0.00 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.92 
Group 2 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Proportion of 
opportunistic partners 
Group 1 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 
Group 2 0.40 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 
Cumulative number 
of ties 
Group 1 2 16 18 18 19 19 
Group 2 2 19 21 21 22 22 
Average strength 
of ties 
Group 1 0 0.41 0.83 1.15 1.38 1.50 
Group 2 0 0.38 0.68 0.89 1.04 1.13 
Cumulative profit 
Group 1 0 6.64 14.79 21.26 25.92 28.82 
Group 2 0 7.24 14.09 19.05 22.65 24.99 
 
5.4.2 High Level of TU and High Level of MD 
 
The results at this experimental point provide an answer to the most interesting question 
in this research: which of the two types of embeddedness is more appropriate at the high 
level of both TU and MD. At the high level of TU, the amounts of resources necessary 
to cover technological requirements increase fast and unstably. In this case, it seems that 
the coordinators taking the relational strategy need to use a competitive tender to find 
proper partners because they may not be able to flexibly respond to the high level of TU 
with only existing partners and may face the problem of overembeddedness (Gargiulo 
and Benassi, 2000; Gulati and Westphal, 1999). On the other hand, it seems that the 
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coordinators employing the structural strategy can effectively deal with the high level of 
TU by collecting information on multiple alternative candidates through the observation 
of network positions and the information transmission via third parties, and by selecting 
more competent partners based on this information.  
 
Figure 5-13 Average Proportion of Requested Partners at High TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-13 demonstrates the average proportion of requested partners. The proportion 
for Group 1 increases steeply until the period of around 30 and then shows a flat trend 
with around 0.6. On the other hand, the proportion for Group 2 stays at about 0.9 
throughout the period. It is worthwhile to note that the proportion for Group 1 at this 
experimental point is generally lower than those at the two previous test points. The low 
proportion indicates that the coordinators taking the relational strategy unavoidably 
employ a competitive tender to choose competent members who can respond to the high 
level of TU. Moreover, the partners selected via bidding need to be managed by more 
rigorous formal contracting at the high level of MD. Therefore, the coordinators in 
Group 1 should bear the considerable hidden costs involved in selecting and controlling 
partners. On the other hand, there is little difference between the proportions for Group 
2 at this experimental point and at the two previous test points. Therefore, the structural 
strategy is superior in cost-effectiveness to the relational strategy. In the meantime, the 
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high proportion for Group 2 from the initial period indicates that the structural strategy 
is more advantageous in information accessibility than the relational strategy. 
 
Figure 5-14 demonstrates the average proportion of opportunistic partners. It is notable 
that there is little difference between the proportions for Group 1 and 2. As shown in 
Figure 5-13, around forty percent of the members in the winning ITO consortia built by 
Group 1 are selected via a competitive tender. The correctness of information on 
partners collected through bidding is not likely to be higher than that of this information 
shared through strong ties. Therefore, the accuracy for Group 1 becomes lower and is 
not much higher than that for Group 2, which is different from the results at the 
previous two test points. 
 
Figure 5-14 Average Proportion of Opportunistic Partners at High TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-15 shows the cumulative number of ties. At the high level of TU, the fast and 
unstable pace of change in technological requirements is likely to be beyond the 
coverage of existing partners for Group 1. Therefore, the coordinators taking the 
relational strategy select new members who can respond to the high level of TU via 
bidding as shown in Figure 5-13. As a result, the cumulative number of ties for Group 1 
increases constantly until the end period. A similar trend is found in the cumulative 
number of ties for Group 2. The coordinators taking the structural strategy easily and 
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quickly access information on multiple alternative candidates through the observation of 
network positions and the information transmission via third parties, and establish ITO 
consortia with new partners who can respond to the high level of TU.  
 
Figure 5-15 Cumulative Number of Ties at High TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-16 Average Strength of Ties at High TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-16 shows the average strength of ties. The cumulative numbers for both groups 
at this experimental point go up more steeply and continuously until the end period than 
those at the two previous test points. The steep and continuous increase in the numbers 
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makes a difference between the curve shapes of the average strength at this 
experimental point and at the two previous test points. The strength for each group 
increases steeply at first and then starts to decrease slowly from the period of about 30. 
Also, that for Group 1 is not much higher than that for Group 2. 
 
In the case where existing partners coupled via strong ties cannot respond to the high 
level of TU, the coordinators taking the relational strategy should select new members 
through elaborate bidding procedures. Also, the correctness of information on the new 
partners selected via bidding is not higher. Moreover, they should be managed via more 
rigorous formal contracting at the high level of MD. These formal mechanisms incur the 
considerable hidden costs involved in selecting and controlling partners. On the other 
hand, the coordinators employing the structural strategy can flexibly respond to the high 
level of TU without using a competitive tender. Furthermore, the hidden costs of 
managing reputational partners who occupy prominent network positions are less than 
those of controlling members who are selected via bidding at the high level of MD. 
Therefore, Group 2 can make better performance than Group 1. 
 
Figure 5-17 Cumulative Profit at High TU & High MD 
 
Figure 5-17 shows the cumulative profit. The two groups compete with each other until 
the period of around 30 and then Group 2 gains more profit than Group 1 as predicted. 
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Finally, Table 5-5 demonstrates the numerical results at the experimental point of the 
high level of TU and the high level of MD. 
 
Table 5-5 Numerical Results at High TU & High MD 
Period 1 30 60 90 120 150 
Proportion of 
requested partners 
Group 1 0.00 0.67 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.57 
Group 2 0.00 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.91 
Proportion of 
opportunistic partners 
Group 1 0.33 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.61 
Group 2 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.63 
Cumulative number 
of ties 
Group 1 2 16 24 34 43 52 
Group 2 3 17 28 40 52 62 
Average strength 
of ties 
Group 1 0.26 1.06 0.99 0.84 0.74 0.67 
Group 2 0.17 0.96 0.90 0.78 0.69 0.62 
Cumulative profit 
Group 1 0.54 17.00 23.92 28.47 32.09 34.44 
Group 2 0.51 16.85 25.54 31.66 35.89 38.51 
 
5.4.3 High Level of TU and Low Level of MD  
 
The results at the experimental point of the high level of TU and low level of MD are 
similar with those at the previous test point of the high level of TU and the high level of 
MD. Figure 5-18 shows the average proportion of requested partners. The proportion of 
about 0.7 for Group 1 indicates that around thirty percent of the members in the winning 
ITO consortia built by the coordinators taking the relational strategy are selected via a 
competitive tender. On the other hand, the high proportion for Group 2 means that the 
winning ITO consortia established by the coordinator employing the structural strategy 
mainly include reputational partners who occupy prominent network positions. 
Therefore, the structural strategy is superior in cost-effectiveness to the relational 
strategy. In the meantime, the proportions for Group 1 and 2 start to show a flat trend 
from the period of around 30 and from the initial period respectively. Therefore, Group 
2 enjoys more advantages in information accessibility than Group 1. 
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Figure 5-18 Average Proportion of Requested Partners at High TU & Low MD 
 
 
Figure 5-19 Average Proportion of Opportunistic Partners at High TU & Low MD 
 
 
Figure 5-19 demonstrates the average proportion of opportunistic partners. As with the 
results at the previous test point, there is little difference between the two proportions. 
That is, Group 1 cannot enjoy more advantages in information correctness than Group 2. 
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Figure 5-20 Cumulative Number of Ties at High TU & Low MD 
 
 
Figure 5-21 Average Strength of Ties at High TU & Low MD 
 
 
Figure 5-20 and 5-21 show the cumulative number and average strength of ties 
respectively. The cumulative numbers for both groups go up incrementally until the end 
period. Also, Group 1 maintains a small number of strong ties while Group 2 sustains a 
large number of weak ties. 
 
The correctness of information on partners for Group 1 is not much higher than that for 
Group 2. Also, the coordinators taking the relational strategy cannot flexibly respond to 
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the high level of TU only with existing partners who are connected via strong ties. 
Therefore, they select new members via a competitive tender. Furthermore, the new 
partners selected via bidding can be controlled with the higher hidden costs involved in 
designing and enforcing more rigorous formal contracting even at the low level of MD. 
Consequently, the structural strategy can be more appropriate than the relational 
strategy at the high level of TU and the low level of MD.  
 
Figure 5-22 shows the cumulative profit. The cumulative profits for Group 1 and 2 
increase similarly at the initial period. However, Group 2 gains more profit than Group 
1 as time passes.  
 
Figure 5-22 Cumulative Profit at High TU & Low MD 
 
Finally, Table 5-6 demonstrates the numerical results at the experimental point of the 
high level of TU and the low level of MD. 
 
Table 5-6 Numerical Results at High TU & Low MD 
Period 1 30 60 90 120 150 
Proportion of 
requested partners 
Group 1 0 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.74 
Group 2 0 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 
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Table 5-7 Continued 
Period 1 30 60 90 120 150 
Proportion of 
opportunistic partners 
Group 1 0.44 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.11 
Group 2 0.44 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Cumulative Number 
of ties 
Group 1 2 17 19 22 24 28 
Group 2 2 19 22 25 29 33 
Strength 
of ties 
Group 1 0.11 1.04 1.72 2.07 2.24 2.20 
Group 2 0.02 0.80 1.49 1.89 2.11 2.11 
Cumulative profit 
Group 1 0.00 14.39 27.69 36.85 44.05 49.49 
Group 2 0.00 14.37 28.44 39.65 48.59 55.05 
 
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The chapter conclusion summarises the conditional superiority of relational or structural 
embeddedness at the different levels of TU and MD in the long-term perspective. As 
described earlier, the experiment from the period of 1 to 150 was replicated 50 times at 
each experimental point. Then, the investigation into the cumulative profit for each 
group at the end period provides a better understanding of how the two uncertainties 
affect the long-term profit for the coordinators taking the relational or structural strategy.  
 
At first, the interaction effect of the two uncertainties is calculated. Thereafter, its 
statistical significance is tested with an ANOVA. Let T1i,j or T2i,j be the sum of the 
cumulative profit for Group 1 or 2 at the end period of the experimental point of the i th 
level of TU and the j th level of MD. Also, let IG1 or IG2 be the interaction effect of TU 
and MD on the cumulative profit for Group 1 or 2 at the end period. Then, as shown in 
Section 5.2 Design of Experiments, they are calculated as follows. 
 
L,L H,H L,H H,L
G1
[ 1 1 ] [ 1 1 ]
7.22
2
T T T T
I
n
      and 
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L,L H,H L,H H,L
G2
[ 2 2 ] [ 2 2 ]
7.31
2
T T T T
I
n
     . 
 
Furthermore, the following ANOVA tables show the statistical significance of each 
interaction effect. 
 
Table 5-8 ANOVA for Interaction Effect on Cumulative Profit for Group 1 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Interaction 1 2607.600 2607.600 771.810 0.000 
Error 196 662.200 3.380   
S = 1.838, R2 = 95.69%, R2 (Adj.) = 95.63%  
 
Table 5-9 ANOVA for Interaction Effect on Cumulative Profit for Group 2 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Interaction 1 2670.000 2670.00 1239.70 0.000 
Error 196 422.100 2.200   
S = 1.468   R2 = 98.73%, R2 (Adj.) = 98.71% 
 
Therefore, the interaction of TU and MD has a negative effect on the cumulative profits 
for Group 1 and 2. Also, the cumulative profit for Group 2 is a little bit more sensitive 
to the interaction of the two uncertainties than that for Group 1 because 
 
|IG1| = 7.22 < 7.31 = |IG2|. 
 
Figure 5-23 graphically demonstrates the interaction effects of TU and MD on the 
cumulative profits for Group 1 and 2. In line with the above numerical comparison (i.e. 
|IG1| < |IG2|), the slope of the surface for Group 2 is steeper than that for Group 1. 
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Figure 5-23 Interaction Effects of TU & MD 
 
      
 
 
Table 5-10 T-Test for Comparing Cumulative Profits for Group 1 and 2 
Uncertainty 
Measurement Difficulty 
Low High 
Technological 
Unpredictability 
Low 
Group 1 > Group 2 
(p-value: 0.00) 
Group 1 > Group 2 
(p-value: 0.00) 
High 
Group 1 < Group 2 
 (p-value: 0.00) 
Group 1 < Group 2 
(p-value: 0.00) 
 
Next, the difference between the cumulative profits for the two groups is examined at 
the end period of each test point. Table 5-9 shows the T-test results for the statistical 
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comparison between them. As a result, no matter how difficult it is to measure ITO 
performance, Group 1 gains more profits as long as the pace of change in technological 
requirements is slow and stable. On the contrary, when technological requirements 
change fast and unstably, Group 2 gains more profits regardless of the level of MD. 
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CHAPTER 6 Discussions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This research aims to reveal the conditional superiority of relational or structural 
embeddedness in enhancing long-term performance in the presence of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty imposed on ITO business environments. In 
order to achieve this aim, a simulation model was developed based on several theories 
which have been frequently used to explain complex and dynamic interactions between 
ITO parties. Moreover, a full factorial design was applied for efficient and systematic 
simulation experiments. The basic test was conducted to verify the developed 
simulation model through the comparison with existing studies. Thereafter, with this 
confirmed model, the complete tests were implemented to compare the two types of 
embeddedness at the different levels of the two uncertainties. In particular, the 
investigation into the cumulative profit at the end period provided a better 
understanding of the interaction effects of the two uncertainties on the long-term profit 
for the coordinators taking the relational or structural strategy. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings derived from analysing these data. Also, several 
theoretical and practical implications are proposed. 
 
6.2 Discussion of Findings 
 
The data for the comparison between the two types of embeddedness were gained 
through the experiments planned with a full factorial design. At first, the proportion of 
requested members and the proportion of opportunistic members were examined. Next, 
the cumulative number of ties and the average strength of ties were investigated. Finally, 
the cumulative profits for the two types of embeddedness were compared. Table 6-1 
summarises the simulation results. R and S represent relational and structural 
embeddedness respectively. TP also indicates a test point.  
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Table 6-1 Conditional Superiority of Relational and Structural Embeddedness 
Uncertainty 
Measurement difficulty 
High Low 
Technological 
unpredictability 
Low 
S < R  
at TP 1 
S < R  
at TP 2 
High 
S > R  
at TP 3 
S > R  
at TP 4 
 
The developed simulation model was verified based on the results at TP 1. When 
technological unpredictability was at the low level, there were existing partners who 
could cover technological requirements changing slowly and stably. Therefore, the 
coordinators taking the relational strategy did not have difficulty in finding more 
suitable alternatives although they maintained a small number of strong ties. Also, the 
strongly connected partners could be controlled with lower hidden costs at the high 
level of measurement difficulty. Furthermore, the proportion of opportunistic members 
for the relational strategy was lower than that for the structural strategy. Consequently, 
relational embeddedness led to better performance at this experimental point. The 
results at TP 1 were compared with the existing literature dealing with the advantages of 
relational embeddedness when it is difficult to exactly measure outcomes. Several 
studies on the comparison between the two types of embeddedness in other research 
contexts show that organisations or individuals prefer existing partners when the 
performance of partners or the quality of services and products is uncertain (Beckman et 
al., 2004; DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Podolny, 1994). Moreover, it is suggested that 
firms can enjoy cost-benefits from the repetition or long-term maintenance of their 
current outsourcing relationships at the high level of measurement difficulty because the 
needs for the exact outcome measurement and partner switch are reduced (Goo et al., 
2007; Gopal et al., 2003; Kronman, 1985).   
 
The results at TP 2 revealed that relational embeddedness made better performance as 
with those at TP 1. Measurement difficulty was at the low level at TP 2. Therefore, it is 
remarkable that the proportion of opportunistic members for the structural strategy at 
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this test point was lower than that at TP 1. Nonetheless, the proportion for the relational 
strategy was somehow lower than, or similar to, that for the structural strategy. 
Furthermore, the coordinators taking the relational strategy could still respond to the 
low level of technological unpredictability with their existing partners who were 
coupled through strong ties. 
 
Interestingly, structural embeddedness led to better performance at TP 3 where both 
uncertainties are at the high level. At this experimental point, the coordinators taking the 
relational strategy could not respond to the rapid and unstable change of technological 
requirements with only existing partners. Therefore, they found new members through 
competitive tenders and controlled the members’ behaviour with more rigorous formal 
contracts. However, these formal mechanisms incurred considerable hidden costs 
especially at the high level of measurement difficulty. Furthermore, as the proportion of 
existing partners decreased and the proportion of partners selected via bidding increased, 
the proportion of opportunistic members became higher. In contrast, the coordinators 
taking the structural strategy could flexibly respond to the high level of technological 
unpredictability by gaining information on multiple alternative candidates through the 
observation of their network positions and the information transmission via third parties, 
and by choosing more competent partners for given technological requirements. 
Moreover, when it is difficult to exactly measure outcomes, the hidden costs of 
controlling reputational partners were smaller than those of managing partners selected 
via bidding.  
 
Structural embeddedness made better performance at TP 4. The inferiority of relational 
embeddedness at this experimental point was derived from the fact that the coordinators 
taking the relational strategy were not able to react to the high level of technological 
unpredictability with only existing partners as shown in the test results at TP 3. 
 
In brief, the research on relational embeddedness emphasises the advantages of trust and 
commitment generated by the repetition or long-term maintenance of an outsourcing 
relationship between specific partners as shown in the literature on ITO partnerships. 
The findings support this argument when measurement difficulty is at the high level and 
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technological unpredictability is at the low level. On the other hand, the study on 
structural embeddedness focuses on the uses of (potential) partners’ network positions 
and information transmitters as revealed in the literature on network-based ITO 
relationships. The results support this claim when technological unpredictability is at the 
high level regardless of the level of measurement difficulty. Especially, at the high 
levels of both uncertainties, structural embeddedness makes better performance than 
relational embeddedness.  
 
The findings that structural embeddedness makes better performance at TP 3 and 4 need 
to be more specifically discussed compared with the arguments that organisations or 
individuals prefer existing partners who are relationally embedded when the uncertainty 
regarding product and service quality or partners’ performance is at the high level 
(Beckman et al., 2004; DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Podolny, 1994).  
 
In ITO business environments, much attention has been paid to how to successfully 
establish and maintain long-term cooperative outsourcing relationships such as 
partnerships (Kern and Willcocks, 2002; Lacity et al., 2010). It has been shown that the 
efforts to manage outsourcing relationships through more complete formal contracts 
sometimes lead to unsatisfactory results (Nam et al., 1996). Furthermore, formal 
contracts are naturally incomplete because it is almost impossible to predict and specify 
all of the possible contingencies in advance (Kim and Chung, 2003). Therefore, firms 
attempt to supplement this incompleteness with several advantages created by the 
repetition or long-term maintenance of outsourcing relationships with reliable partners 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). Clients and vendors who are coupled through relationally 
embedded ties can flexibly respond to the high level of uncertainty (Fitzgerald and 
Willcocks, 1994; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). They can resolve information asymmetry 
and suppress uncertainty by sharing high-quality information and tacit knowledge 
(Rowley et al., 2000). In addition, relational embeddedness is advantageous in terms of 
cost-benefits. Clients consider alternative vendors for various reasons: low service or 
product quality, low relationship quality, contract problems, internal and external 
changes (Heng et al., 2009). However, they should bear the considerable switching 
costs involved in finding and managing new vendors when they already have well-
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established outsourcing relationships (Gopal et al., 2003). Alternatively, the behaviour 
of outsourcing parties connected through relationally embedded ties can be efficiently 
governed by trust and commitment which are manifest and developed in the process 
evolving through consecutive interactions between them (Kim and Chung, 2003; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002).  
 
However, a huge amount of resources should be invested in the development of 
relationally embedded relationships (Larson, 1992). Therefore, it is difficult to maintain 
a large number of strong ties. Moreover, a few strong ties may restrict access to new 
information and business opportunities because strongly connected outsourcing parties 
tend to stay within their existing relationships (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000).  
 
In the meantime, the selection of a competent partner is regarded as one of the most 
critical determinants of ITO success (Ketler and Walstrom, 1993; McFarlan and Nolan, 
1995). Clients attempt to find alternatives in the case where their existing vendors 
cannot appropriately cover contingencies caused by the rapid and unstable change in 
ITO business environments (Goo et al., 2007). When firms find alternative partners who 
are considered more suitable, they can use an ITO network which acts as a conduit of 
valuable information on the characteristics of multiple candidates and on the quality of 
their services or products (Granovetter, 1995; Podolny, 2001). Therefore, clients with a 
large number of weak ties can access information on diverse potential vendors and have 
an opportunity to compare them (Ravindran et al., 2009). Also, the prominent network 
positions occupied by reputational vendors represent their excellent outcomes or their 
abilities to implement obligations (Heng et al., 2009; Malik and Bouguettaya, 2009).  
 
In addition, it is suggested that “the essence of exploitation is the refinement and 
extension of existing competencies, technologies, and paradigms” and “the essence of 
exploration is experimentation with new alternatives” (March, 1991, p.85). According 
to the general argument on exploration and exploitation, more resources should be 
invested in exploration at the high level of uncertainty (Lant et al., 1992). For example, 
the research of Afuah (2000) implies that firms facing the rapid pace of technological 
change should not invest all their resources in a few existing partners who are strongly 
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connected. Rather, they need to allocate their resources to multiple alternative 
relationships which could provide several options in response to the high level of 
technological unpredictability (Rowley et al., 2000).  
 
As a result, as shown in a body of literature concerning ITO partnerships, relational 
embeddedness more successfully operates at the high level of measurement difficulty. 
This is supported by the simulation results at TP 1. However, when existing vendors’ 
capabilities or outsourcing parties’ collaboration cannot keep up with the rapid and 
unstable change of technological requirements, structural embeddedness makes better 
performance.  This is in line with the simulation results at TP 3 and 4. 
 
Finally, this research proposes a conceptual framework including several key features 
which were used to compare the two types of embeddedness as shown in Figure 6-1. 
 
Figure 6-1 Conceptual Framework of Relational and Structural Embeddedness 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Theoretical Implication 
 
The findings of this research complement and extend the existing literature in the 
following three research areas: IT outsourcing, network dynamics and environmental 
adaptation.  
 
Number of ties 
Strength of ties 
 
Measurement 
difficulty 
Technological 
unpredictability 
Long-term 
performance 
Tension between 
relational and structural 
embeddedness 
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6.3.1 IT Outsourcing 
 
Each ITO research stream on relational or structural embeddedness has mainly focused 
on its own advantages in response to uncertainty as shown in the literature on long-term 
cooperative outsourcing relationships or on network-based outsourcing relationships. 
However, the lack of comparative studies may draw the confusing conclusion that both 
types of embeddedness could be commonly suitable for any given uncertainty. This 
research provides a better understanding of which leads to better performance by 
examining its conditional superiority at the different levels of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty which are regarded to be important in ITO 
studies.  
 
Especially, the simulation results offer a possible theoretical answer to why an ITO 
partnership based on relational embeddedness sometimes fails in spite of its popularity. 
An ITO partnership has been prevalent in the real world and has been intensively 
studied in the academic area (Dibbern et al., 2004; Kern and Willcocks, 2002; Lacity et 
al., 2010). Above all, this long-term cooperative outsourcing relationship is generally 
perceived to be more advantageous in terms of cost-benefits because clients can reduce 
the considerable transaction costs involved in switching vendors and measuring 
performance (Goo et al., 2007; Gopal et al., 2003; Kronman, 1985). However, it is 
reported that the partnership does not always guarantee the success of ITO. Mike 
Lafford, the Group Vice President of Gartner Incoporate, advises that a long-term ITO 
contract may lead to clients’ disadvantages, and the realisation of his concern is found 
in the example of the State of Virginia’s ITO (Park, 2009). Virginia Information 
Technologies Agency (VITA) made a massive ITO contract with Northrop Grumman 
Corporation. The size and duration of this contract were approximately two billion 
dollars and ten years. However, the attempt to outsource the state’s information systems 
has proven to be a failure and the Director of VITA has resigned from his position. As 
shown in many studies on an ITO partnership, trust and commitment were likely to be 
manifested and developed between the client and vendor. However, if the dynamic 
change of technological requirements over time was beyond the coverage of the 
vendor’s capability or the outsourcing parties’ collaboration, the client was likely to 
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face the problem of overembeddedness and could not flexibly respond to the high level 
of technological unpredictability (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Gulati and Westphal, 
1999).  
 
In addition, the simulation results provide a potential theoretical reply to in which 
condition structural embeddedness is preferred in ITO business environments. The 
collaborative research consortia funded by the European Union seventh framework 
programme perform information and communication technologies (ICT) research 
projects to enhance the competitiveness of European industry through the development 
of ICT. This programme focuses on the following research challenges, which require 
advanced information technologies and methods (European Commission, 2012). 
 
Table 6-2 EU FP 7 ICT Programme  
Challenge Research Theme 
Challenge 1 Pervasive and trusted network and service infrastructures 
Challenge 2 Cognitive systems and robotics 
Challenge 3 Alternative paths to components and systems 
Challenge 4 Technologies for digital content and languages 
Challenge 5 ICT for health, ageing well, inclusion and governance 
Challenge 6 ICT for low carbon economy 
Challenge 7 ICT for enterprise and manufacturing 
Challenge 8 ICT for creativity and learning 
 
Therefore, in accordance with previous business settings, technological requirements 
are likely to change rapidly and unstably, and it is probably difficult to measure 
outcomes. In this case, the practical survey report on how to select partners for the 
formation of ICT consortia shows that project managers frequently use candidates’ 
reputations and third parties to find suitable partners who are competent as well as 
reliable (Drath and Wayman, 2010).  
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6.3.2 Network Dynamics 
 
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of network studies which address the 
pattern of structuralised relationships among actors over recent decades (Brass et al., 
2004). A network is viewed as antecedents or consequences in various research settings. 
The majority of research especially at the egocentric level has investigated how an 
actor’s network position can affect its outcomes in the perspective of antecedents. For 
example, a body of literature has examined the effects of network positions on a variety 
of important outcomes such as “power, leadership, mobility, employment, individual 
performance, individual creativity, entrepreneurship and team performance” (Borgatti 
and Foster, 2003, p.993). On the other hand, it has been examined why and how 
network ties are created and reinforced from the viewpoint of consequences. For 
instance, the strength of network ties is reinforced in the presence of the uncertainty 
regarding service and product quality or partners’ performance since organisations or 
individuals tend to select their existing partners to suppress the uncertainty (DiMaggio 
and Louch, 1998; Kraatz, 1998; Podolny, 1994). More specifically, the research of 
Beckman et al. (2004) illustrates how firms change their network ties in accordance 
with the different type of uncertainty. That is, it is suggested that firms tend to reinforce 
and extend their network ties in response to market uncertainty and firm-specific 
uncertainty respectively.  
 
In addition to the literature in the research area of network dynamics, this research 
improves an understanding of how the strength and structure of network ties at the 
egocentric level can be changed by the different levels of technological unpredictability 
and measurement difficulty. The simulation results in this research show that the 
coordinators taking the structural strategy increase the number of network ties at the 
high level of technological unpredictability. These heterogeneous and temporary ITO 
relationships allow the coordinators to flexibly respond to the rapid and unstable change 
of technological requirements. On the other hand, the test results in this study reveal that 
the coordinators taking the relational strategy consolidate their existing network ties in 
response to the high level of measurement difficulty. These outsourcing parties can 
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overcome the difficulty in measuring ITO performance and enjoy advantages stemming 
from strong ties. 
 
6.3.3 Environmental Adaptation 
 
A firm’s performance is affected by whether it refines and extends “existing 
competencies, technologies and paradigms” (i.e. exploitation) or it searches and 
experiments with “new alternatives” (i.e. exploration) (March, 1991, p.85). Also, 
exploitation and exploration compete with each other due to scarce resources and the 
amount of resources allocated to either of them is different in accordance with business 
environments (Rowley et al., 2000). Therefore, a firm’s strategic choice between 
exploitation and exploration in response to environmental changes is regarded as one of 
the fundamental problems for adaptive systems (Holland, 1992). Generally, it is 
accepted that firms should invest more resources in exploration than in exploitation in 
the presence of the high level of uncertainty (Lant et al., 1992). However, it is shown 
that more investment in exploration does not always lead to better performance in 
uncertain business settings. For example, the research of Lee et al. (2003b) addresses 
the conditional superiority of exploitation or exploration when a new, but incompatible, 
technology is introduced in the market. It is suggested that exploration is more useful 
when an emergent technology appears before an existing technology has become too 
prevalent or when there are many power users. In contrast, it is proposed that 
exploitation is more beneficial when a new technology emerges after an old technology 
has been commonly adopted or when there are few power users.  
 
This research contributes to the research of environmental adaptation by examining the 
conditional superiority of each type of embeddedness according to the type and level of 
uncertainty. The partner selection and control strategy based on relational and structural 
embeddedness focus on the utilisation of present partners and the search for alternative 
partners respectively. Therefore, the concepts of the two strategies are in line with those 
of exploitation and exploration. The findings in this research suggest that the 
coordinators taking the relational strategy can efficiently adapt to the high level of 
measurement difficulty when the pace of technological change is slow and stable by 
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exploiting existing partners. It is also proposed that the coordinators employing the 
structural strategy can flexibly adapt to the fast and unstable change of technological 
requirements by exploring multiple alternatives.   
 
6.4 Practical Implication 
 
In the practical perspective, the investigation on the conditional superiority of each type 
of embeddedness provides ITO managers with a guideline for the choice between 
existing partners who are strongly connected and reputational partners who occupy 
prominent network positions. 
 
Figure 6-2 Guideline for Establishment of ITO Consortia 
 
Uncertainty 
Measurement difficulty 
High Low 
Technological 
unpredictability 
Low S < R S < R 
High S > R S > R 
 
 
 
 
* S and R indicate structural and relational embeddedness respectively. 
 
Question: 
Whether to build an ITO consortium with 
existing or reputational partners? 
 Is the change of technological requirements 
rapid and unstable? 
It is recommended to build 
an ITO consortium  
with existing partners 
It is recommended to build 
an ITO consortium  
with reputational partners 
No Yes 
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Figure 6-2 illustrates a guideline for deciding whether to establish ITO consortia with 
existing or reputational partners. As shown in the table summarising the simulation 
results, the long-term profits of coordinators are more affected by technological 
unpredictability than measurement difficulty in ITO business environments where the 
two uncertainties coexist. Therefore, coordinators should consider whether the change 
of technological requirements is rapid and unstable. If the answer is yes, it is 
recommended to build ITO consortia with reputational partners who are located in 
prominent network positions. Coordinators can flexibly respond to the high level of 
technological unpredictability with these members. However, if the reply is no, it is 
recommended to establish ITO consortia with existing partners who are coupled through 
strong ties. These members can sufficiently cover technological requirements which 
change slowly and stably. Furthermore, outsourcing relationships with them include 
trust and commitment. 
 
6.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the simulation results were discussed at different levels of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty. In particular, the findings on the 
superiority of structural embeddedness at the high level of technological 
unpredictability was discussed compared with the literature which prefers existing 
partners in the presence of uncertainty and which favours exploration to adapt to 
uncertain business settings. 
 
In addition, theoretical and managerial implications were proposed. The findings 
complement and extend the literature in the research area of IT outsourcing, network 
dynamics and environmental adaptation. Also, they provide ITO managers with a 
guideline for the choice between existing and reputational partners in ITO business 
environments where technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty exist 
together.  
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 describes the summary of this research. Also, the limitations and further 
research directions are discussed. 
 
7.2 Research Summary 
 
In ITO business environments, there are various forms of risks which can increase the 
possibility of outsourcing parties’ opportunistic behaviour and threaten long-term 
performance. Among them, especially, the uncertainties stemming from the 
unpredictability of technological requirements and the difficulty in measuring outcomes 
have been frequently and significantly addressed (Kim and Chung, 2003; Lacity et al., 
2010)  
 
Recent studies have demonstrated that relational and structural embeddedness play an 
important role in controlling these uncertainties in the context of ITO (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Ravindran et al., 2009). However, each research stream has mainly 
emphasised its own advantages as revealed in the literature regarding ITO partnerships 
or network-based ITO relationships. That is, the comparison between the two types of 
embeddedness has not been conducted in the research area of ITO. Although there are 
several studies which compare relational and structural embeddedness in other research 
contexts (Beckman et al., 2004; DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Hansen, 
1999; Kraatz, 1998; Schneider et al., 1997), they do not adopt technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty imposed on ITO business environments as 
comparative criteria. Furthermore, these studies mainly emphasise which of the two 
types of embeddedness is preferred at the high level of uncertainty rather than which of 
them leads to better performance according to the type and level of uncertainty. There is, 
therefore, a paucity of literature on the conditional superiority of each type of 
embeddedness at the different levels of the two uncertainties in the context of ITO. 
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In order to fill the research gap, this research developed a simulation model which can 
compare the two types of embeddedness in the presence of technological 
unpredictability and measurement difficulty of which the levels are not uniform across a 
wide range of IT services. In this model, technological unpredictability is associated 
with the use of elaborate tender procedures and rigorous contract clauses while 
measurement difficulty is related to the correctness of information on (potential) 
partners’ behavioural tendencies. In response to given outsourcing opportunities with 
the different levels of these two uncertainties, coordinators take the relational or 
structural strategy. The coordinator taking the relational strategy attempts to select an 
existing partner for whom it has the outsourcing history. They are coupled through a 
strong tie and the partner’s behaviour can be managed with lower hidden costs. On the 
other hand, the coordinator taking the structural strategy tries to choose a reputational 
partner who occupies a prominent network position. The partner is likely to be more 
competent for a given outsourcing opportunity. However, the coordinator bears the 
higher hidden costs involved in controlling the partner’s behaviour because they are not 
completely committed to each other.  
 
A full factorial design was applied to conduct efficient and systematic simulation 
experiments. Technological unpredictability and measurement difficulty were used as 
two key factors and each of them had two levels: low and high. Simulation tests were 
implemented at all the possible combinations of the levels of the two uncertainties. At 
first, the developed simulation model was verified by examining the consistency 
between the existing literature addressing the advantages of relational embeddedness at 
the high level of measurement difficulty. Thereafter, the data for the comparison 
between the two types of embeddedness were gained through the experiments at the 
whole test points with this confirmed model. 
 
The investigation into relational embeddedness emphasises the advantages of trust and 
commitment generated by the repetition or long-term maintenance of an outsourcing 
relationship between specific partners as shown in the literature on ITO partnerships. 
The results support this argument when measurement difficulty and technological 
unpredictability are at the high and low level respectively. On the other hand, the 
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examination on structural embeddedness focuses on the uses of (potential) partners’ 
network positions and information transmitters as revealed in the literature on network-
based ITO relationships. The results support this claim when technological 
unpredictability is at the high level regardless of the level of measurement difficulty. 
Especially, at the high levels of both uncertainties, structural embeddedness makes 
better performance than relational embeddedness. 
 
The findings of this research contribute to the existing literature in the following three 
research areas: IT outsourcing, network dynamics and environmental adaptation. In the 
practical perspective, the investigation into the conditional superiority of each type of 
embeddedness provides ITO managers with a guideline for the choice between existing 
partners who are strong connected and reputational partners who occupy prominent 
network positions. 
 
7.3 Research Limitation 
 
A simulation model is regarded as the outcome of efforts to develop or extend a theory 
but sometimes as a theory itself in the perspective that several theoretical notions are 
embodied in the model (Harrison et al., 2007). Also, the findings drawn from the 
implementation of the model can be qualified for a well-made theory in the sense that it 
includes constructs derived from existing studies, theoretical logics establishing 
relationships among them and assumptions defining research boundary conditions 
(Sutton and Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989). Furthermore, the external validity of a 
simulation study is guaranteed to a certain degree in the case where the related theories 
underlying the study are supported by a lot of empirical evidence (Davis et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the results may be considered the theoretical inferences from the analysis 
of virtual data. Moreover, a simulation study shows its consequences only for a specific 
set of parameters and assumptions. Therefore, the findings in this research are not likely 
to be valid if the parameters are changed or the assumptions are violated.  
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7.4 Further Research Directions 
 
This study needs to be empirically tested to obtain its high external validity. As 
discussed in Section 3.3.6 Validate Empirical Data, external validity is not likely to be 
an important issue in this research because the developed simulation model and the new 
findings are based on several well-established theories supported by a body of empirical 
literature. However, the model and findings may be regarded as the logical 
consequences drawn from the simulation tests as discussed in the previous section. 
Moreover, one of the significant roles of a simulation study is to provide a basis for 
further empirical studies (Harrison et al., 2007). Therefore, the consequences in this 
research can be used as a foundation for the empirical examination on the conditional 
superiority of each type of embeddedness in the presence of uncertainty imposed on 
ITO business environments.  
 
Secondly, it needs to be investigated which of the two types of embeddedness is more 
advantageous in the presence of both asset specificity and uncertainty in the context of 
ITO. This research introduced the two uncertainties for the comparison between 
relational and structural embeddedness. In addition to uncertainty, asset specificity has 
been frequently and significantly addressed in ITO studies (Dibbern et al., 2004; Lacity 
et al., 2010). Moreover, the interaction between asset specificity and uncertainty can 
seriously threaten the efficiency of outsourcing relationships in the context of ITO (Goo 
et al., 2007; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). It is necessary, therefore, to compare the two 
types of embeddedness in a situation where asset specificity and uncertainty exist 
together. 
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Appendix A: Notations 
 
4.3    Vendors in ITO Network 
ijv  
the j th vendor (for j = 1, ··· , n) to provide resources for the i th type of 
technology (for i = 1, ··· , m) 
( )ija t  the level of coordination abilities which vij has at the period of t  
ijs  the strategy which which vij takes 
rn  the number of vendors taking the relational strategy 
sn  the number of vendors taking the structural strategy 
( )ijr t  
the amount of resources which vij has for the i th type of technology at the 
period of t (for t = 1, ··· , T) 
ijb  the behavioural tendency which vij has 
cn  the number of cooperative vendors 
on  the number of opportunistic vendors 
 
4.4    Two Uncertainties Imposed on ITO Business Environments 
( )tRFP  the request-for-proposals published at the period of t 
( )pa t  the level of coordination abilities required in RFP(t) 
( )xpr t  the amount of resources for the x th type of technology required in RFP(t) 
  the increasing rate and instability of coordination abilities and resources 
required in RFP(t) 
( )I t  
the sum of coordination abilities and resources which are actually invested 
by the winning ITO consortium members at the period of t 
( )R t  
the sum of coordination abilities and resources which are necessary to cover 
the technological requirements in RFP(t) 
( )Prop t  the proportion of I(t) to R(t)  
  the extent to which the technological requirements in RFP(t) can be verified 
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4.5    Coordinator’s Decision-Making 
1p  the proportion of vendors who can be qualified to be a coordinator 
( )ijxCFB t  
the call-for-proposals published by a coordinator (vij) to secure resources for 
the x th type of technology  
( )ijxbr t  the amount of resources for the x th type of technology in CFBijx(t) 
( )ij xyp t  
vij’s cumulative profit gained through the join in ITO consortia together with 
vxy until the period of t − 1 
, max ( )ij x pv t  vxy with the maximum value of pij↔xy(t) 
( )uv xyr t  
whether vuv has the experience of participating in ITO consortia together 
with vxy between the period of 1 to t − 1 
( )xyc t  vxy’s degree centrality at the period of t 
, max ( )ij x cv t  
vxy with the maximum value of cxy(t) among candidates who are perceived to 
be cooperative by vij 
rc  
the hidden costs of managing an existing partner who is selected by a 
coordinator taking the relational strategy 
sc  
the hidden costs of managing a reputational partner who is selected by a 
coordinator taking the structural strategy 
bc cc  the hidden costs of selecting and managing a partner who is chosen through 
a bid when there are no existing or reputational partners 
 
4.6    Partner’s Decision-Making 
2p  the proportion of vendors who can perform the role of a partner 
 
4.7    Profits 
( )caa t  
the level of coordination abilities which are actually used by the winning 
ITO consortium coordinator (vij) at the period of t 
( )car t  
the amount of resources which are actually invested by the winning ITO 
consortium coordinator (vij) in the i th type of technology at the period of t 
( )xpar t  
the amount of resources which are actually invested by the winning ITO 
consortium partner (vxy) in the x th type of technology at the period of t 
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4.7    Continued  
( )uPO t  
the payoff which the market offers for the winning ITO consortium at the 
period of t when the quality of a delivered IT service is unsatisfactory 
( )sPO t  
the payoff which the market offers for the winning ITO consortium at the 
period of t when the quality of a delivered IT service is satisfactory 
r  the profit rate 
( )cpoa t  
the payoff which is allocated to the winning ITO consortium coordinator for 
the investment in coordination abilities at the period of t 
( )cpor t  
the payoff which is allocated to the winning ITO consortium coordinator for 
the investment in resources for the i th type of technology at the period of t 
( )xppor t  
the payoff which is allocated to the winning ITO consortium partner (vxy) for 
the investment in resources for the x th type of technology at the period of t 
( )cpa t  
the profit which is gained by the winning ITO consortium coordinator for 
the investment in coordination abilities at the period of t 
( )cpr t  
the profit which is gained by the winning ITO consortium coordinator for 
the investment in resources for the i th type of technology at the period of t 
( )xppr t  
the profit which is gained the winning ITO consortium partner (vxy) for the 
investment in resources for the x th type of technology at the period of t 
 
4.8    Information Update and Transfer 
( )ab cdpb t  vcd’s behavioural tendency perceived by vab at the period of t − 1 
pt  the probability to transfer information 
( )rcpa t  
the profit for the winning ITO consortium coordinator taking the relational 
strategy for the investment in coordination abilities at the period of t 
( )scpa t  
the profit for the winning ITO consortium coordinator taking the structural 
strategy for the investment in coordination abilities at the period of t 
( )rCPA T  
the cumulative profit for the winning ITO consortium coordinators taking 
the relational strategy at the period of T 
( )sCPA T  
the cumulative profit for the winning ITO consortium coordinators taking 
the structural strategy at the period of T 
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4.8    Continued 
( )ij xynt t  whether the tie between vij and vxy is newly created at the period of t 
( )nt t  
the number of ties which are newly built by the winning ITO consortium 
coordinator at the period of t 
( )rnt t  
the number of new ties which are generated by the winning ITO consortium 
coordinator taking the relational strategy at the period of t 
( )snt t  
the number of new ties which are generated by the winning ITO consortium 
coordinator taking the structural strategy at the period of t 
( )rCNT T  
the cumulative number of new ties for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinators taking the relational strategy at the period of T 
( )sCNT T  
the cumulative number of new ties for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinators taking the structural strategy at the period of T 
( )rAST T  
the average strength of ties for the winning ITO consortium coordinators 
taking the relational strategy at the period of T 
( )sAST T  
the average strength of ties for the winning ITO consortium coordinator 
taking the structural strategy at the period of T 
( )n t  the number of partners in the winning ITO consortium at the period of t 
( )no t  
the number of opportunistic partners in the winning ITO consortium at the 
period of t 
( )po t  
the proportion of opportunistic partners in the winning ITO consortium at 
the period of t 
( )rpo t  
the proportion of opportunistic partners for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinator taking the relational strategy at the period of t 
( )spo t  
the proportion of opportunistic partners for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinator taking the structural strategy at the period of t 
( )rNW T  
the cumulative number of winning contracts for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinators taking the relational strategy at the period of T 
( )sNW T  
the cumulative number for winning contracts for the winning ITO 
consortium coordinators taking the structural strategy at the period of T 
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4.8    Continued 
( )rAPO T  
the average proportion of opportunistic partners for the winning ITO 
consortium coordinators taking the relational strategy at the period of T 
( )sAPO T  
the average proportion of opportunistic partners for the winning ITO 
consortium coordinators taking the structural strategy at the period of T 
( )nrp t  
the number of requested partners in the winning ITO consortium at the 
period of t 
( )prp t  
the proportion of requested partners in the winning ITO consortium at the 
period of t 
( )rprp t  
the proportion of requested partners for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinator taking the relational strategy at the period of t 
( )sprp t  
the proportion of requested partners for the winner ITO consortium 
coordinator taking the structural strategy at the period of t 
( )rAPR T  
the average proportion of requested partners for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinators taking the relational strategy at the period of T 
( )sAPR T  
the average proportion of requested partners for the winning ITO consortium 
coordinators taking the structural strategy at the period of T 
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Appendix B: Initial Values of Parameters 
 
m = 5 
n = 10  
amin(0) = 30, amax(0) = 50 
rmin(0) = 30, rmax(0) = 50 
pij↔xy(0) = 0, rij↔xy(0) = 0, pbij↔xy(0) = 0 (for all i, j, x, y) 
p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.2 
rc = prx(t) × 0.005, sc = prx(t) × 0.03, bc+cc = prx(t) × 0.05 
r = 0.1 
pt = 0.5 
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4.3    Vendors in ITO Network 
 
    For b = 1 To NofRT        
        RT(b) = "r" & b 
        INofVforRT(b) = Int((Rnd() * (MaxNofV ‐ (MinNofV) + 1)) + (MinNofV)) 
    Next 
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        NofCoopVforRT(b) = Round(INofVforRT(b) * PCandO, 0)         
        NofVURelforRT(b) = Round(INofVforRT(b) * PRandS, 0) 
    Next             
    For b = 1 To NofRT      
        Dim colC_1 As New Collection 
            ReDim varLong(1 To INofVforRT(b), 1 To 1) As Integer 
        Dim a_1 As Integer, lngRnd_1 As Integer 
        Randomize 
        For a_1 = 1 To INofVforRT(b) 
            colC_1.Add a_1 
        Next 
        For a_1 = INofVforRT(b) To 1 Step ‐1 
            lngRnd_1 = Int(a_1 * Rnd) + 1 
            varLong(a_1, 1) = colC_1.Item(lngRnd_1) 
            colC_1.Remove lngRnd_1 
        Next 
        Range(Cells(1 + TNofCoopV, 5), Cells(TNofCoopV + NofCoopVforRT(b), 5)) = varLong 
        TNofCoopV = TNofCoopV + NofCoopVforRT(b)         
        Dim colC_2 As New Collection 
            ReDim varLong(1 To INofVforRT(b), 1 To 1) As Integer 
        Dim a_2 As Integer, lngRnd_2 As Integer 
        Randomize 
        For a_2 = 1 To INofVforRT(b) 
            colC_2.Add a_2 
        Next 
        For a_2 = INofVforRT(b) To 1 Step ‐1 
            lngRnd_2 = Int(a_2 * Rnd) + 1 
            varLong(a_2, 1) = colC_2.Item(lngRnd_2) 
            colC_2.Remove lngRnd_2 
        Next 
        Range(Cells(1 + TNofVURel, 6), Cells(TNofVURel + NofVURelforRT(b), 6)) = varLong 
        TNofVURel = TNofVURel + NofVURelforRT(b)         
        For c = 1 To INofVforRT(b)             
            IVend(b, c, 1) = "v" & b & "," & c            
            IVend(b, c, 2) = Int((Rnd() * (MaxQofR ‐ (MinQofR) + 1)) + (MinQofR))           
            IVend(b, c, 4) = Int((Rnd() * (MaxLofA ‐ (MinLofA) + 1)) + (MinLofA))                     
            IVend(b, c, 6) = c             
        Next 
    Next      
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To INofVforRT(b) 
            For x = 1 + TNofCoopV To TNofCoopV + NofCoopVforRT(b)             
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                If IVend(b, c, 6) = Cells(x, 5) Then             
                    IVend(b, c, 3) = 1       
                End If             
            Next             
        Next         
        TNofCoopV = TNofCoopV + NofCoopVforRT(b)     
    Next     
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To INofVforRT(b)         
            If IVend(b, c, 3) = 1 Then            
            Else             
                IVend(b, c, 3) = ‐1             
            End If             
        Next     
    Next     
    Range(Cells(1, 5), Cells(TNofCoopV, 5)).ClearContents         
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To INofVforRT(b)         
            For x = 1 + TNofVURel To TNofVURel + NofVURelforRT(b)            
                If IVend(b, c, 6) = Cells(x, 6) Then             
                    IVend(b, c, 5) = 1         
                End If             
            Next             
        Next         
        TNofVURel = TNofVURel + NofVURelforRT(b)     
    Next     
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To INofVforRT(b)         
            If IVend(b, c, 5) = 1 Then             
            Else             
                IVend(b, c, 5) = ‐1             
            End If             
        Next     
    Next 
    Range(Cells(1, 6), Cells(TNofVURel, 6)).ClearContents 
 
4.4    Two Uncertainties Imposed on ITO Business Environments 
 
4.4.1    Technological Unpredictability 
 
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        RFP(b, 1) = RT(b)     
    Next      
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)         
            Sumofrij = Sumofrij + Vend(b, c, 2)         
        Next     
    Next     
    MofQofRinRFP_1 = Sumofrij / TNofV 
    MofQofRinRFP = MofQofRinRFP_1 * Alpha             
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)         
            SSumofrij = SSumofrij + (MofQofRinRFP_1 ‐ Vend(b, c, 2)) ^ 2         
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        Next         
    Next     
    SDofQofRinRFP = Sqr(SSumofrij / (TNofV ‐ 1)) * Alpha  
    For b = 1 To NofRT                       
        Regenerate_pri:     
        RFP(b, 2) = MofQofRinRFP + SDofQofRinRFP * Abs(GaussianRandom()) 
        if RFP(b, 2) =< 0 Then 
            GoTo Regenerate_pri 
        End if        
    Next 
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)         
            Sumofaij = Sumofaij + Vend(b, c, 4)         
        Next     
    Next     
    MofLofAinRFP_1 = Sumofaij / TNofV 
    MofLofAinRFP = MofLofAinRFP_1 * Alpha         
    For b = 1 To NofRT    
        For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)         
            SSumofaij = SSumofaij + (MofLofAinRFP_1 ‐ Vend(b, c, 4)) ^ 2         
        Next         
    Next     
    SDofLofAinRFP = Sqr(SSumofaij / (TNofV ‐ 1)) * Alpha           
    Regenerate_pa: 
    RFP(NofRT + 1, 2) = MofLofAinRFP + SDofLofAinRFP * Abs(GaussianRandom())  
    if RFP(NofRT+1, 2) <= 0 Then 
        GoTo Regenerate_pa 
    End If 
 
4.4.2    Measurement Difficulty 
 
    AI = AI + WCoor(4) 
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        If RT(b) = WCoor(5) Then         
            If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then             
                AI = AI + WItself_Suf(10)             
            Else             
                AI = AI + WItself_Ins(10)                 
                AI = AI + WPartner(b, 10)                                     
            End If         
        Else         
            AI = AI + WPartner(b, 10)         
        End If     
    Next             
    For b = 1 To NofRT + 1     
        Req = Req + RFP(b, 2)     
    Next      
    PofAItoReq = AI / Req 
    If PofAItoReq >= Beta Then         
        Quality = "Satisfactory"         
    Else 
        Quality = "Unsatisfactory"         
    End If 
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4.5    Coordinator’s Decision-Making 
 
4.5.1    Whether to Become Coordinator 
     
    For b = 1 To NofRT         
        NofVasCforRT(b) = Round(NofVforRT(b) * PforCoor, 0) 
        Dim colC_3 As New Collection 
            ReDim varLong(1 To NofVforRT(b), 1 To 1) As Integer 
        Dim a_3 As Integer, lngRnd_3 As Integer 
        Randomize 
        For a_3 = 1 To NofVforRT(b) 
            colC_3.Add a_3 
        Next 
        For a_3 = NofVforRT(b) To 1 Step ‐1 
            lngRnd_3 = Int(a_3 * Rnd) + 1 
            varLong(a_3, 1) = colC_3.Item(lngRnd_3) 
            colC_3.Remove lngRnd_3 
        Next 
        Range(Cells(2 + TNofVasC, 5), Cells(1 + TNofVasC + NofVasCforRT(b), 5)) = varLong                 
        For g = TNofVasC To TNofVasC + NofVasCforRT(b)             
            For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)                 
                If Cells(2 + g, 5) = Vend(b, c, 6) Then                     
                    PCoor(g + 1, 1) = RT(b)                     
                    PCoor(g + 1, 2) = Vend(b, c, 1)  
                    PCoor(g + 1, 3) = Vend(b, c, 4)                      
                    PCoor(g + 1, 4) = Vend(b, c, 5)                      
                    PCoor(g + 1, 7) = Vend(b, c, 2)                      
                    PCoor(g + 1, 8) = Vend(b, c, 3)                   
                End If                 
            Next         
        Next         
        TNofVasC = TNofVasC + NofVasCforRT(b)         
    Next     
    Range(Cells(2, 5), Cells(2 + TNofVasC, 5)).ClearContents     
    For g = 1 To TNofVasC                 
        PCoor(g, 5) = RFP(NofRT + 1, 2)        
        If PCoor(g, 3) >= PCoor(g, 5) Then             
            PCoor(g, 6) = "Yes"             
        Else             
            PCoor(g, 6) = "No"         
        End If         
    Next     
    For g = 1 To TNofVasC             
        If PCoor(g, 6) = "Yes" Then                
            h = h + 1                
            Coor(h, 1) = "C" & h               
            Coor(h, 2) = PCoor(g, 2)                 
            Coor(h, 3) = PCoor(g, 3)                 
            Coor(h, 4) = PCoor(g, 4)                 
            Coor(h, 5) = PCoor(g, 5)                 
            Coor(h, 6) = PCoor(g, 1)             
            Coor(h, 7) = PCoor(g, 7)             
            Coor(h, 8) = PCoor(g, 8)             
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        End If             
    Next 
 
4.5.2    Publication of Call-for-Bids 
                  
    For h = 1 To NofC                    
        For b = 1 To NofRT 
            If Coor(h, 6) = RT(b) Then                 
                Coor(h, 9) = RFP(b, 2)                                     
                If Coor(h, 7) >= RFP(b, 2) Then                     
                    Coor(h, 10) = "Yes"                      
                    Coor(h, 10 + b) = 0                                        
                Else                     
                    Coor(h, 10) = "No"                      
                    Coor(h, 10 + b) = RFP(b, 2) ‐ Coor(h, 7)                     
                End If 
            Else                     
                Coor(h, 10 + b) = RFP(b, 2)                 
            End If                 
        Next             
    Next 
 
4.5.3    Relational vs. Structural Strategy 
 
    For h = 1 To NofC                
        For b = 1 To NofRT 
            If Coor(h, 10 + b) > 0 Then              
                For e = 1 To TNofV                 
                    If Coor(h, 2) = ColofV(e, 2) Then                     
                        For e_1 = 1 + TNofV_1 To TNofV_1 + NofVforRT(b)                         
                            If Coor(h, 2) = RowofV(2, e_1) Then                              
                            Else                                                         
                                If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then 
                                    If Data(ColofV(e, 1), RowofV(1, e_1), 5) = 1 Then                                  
                                        If Data(ColofV(e, 1), RowofV(1, e_1), 4) > Vmax(h, b, 1) Then                                         
                                            Vmax(h, b, 1) = Data(ColofV(e, 1), RowofV(1, e_1), 4)                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 2) = RowofV(2, e_1)                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Request"                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 4) = Data(ColofV(e, 1), RowofV(1, e_1), 5)                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 5) = Coor(h, 10 + b)                                         
                                        End If                                     
                                    End If                                     
                                    If Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0 Then                                         
                                        Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0                
                                        Vmax(h, b, 2) = ""                                         
                                        Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Notify"                                         
                                        Vmax(h, b, 4) = 0                                             
                                        Vmax(h, b, 5) = 0                                     
                                    End If 
                                Else                                                                 
                                    If Data(ColofV(e, 1), RowofV(1, e_1), 5) = ‐1 Then                                                                          
                                    Else                                     
                                        If Outdegree(e_1) > Vmax(h, b, 1) Then                                         
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                                            Vmax(h, b, 1) = Outdegree(e_1)                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 2) = RowofV(2, e_1)                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Request"                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 4) = Data(ColofV(e, 1), RowofV(1, e_1), 5)                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 5) = Coor(h, 10 + b)                                         
                                        End If                                         
                                        If Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0 Then                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0               
                                            Vmax(h, b, 2) = ""                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Notify"                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 4) = 0                                             
                                            Vmax(h, b, 5) = 0                                         
                                        End If                                     
                                    End If                                     
                                End If                                 
                            End If                     
                        Next                     
                    End If                     
                Next             
            Else            
                Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0                 
                Vmax(h, b, 2) = ""                 
                Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Sufficient"                 
                Vmax(h, b, 4) = 0                 
                Vmax(h, b, 5) = 0                 
            End If             
            TNofV_1 = TNofV_1 + NofVforRT(b)        
        Next         
    Next  
    for h = 1 to NofC 
        for b = 1 to NofRT 
            for i = 1 to NofVasPforRT(b)                             
                If PPartner(h, b, i, 9) = "No" Then                           
                Else                           
                    If PPartner(h, b, i, 9) > Bidmax(h, b, 1) Then                                 
                        Bidmax(h, b, 1) = PPartner(h, b, i, 9)                                     
                        Bidmax(h, b, 2) = PPartner(h, b, i, 1)                                     
                        Bidmax(h, b, 3) = PPartner(h, b, i, 2)                                      
                        Bidmax(h, b, 4) = PPartner(h, b, i, 3)                                      
                        Bidmax(h, b, 5) = PPartner(h, b, i, 4)                                      
                        Bidmax(h, b, 6) = PPartner(h, b, i, 5)                                      
                        Bidmax(h, b, 7) = PPartner(h, b, i, 6)                                      
                        Bidmax(h, b, 8) = PPartner(h, b, i, 7)                                      
                        Bidmax(h, b, 9) = PPartner(h, b, i, 8)                                 
                    End If                             
                End If                                                 
            Next                 
        Next     
    Next          
    For h = 1 To NofC    
        If Coor(h, 10 + NofRT + 1) = ‐1 Then         
        Else             
            If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then                 
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                NofCforR = NofCforR + 1 
                LofAforR = LofAforR + Coor(h, 3)                 
            Else             
                NofCforS = NofCforS + 1 
                LofAforS = LofAforS + Coor(h, 3)            
            End If             
            For b = 1 To NofRT             
                If Coor(h, 6) = RT(b) Then                     
                    If Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Sufficient" Then                                                 
                    Else                                            
                        If Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Accept" Then                                                    
                            If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then                                 
                                NofRPforR(h) = NofRPforR(h) + 1 
                                QofRPforR(h) = QofRPforR(h) + Partner(h, b, 5)                                 
                                If Partner(h, b, 6) = 1 Then                                 
                                    NofCPforR(h) = NofCPforR(h) + 1                                 
                                Else                                 
                                    NofOPforR(h) = NofOPforR(h) + 1                                 
                                End If                                 
                            Else                                 
                                NofRPforS(h) = NofRPforS(h) + 1 
                                QofRPforS(h) = QofRPforS(h) + Partner(h, b, 5)                                 
                                If Partner(h, b, 6) = 1 Then                                 
                                    NofCPforS(h) = NofCPforS(h) + 1                                 
                                Else                                 
                                    NofOPforS(h) = NofOPforS(h) + 1                                 
                                End If                                 
                            End If                                                     
                        End If                     
                    End If                     
                Else                 
                    If Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Accept" Then                         
                        If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then                                 
                            NofRPforR(h) = NofRPforR(h) + 1 
                            QofRPforR(h) = QofRPforR(h) + Partner(h, b, 5)                             
                            If Partner(h, b, 6) = 1 Then                                 
                                NofCPforR(h) = NofCPforR(h) + 1                             
                            Else                             
                                NofOPforR(h) = NofOPforR(h) + 1                             
                            End If                             
                        Else                             
                            NofRPforS(h) = NofRPforS(h) + 1 
                            QofRPforS(h) = QofRPforS(h) + Partner(h, b, 5)                             
                            If Partner(h, b, 6) = 1 Then                                 
                                NofCPforS(h) = NofCPforS(h) + 1                             
                            Else                             
                                NofOPforS(h) = NofOPforS(h) + 1                             
                            End If                             
                        End If                                             
                    End If                 
                End If             
            Next             
            If Coor(h, 10) = "Yes" Then             
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                If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then                     
                    If NofRPforR(h) = 0 Then                     
                        PofRPforR(h) = 0                         
                        MQofRPforR(h) = 0                         
                        PofCPforR(h) = 0                     
                        PofOPforR(h) = 0                         
                    Else                     
                        PofRPforR(h) = NofRPforR(h) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                         
                        MQofRPforR(h) = QofRPforR(h) / NofRPforR(h)                             
                        PofCPforR(h) = NofCPforR(h) / NofRPforR(h)                     
                        PofOPforR(h) = NofOPforR(h) / NofRPforR(h)                         
                        NofCforR_1 = NofCforR_1 + 1                     
                    End If                     
                Else                     
                    If NofRPforS(h) = 0 Then                         
                        PofRPforS(h) = 0                         
                        MQofRPforS(h) = 0                         
                        PofCPforS(h) = 0                         
                        PofOPforS(h) = 0                     
                    Else                         
                        PofRPforS(h) = NofRPforS(h) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                         
                        MQofRPforS(h) = QofRPforS(h) / NofRPforS(h)                         
                        PofCPforS(h) = NofCPforS(h) / NofRPforS(h)                         
                        PofOPforS(h) = NofOPforS(h) / NofRPforS(h)                         
                        NofCforS_1 = NofCforS_1 + 1                 
                    End If                 
                End If             
            Else             
                If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then                     
                    If NofRPforR(h) = 0 Then                         
                        PofRPforR(h) = 0                         
                        MQofRPforR(h) = 0                         
                        PofCPforR(h) = 0                     
                        PofOPforR(h) = 0                     
                    Else                         
                        PofRPforR(h) = NofRPforR(h) / NofRT                         
                        MQofRPforR(h) = QofRPforR(h) / NofRPforR(h)                             
                        PofCPforR(h) = NofCPforR(h) / NofRPforR(h)                     
                        PofOPforR(h) = NofOPforR(h) / NofRPforR(h)                         
                        NofCforR_1 = NofCforR_1 + 1                         
                    End If                     
                Else                     
                    If NofRPforS(h) = 0 Then                         
                        PofRPforS(h) = 0                         
                        MQofRPforS(h) = 0                     
                        PofCPforS(h) = 0                         
                        PofOPforS(h) = 0                         
                    Else                     
                        PofRPforS(h) = NofRPforS(h) / NofRT                         
                        MQofRPforS(h) = QofRPforS(h) / NofRPforS(h)                     
                        PofCPforS(h) = NofCPforS(h) / NofRPforS(h)                         
                        PofOPforS(h) = NofOPforS(h) / NofRPforS(h)                         
                        NofCforS_1 = NofCforS_1 + 1                         
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                    End If                 
                End If                 
            End If             
        End If    
    Next     
    For h = 1 To NofC     
        If Coor(h, 10 + NofRT + 1) = ‐1 Then         
        Else        
            If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then                 
                CPofRPforR = CPofRPforR + PofRPforR(h) 
                CMQofRPforR = CMQofRPforR + MQofRPforR(h)                 
                CPofCPforR = CPofCPforR + PofCPforR(h) 
                CPofOPforR = CPofOPforR + PofOPforR(h)             
            Else             
                CPofRPforS = CPofRPforS + PofRPforS(h) 
                CMQofRPforS = CMQofRPforS + MQofRPforS(h)                 
                CPofCPforS = CPofCPforS + PofCPforS(h) 
                CPofOPforS = CPofOPforS + PofOPforS(h)                 
            End If         
        End If     
    Next     
    If NofCforR = 0 Then     
        MLofAforR = 0         
    Else         
        MLofAforR = LofAforR / NofCforR         
    End If     
    If NofCforR_1 = 0 Then         
        MCPofRPforR = 0 
        MCMQofRPforR = 0 
        MCPofCPforR = 0 
        MCPofOPforR = 0     
    Else         
        MCPofRPforR = CPofRPforR / NofCforR_1 
        MCMQofRPforR = CMQofRPforR / NofCforR_1 
        MCPofCPforR = CPofCPforR / NofCforR_1 
        MCPofOPforR = CPofOPforR / NofCforR_1     
    End If     
    If NofCforS = 0 Then     
        MLofAforS = 0     
    Else     
        MLofAforS = LofAforS / NofCforS     
    End If     
    If NofCforS_1 = 0 Then         
        MCPofRPforS = 0 
        MCMQofRPforS = 0 
        MCPofCPforS = 0 
        MCPofOPforS = 0         
    Else 
        MCPofRPforS = CPofRPforS / NofCforS_1 
        MCMQofRPforS = CMQofRPforS / NofCforS_1 
        MCPofCPforS = CPofCPforS / NofCforS_1 
        MCPofOPforS = CPofOPforS / NofCforS_1     
    End If 
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4.6    Partner’s Decision-Making 
 
    For h = 1 To NofC         
        For b = 1 To NofRT         
            If Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Request" Then             
                For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)                 
                    If Vmax(h, b, 2) = Vend(b, c, 1) Then 
                        If Coor(h, 4) = 1 Then 
                            If Vend(b, c, 3) = 1 Then           
                                If Vend(b, c, 2) >= Coor(h, 10 + b) Then                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Accept"                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 1) = RT(b)                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 2) = Vmax(h, b, 3)                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 3) = Vend(b, c, 1)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 4) = Vmax(h, b, 4)                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 5) = Vend(b, c, 2)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 6) = Vend(b, c, 3)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 7) = Vmax(h, b, 5)                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 8) = "Yes"                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 9) = Partner(h, b, 5) 
                                Else                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0                
                                    Vmax(h, b, 2) = ""                                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Notify"                                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 4) = 0                                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 5) = 0                             
                                End If 
                            Else                         
                                Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Accept"                             
                                Partner(h, b, 1) = RT(b)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 2) = Vmax(h, b, 3)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 3) = Vend(b, c, 1)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 4) = Vmax(h, b, 4)                             
                                Partner(h, b, 5) = Vend(b, c, 2)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 6) = Vend(b, c, 3)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 7) = Vmax(h, b, 5)                             
                                If Partner(h, b, 5) >= Partner(h, b, 7) Then                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 8) = "Yes"                                
                                Else                             
                                    Partner(h, b, 8) = "No"                                 
                                End If                                     
                                If Partner(h, b, 5) >= Partner(h, b, 7) Then                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 9) = Partner(h, b, 5)                                 
                                Else                             
                                    Partner(h, b, 9) = Partner(h, b, 7)                                 
                                End If                             
                            End If 
                        Else 
                            If Vend(b, c, 3) = 1 Then                                                                                             
                                If Vend(b, c, 2) >= Coor(h, 10 + b) Then                                     
                                    Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Accept"                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 1) = RT(b)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 2) = Vmax(h, b, 3)                                  
Appendix C: Source Code 
182 
 
                                    Partner(h, b, 3) = Vend(b, c, 1)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 4) = Vmax(h, b, 4)                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 5) = Vend(b, c, 2)                                 
                                    Partner(h, b, 6) = Vend(b, c, 3)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 7) = Vmax(h, b, 5)                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 8) = "Yes"                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 9) = Partner(h, b, 5)                                      
                                Else                                         
                                    Vmax(h, b, 1) = 0                
                                    Vmax(h, b, 2) = ""                                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Notify"                                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 4) = 0                                             
                                    Vmax(h, b, 5) = 0                                         
                                End If                             
                            Else                                 
                                Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Accept"                             
                                Partner(h, b, 1) = RT(b)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 2) = Vmax(h, b, 3)                             
                                Partner(h, b, 3) = Vend(b, c, 1)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 4) = Vmax(h, b, 4)                             
                                Partner(h, b, 5) = Vend(b, c, 2)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 6) = Vend(b, c, 3)                              
                                Partner(h, b, 7) = Vmax(h, b, 5)                              
                                If Partner(h, b, 5) >= Partner(h, b, 7) Then                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 8) = "Yes"                                 
                                Else                             
                                    Partner(h, b, 8) = "No"                                 
                                End If                                     
                                If Partner(h, b, 5) >= Partner(h, b, 7) Then                                  
                                    Partner(h, b, 9) = Partner(h, b, 5)                                 
                                Else                             
                                    Partner(h, b, 9) = Partner(h, b, 7)                                 
                                End If                             
                            End If                         
                        End If                     
                    End If                 
                Next             
            End If         
        Next         
    Next 
    For h = 1 To NofC        
        For b = 1 To NofRT 
            If Vmax(h, b, 3) = "Notify" Then             
                Reselect_Vendors_as_Candidate_Partner: 
                NofVasPforRT(b) = Round(NofVforRT(b) * PforPart, 0)                
                Dim colC_4 As New Collection 
                    ReDim varLong(1 To NofVforRT(b), 1 To 1) As Integer 
                Dim a_4 As Integer, lngRnd_4 As Integer 
                Randomize 
                For a_4 = 1 To NofVforRT(b) 
                    colC_4.Add a_4 
                Next 
                For a_4 = NofVforRT(b) To 1 Step ‐1 
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                    lngRnd_4 = Int(a_4 * Rnd) + 1 
                    varLong(a_4, 1) = colC_4.Item(lngRnd_4) 
                    colC_4.Remove lngRnd_4 
                Next 
                Range(Cells(2 + TNofVasP + h, 5), Cells(1 + TNofVasP + NofVasPforRT(b) + h, 5)) = varLong                 
                For i = 1 To NofVasPforRT(b)                 
                    For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)                     
                        If Cells(1 + TNofVasP + h + i, 5) = Vend(b, c, 6) Then                         
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 3) = Vend(b, c, 1) 'vij                         
                        End If                     
                    Next                     
                Next 
                For i = 1 To NofVasPforRT(b)                 
                    If PPartner(h, b, i, 3) = Coor(h, 2) Then                         
                        Range(Cells(1 + TNofVasP + h + 1, 5), Cells(1 + TNofVasP + h + NofVasPforRT(b),  
                             5)).ClearContents                         
                        GoTo Reselect_Vendors_as_Candidate_Partner                     
                    End If                 
                Next 
                For i = 1 To NofVasPforRT(b)                 
                    For c = 1 To NofVforRT(b)                     
                        If Cells(1 + TNofVasP + h + i, 5) = Vend(b, c, 6) Then                             
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 1) = RT(b) 'ri                             
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 2) = Vmax(h, b, 3) 'Type                             
                            For e = 1 To TNofV 
                                If Coor(h, 2) = ColofV(e, 2) Then 
                                    Colofpbij = ColofV(e, 1) 
                                End If 
                            Next 
                            For e = 1 To TNofV 
                                If Vend(b, c, 1) = RowofV(2, e) Then 
                                    Rowofpbij = RowofV(1, e) 
                                End If 
                            Next                             
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 4) = Data(Colofpbij, Rowofpbij, 5)                             
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 5) = Vend(b, c, 2)                              
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 6) = Vend(b, c, 3)                             
                            PPartner(h, b, i, 7) = Coor(h, 10 + b)                                                        
                            If PPartner(h, b, i, 5) >= PPartner(h, b, i, 7) Then  
                                PPartner(h, b, i, 8) = "Yes" 
                            Else 
                                PPartner(h, b, i, 8) = "No" 
                            End If                                                         
                            If PPartner(h, b, i, 4) = ‐1 Then                                 
                                PPartner(h, b, i, 10) = ‐1                                 
                                NofCP(h, b) = NofCP(h, b) + 0             
                            Else                                 
                                If PPartner(h, b, i, 6) = 1 Then                                     
                                    If PPartner(h, b, i, 8) = "Yes" Then                                         
                                        PPartner(h, b, i, 10) = 1                                         
                                        NofCP(h, b) = NofCP(h, b) + 1                                     
                                    Else                                         
                                        PPartner(h, b, i, 10) = ‐1                                         
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                                        NofCP(h, b) = NofCP(h, b) + 0                                     
                                    End If                                     
                                Else                                     
                                    PPartner(h, b, i, 10) = 1                                     
                                    NofCP(h, b) = NofCP(h, b) + 1                                     
                                End If                                 
                            End If 
                            If PPartner(h, b, i, 10) = 1 Then                                 
                                If PPartner(h, b, i, 6) = 1 Then                                     
                                    PPartner(h, b, i, 9) = PPartner(h, b, i, 5)                                     
                                Else                                     
                                    If PPartner(h, b, i, 5) >= PPartner(h, b, i, 7) Then                                         
                                        PPartner(h, b, i, 9) = PPartner(h, b, i, 5)                                         
                                    Else                                         
                                        PPartner(h, b, i, 9) = PPartner(h, b, i, 7)                                         
                                    End If                                
                                End If                             
                            Else                                 
                                PPartner(h, b, i, 9) = "No"                                 
                            End If 
                        End If                     
                    Next                 
                Next                 
                TNofVasP = TNofVasP + NofVasPforRT(b)                 
            End If             
        Next         
    Next 
    Range(Cells(2, 5), Cells(2 + TNofVasP * NofRT, 5)).ClearContents                             
 
4.7    Profits 
 
4.7.1    Actual Investment 
 
    WCoor(10) = WCoor(4)     
    For b = 1 To NofRT 
        If RT(b) = WCoor(5) Then 
            If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then                 
                WItself_Suf(10) = WCoor(7)                 
            Else                 
                WItself_Ins(10) = WCoor(6)                  
                If WPartner(b, 6) = 1 Then                      
                    WPartner(b, 10) = WPartner(b, 7)                 
                Else                     
                    WPartner(b, 10) = 0                 
                End If                 
            End If 
        Else         
            If WPartner(b, 6) = 1 Then 'Partner                 
                WPartner(b, 10) = WPartner(b, 7)             
            Else                 
                WPartner(b, 10) = 0                 
            End If 
        End If     
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    Next 
 
4.7.2    Payoff / 4.7.3    Profit 
             
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        If WCoor(5) = RT(b) Then               
            If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then            
            Else            
                If WPartner(b, 2) = "Notify" Then                
                    NofNotify = NofNotify + 1                
                Else                
                    If WCoor(3) = 1 Then                    
                        NofRPart = NofRPart + 1                    
                    Else                    
                        NofSPart = NofSPart + 1                     
                    End If                
                End If            
            End If               
        Else        
            If WPartner(b, 2) = "Notify" Then                
                NofNotify = NofNotify + 1            
            Else            
                If WCoor(3) = 1 Then                
                    NofRPart = NofRPart + 1                
                Else                    
                    NofSPart = NofSPart + 1                    
                End If            
            End If        
        End If     
    Next          
    WCoor(11) = WCoor(4) * (1 + PRate)  
    If Quality = "Sastisfactory" Then             
        If WCoor(3) = 1 Then         
            WCoor(12) = WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10) ‐ NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) *  
CPforBidding) ‐ NofRPart * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforRPartner)             
            WCoor(15) = NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforBidding) + NofRPart * 
(((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforRPartner)         
        Else         
            WCoor(12) = WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10) ‐ NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * 
CPforBidding) ‐ NofSPart * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforSPartner)             
            WCoor(15) = NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforBidding) + NofSPart * 
(((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforSPartner)         
        End If         
    Else         
        If WCoor(3) = 1 Then         
            WCoor(12) = ‐1 * NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforBidding) ‐ 1 * NofRPart * 
(((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforRPartner)             
            WCoor(15) = NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforBidding) + NofRPart * 
(((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforRPartner)         
        Else         
            WCoor(12) = ‐1 * NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforBidding) ‐ 1 * NofSPart * 
(((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforSPartner)         
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            WCoor(15) = NofNotify * (((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforBidding) + NofSPart * 
(((WCoor(11) ‐ WCoor(10)) / NofRT) * CPforSPartner)         
        End If             
    End If     
    For b = 1 To NofRT                 
        If RT(b) = WCoor(5) Then 
            If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then 
                If Quality = "Pass" Then                     
                    WItself_Suf(11) = WCoor(7) * (1 + PRate)                      
                    WItself_Suf(12) = WCoor(7) * PRate                      
                Else                     
                    WItself_Suf(11) = WCoor(7) 'Payoff                      
                    WItself_Suf(12) = 0 'Profit                     
                End If 
                WItself_Suf(13) = WCoor(13) 
            Else 
                If Quality = "Satisfactory" Then                     
                    WItself_Ins(11) = WCoor(6) * (1 + PRate)                      
                    WItself_Ins(12) = WCoor(6) * PRate  
                    WPartner(b, 11) = WPartner(b, 7) * (1 + PRate)                      
                    WPartner(b, 12) = WPartner(b, 11) ‐ WPartner(b, 10)               
                Else 
                    WItself_Ins(11) = WCoor(6) 'Payoff                     
                    WItself_Ins(12) = 0 'Profit 
                    If WPartner(b, 6) = 1 Then 'Payoff                 
                        WPartner(b, 11) = WPartner(b, 7)                 
                    Else                 
                        WPartner(b, 11) = 0                     
                    End If             
                    WPartner(b, 12) = WPartner(b, 11) ‐ WPartner(b, 10) 'Profit                 
                End If            
            End If 
        Else 
            If Quality = "Satisfactory" Then             
                WPartner(b, 11) = WPartner(b, 7) * (1 + PRate)                                          
                WPartner(b, 12) = WPartner(b, 11) ‐ WPartner(b, 10)  
            Else                 
                If WPartner(b, 6) = 1 Then 'Payoff                 
                    WPartner(b, 11) = WPartner(b, 7)                 
                Else                 
                    WPartner(b, 11) = 0                     
                End If                 
                WPartner(b, 12) = WPartner(b, 11) ‐ WPartner(b, 10)                 
            End If             
        End If     
    Next 
  
4.7    Information Update and Transfer 
    
    For b = 1 To NofRT 
        If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then 
            If WCoor(5) = RT(b) Then                                             
            Else              
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                If Quality = "Satisfactory" Then                     
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) + 1                      
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) + (WCoor(12) + 
WItself_Suf(12)) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                       
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 3) = 1                      
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) + (WCoor(11) + 
WItself_Suf(11)) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                        
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = 1                      
                Else  
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) + 1                      
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) + (WCoor(12) + 
WItself_Suf(12)) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                                          
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 3) = 1                     
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) + (WCoor(11) + 
WItself_Suf(11)) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                      
                    If WPartner(b, 6) = ‐1 Then                      
                        Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = ‐1                 
                    Else                 
                        Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = 1                 
                    End If                 
                End If 
            End If     
        Else 
            If Quality = "Satisfactory" Then                 
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) + 1                 
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) + (WCoor(12) + 
WItself_Ins(12)) / NofRT  
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 3) = 1                 
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) + (WCoor(11) + 
WItself_Ins(11)) / NofRT                  
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = 1  
            Else                 
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 1) + 1                 
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 2) + (WCoor(12) + 
WItself_Ins(12)) / NofRT                                  
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 3) = 1                  
                Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 4) + (WCoor(11) + 
WItself_Ins(11)) / NofRT                  
                If WPartner(b, 6) = ‐1 Then                  
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = ‐1             
                Else             
                    Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = 1             
                End If             
            End If 
        End If             
    Next         
    For b = 1 To NofRT 
        If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then         
            If RT(b) = WCoor(5) Then  
            Else                 
                For b_1 = 1 To NofRT                 
                    If RT(b_1) = WCoor(5) Then 
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 1) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 1) + 1                          
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                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 2) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 2) + WPartner(b, 
12) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 3) = 1                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 4) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 4) + WPartner(b, 
11) / (NofRT ‐ 1)  
                    Else 
                        If WPartner(b, 1) = WPartner(b_1, 1) Then  
                        Else 
                            If Quality = "Satisfactory" Then                                 
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 1) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 
13), 1) + 1                                 
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 2) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 
13), 2) + WPartner(b, 12) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                                  
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 3) = 1                                  
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 4) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 
13), 4) + WPartner(b, 11) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                                  
                                If Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = ‐1 Then                                  
                                Else                                     
                                    Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = 1                                     
                                End If 
                            Else                                 
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 1) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 
13), 1) + 1                                  
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 2) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 
13), 2) + WPartner(b, 12) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                                  
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 3) = 1                                  
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 4) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 
13), 4) + WPartner(b, 11) / (NofRT ‐ 1)                                  
                                If Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = ‐1 Then                                  
                                Else                                 
                                    If WPartner(b_1, 6) = ‐1 Then                                      
                                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = ‐1                                         
                                    Else                                     
                                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = 1                                         
                                    End If                                 
                                End If                             
                            End If                         
                        End If             
                    End If                     
                Next             
            End If 
        Else 
            Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 1) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 1) + 1             
            Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 2) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 2) + WPartner(b, 12) / 
NofRT              
            Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 3) = 1             
            Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 4) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WCoor(13), 4) + WPartner(b, 11) / 
NofRT                                      
            For b_1 = 1 To NofRT          
                If WPartner(b, 1) = WPartner(b_1, 1) Then 
                Else                 
                    If Quality = "Satisfactory" Then                         
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                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 1) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 1) 
+ 1                         
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 2) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 2) 
+ WPartner(b, 12) / NofRT                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 3) = 1                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 4) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 4) 
+ WPartner(b, 11) / NofRT                          
                        If Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = ‐1 Then                          
                        Else                         
                            Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = 1                              
                        End If 
                    Else                             
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 1) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 1) 
+ 1                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 2) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 2) 
+ WPartner(b, 12) / NofRT                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 3) = 1                          
                        Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 4) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 4) 
+ WPartner(b, 11) / NofRT                          
                        If Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = ‐1 Then                          
                        Else                         
                            If WPartner(b_1, 6) = ‐1 Then                         
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = ‐1                             
                            Else                         
                                Data(WPartner(b, 13), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = 1                             
                            End If                         
                        End If                 
                    End If                     
                End If             
            Next             
        End If     
    Next         
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then  
            If WCoor(5) = RT(b) Then 'Partner = Coordinator                 
            Else              
                For e = 1 To TNofV                         
                    If RowofV(2, e) = WCoor(1) Then                     
                    Else                         
                        If RowofV(2, e) = WPartner(b, 3) Then                         
                        Else                             
                            If Data(WCoor(13), RowofV(1, e), 3) = 1 Then                                 
                                If Data(WCoor(13), RowofV(1, e), 5) = 1 Then                                     
                                    Data(RowofV(1, e), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5)                                    
                                End If                             
                            End If                             
                        End If                     
                    End If                     
                Next             
            End If             
        Else          
            For e = 1 To TNofV                 
                If RowofV(2, e) = WCoor(1) Then                 
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                Else                 
                    If RowofV(2, e) = WPartner(b, 3) Then                     
                    Else                     
                        If Data(WCoor(13), RowofV(1, e), 3) = 1 Then                         
                            If Data(WCoor(13), RowofV(1, e), 5) = 1 Then                             
                                Data(RowofV(1, e), WPartner(b, 13), 5) = Data(WCoor(13), WPartner(b, 13), 5)                                 
                            End If                         
                        End If                         
                    End If                     
                End If                     
            Next         
        End If     
    Next  
    For b = 1 To NofRT     
        If WCoor(8) = "Yes" Then          
            If RT(b) = WCoor(5) Then             
            Else             
                For b_1 = 1 To NofRT                 
                    If RT(b_1) = WCoor(5) Then                     
                    Else                     
                        If WPartner(b_1, 1) = WPartner(b, 1) Then                         
                        Else                     
                            For e = 1 To TNofV                             
                                If RowofV(2, e) = WCoor(1) Then                                
                                Else                                 
                                    If RowofV(2, e) = WPartner(b, 3) Then                                     
                                    Else                                         
                                        If RowofV(2, e) = WPartner(b_1, 3) Then                                         
                                        Else                                         
                                            If Data(WPartner(b, 13), RowofV(1, e), 3) = 1 Then                                            
                                                If Data(WPartner(b, 13), RowofV(1, e), 5) = 1 Then                                                 
                                                    Data(RowofV(1, e), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), 
WPartner(b_1, 13), 5)                                                     
                                                End If                                                 
                                            End If                                             
                                        End If                                     
                                    End If                                 
                                End If                                 
                            Next                             
                        End If                         
                    End If                 
                Next     
            End If         
        Else          
            For b_1 = 1 To NofRT             
                If WPartner(b_1, 1) = WPartner(b, 1) Then                 
                Else                 
                    For e = 1 To NofRT                     
                        If RowofV(2, e) = WCoor(1) Then                         
                        Else                         
                            If RowofV(2, e) = WPartner(b, 3) Then                             
                            Else                                 
                                If RowofV(2, e) = WPartner(b_1, 3) Then                                     
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                                    If Data(WPartner(b, 13), RowofV(1, e), 3) = 1 Then                                 
                                        If Data(WPartner(b, 13), RowofV(1, e), 5) = 1 Then                                     
                                            Data(RowofV(1, e), WPartner(b_1, 13), 5) = Data(WPartner(b, 13), 
WPartner(b_1, 13), 5)                                     
                                        End If                                         
                                    End If                                
                                End If                             
                            End If                             
                        End If                     
                    Next                     
                End If             
            Next         
        End If         
    Next 
